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THE PHILOSOPHIC BASES OF ART AND CRITICISM¹

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REFERENCE back to philosophic principles to expose erroneous assumptions and to establish common grounds for judgments of fact or value could not be justified easily by the record of its success in producing agreement. Philosophers have frequently expressed the expectation that philosophic disagreements would be resolved by applying scientific principles to a subject matter for the first time or that doctrinal disagreements in particular fields of inquiry or action would be removed by discovering and expounding philosophic principles. Yet doctrinal differences seem to have persisted, after each such effort at resolution, translated into more inclusive and more obstinate philosophic oppositions, and the differences of philosophers have disappeared because they have been forgotten more frequently than because they have been resolved. Long before the formulation of such convictions in present-day varieties of pragmatisms and positivisms, the practical man, the artist, the scientist, and the theologian expressed impatience with philosophic considerations because they were impertinent to operations considered urgent, or incompatible with attitudes defended as realistic, or inadequate for ends assumed to be ultimate. The pragmatic impatience with theory and the positivistic exposure of "unreal" problems, however, even in their abbreviated expressions, are philosophies; and the dialectical consequences of principles are particularly apparent, though unexamined, in those minimal philosophies which are expressions of conviction concerning the subject of an inquiry or concerning the method by which the inquiry must be pursued. For general principles, which may seem arbitrary or indefinite in theoretic formulation, have precise significances and consequences in particular applications; while particular things, which may be assumed to have an obvious and simple guise in the beliefs unchallenged in habitual practical operations, possess, without trace of inconsistency, other specifications and characteristics in scientific theory. The significances of all philosophies, even those which are satirized as remote from reality and indifferent to experience, are tested in application to particular subjects; but convictions concerning the nature of things, even those of unwilling philosophers who acknowledge only one dogma of reality, are tested by the

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persistent differences which are the outstanding fact of intellectual history. Whether or not certainty is thought to be possible in human and natural investigations, it is no less true that the nature of things, in so far as it is known, is determined by philosophic principles than that philosophic principles are determined, in so far as they are verified, by the nature of things.

Any general discussion expounds at once the principles of philosophy which it employs and the subject with which it is concerned; but, of all discussions in which philosophy finds an application, the criticism of art is influenced in a peculiarly nice balance by commitment to principle, determination by subject, and use of method. As viewed in its application to the practices or objects of art, the problems of criticism seem to be determined in any one theory by concrete and empirically ascertainable facts and to depend on principles which are determined by the same facts. As viewed in the statements of critics and philosophers, however, the problems of criticism seem to have been determined by a vast diversity of principles used in almost countless approaches, each applied to phenomena irrelevant to other critical precepts and criteria. There is as much disagreement concerning the nature of art or concerning what a poem is—whether it is what is seen on the page or what is heard, whether it is what is imagined by the poet or felt by his reader, or what is judged by the competent or what lies behind or above the expression of any poet²—as there is concerning the nature of being or concerning what may be said to be—whether only things in time and space exist, or whether existence can be attributed only to operations and relations, or whether to be is to be perceived, or whether true being is Ideal or God alone truly is; nor is there any more disagreement concerning beauty, form, imagination, or judgment than concerning truth, virtue, knowledge, or law, and much the same indeterminacy is found in the terms and principles chosen as appropriate in any of these discussions. Yet examination of discussions in the philosophy of art affords clearer insight into the nature of philosophic problems and principles than would other applications of philosophy, since its subject matter no less than its history renders improbable the supposition that the resolution of philosophic differences depends on preliminary agreement concerning the character or even the identity of objects treated in rival theories. For agreement concerning an object usually conceals principles, both those employed to arrive at agreement and those ignored lest they forestall it; and the multiplicity and subtle shadings of theories of art adumbrate the general patterns which reappear in philosophic discussions with less distortion than speculations in those branches of philosophy in which dog-

2. Cf. S. C. Pepper, "The Esthetic Object," *Journal of Philosophy*, XL (1943), 477-82; R. Wellek, "The Mode of Existence of a Literary Work of Art," *Southern Review*, VII (1942), 735-54.

matism is more plausible concerning the things which terms point to or designate. The subject matter of the philosophy of art is, whatever its technical definition, a human process and production, and it is therefore influenced by theory as is the subject matter of no other branch of philosophy. Natural philosophers may suggest operations according to the laws they discover, but the "nature" of things is not directly affected by physics, and even moral philosophers must find means by which to make their intellectual analyses indirectly effective by habituation or will, apathy or passions. Notwithstanding the tendency of idealists to argue that all things are thoughts, or of materialists to reduce thought to the motion of matter, or of dialecticians to repeat some form of Socrates' identification of virtue with knowledge, there is no real danger of confusing the other branches of philosophy with their subject matters, whereas the discussion of art is itself an art, and is, in many analyses, possessed of the same characteristics and directed to the same end as the arts it treats.

What men have said about art may be examined and interpreted for philosophic purposes to elucidate the operation of philosophic discussions in general; but such a use of statements will achieve its philosophic purpose only in the measure that the analysis clarifies the interpretation of theories of art, their oppositions, and their histories. Things and principles are not independent, since principles are employed in any statement of things and things are involved in any statement of principles. Consequently, the examination of theories that have been stated or employed, if it introduces order into the principles applied to things, will also indicate the nature of things which determine principles. Three kinds of data may be differentiated in approaching the problems of art by way of what has been said as a preliminary or as a check to treating ascertainable facts or to following the implications of defensible theories; for facts, principles, and judgments are not always separate in the statement of a critical judgment or even the formulation of a philosophic argument, but they are readily separated in the oppositions and controversies of philosophers. The philosophic principles and the methods of criticism are usually treated indirectly by arguing in detail, after the relevant objects of discussion have been chosen without argument, concerning the "real" nature of those objects. The nature of art, the appropriate methods of criticism, and the true principles of aesthetics are all in a sense determined by the facts and the phenomena; but we are dependent on the testimony of critics, sophisticated or naïve, for the report of phenomena and on the principles of philosophers, deliberate or haphazard, for the criteria of their choice and evaluation. The facts may therefore vary or be approached in different ways; the evaluation of the facts may depend on different principles or on principles differently interpreted; the statements of the critics and the principles of the philosophers, finally, become in their ex-

pression themselves “things” subject to evaluation and explanation, and they are not exempt from the relativity of art objects and evaluations.

The consequences of these variabilities in art and philosophy, as well as in criticism, are apparent in the difficulties which impede efforts to achieve common designation, mutual intelligibility, and objective evaluation. Since there is little relation between the subjects, the terms, or the principles of the various analyses of art, it is seldom easy to translate the statement of one analysis into an equivalent statement in another; or, if the translation is possible, to relate the two theories to the same subject; or, if they do bear on the same kind of data, to derive comparable evaluations of any given object. In the consequent relativity of criteria of truth and relevance, any thing may be identified as a work of art and any characteristic may make it good or bad of its kind; any judgment may seem as valid or as true as any other; and any theory may be set forth plausibly as the unique and absolute truth or, at least, as more probable than other theories. These difficulties are not to be solved, if what has been said of the nature of the discussion of art is correct, by referring the problem to irreducible and stubborn facts or (what is the same thing) to indisputable and appropriate theories, but by examining the meanings of the various explanations and their relations to one another and by formulating criteria for the truth and utility possible to such theories. For such purposes consideration of the nature of art and of the philosophy of art may properly be focused in the statements of the critic and philosopher, since those statements can be treated, without prejudice to fact or principles, first, in their relations to the various subjects to which their principles make them relevant; second, in their relations to other forms of judgment, like science, history, philosophy in general, and art itself; and, third, in their relations to the various terms in which they are stated and which in turn derive varying significances from the ends and criteria proper to criticism in its various modes.

I

The subject matter and meaning of statements about art—what art is and what one discusses when one discusses art—are determined by the principles of discussion and the things discussed, for the choice of things and of aspects of things relevant to a question is a way of choosing and determining their scope and use. Both the things which are the subject matter and the principles which determine the discussion must be discovered from examination of the terms in which the theories are stated. The words of the statements are themselves ambiguous, and the things which they designate or to which they refer in different theories are too numerous and unorganized to reveal interrelations or system in meanings unless they are arranged according to principles, either

principles employed in the statements or principles borrowed for their interpretation from theories concerning references of signs, forms of judgment, ways of being. The latter adjustment occurs constantly in philosophic discussion and critical evaluation, for any theory can be stated in terms of any other theory, usually at considerable expense to its sense and cogency, and every theoretic statement involves, in so far as it is presented as true, as adequate, or simply as different, a judgment passed on other theories, usually removing the need for further consideration of them, since they turn out to be irrelevant to the facts, unscientific, an earlier stage in what has been a progressive march toward a truth which will never be absolute, impractical, or abstract. Yet for all the differences in their subject matters and in judgments about them, the principles which theoretic statements invoke seem to bear a simple relation to one another, at least definite enough to bring them into some contact with other theories and to make them echo or oppose statements of other philosophers. Principles which are independent or contradictory determine a meaning for the statements of opposed theories as definitely as the consistent and fruitful principles of a single system determine the meanings of statements within that system; and it should be possible, therefore, to elucidate controversies and oppositions, much as the meaning of any system is reconstructed and understood, by means of the principles involved.

The words which are used to state the principles and to determine the subject matter of modern discussions of art emerge fairly clearly in the statements of their oppositions. The basic question among present-day oppositions is, perhaps, whether one discusses art adequately by discussing something else or by discussing art, for, in the former case, other oppositions turn on what precise subject other than art should be discussed and, in the latter case, on what art itself is. The theories which have been based on the assumption that the meaning of art is explained best, or solely, by means of other phenomena have recently, as in the past, borrowed the principles and terminology of aesthetics and criticism from some fashionable science, from semantics, psychoanalysis, or economics, from sociology, morals, or theology. The art object and the art experience are then nothing in themselves, since they are determined by circumstances³ and require, like the circumstances which determine them, bio-

3. Cf. John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York, 1934), p. 4: “In order to understand the meaning of artistic products, we have to forget them for a time, to turn aside from them and have recourse to the ordinary forces and conditions of experience that we do not usually regard as esthetic.” For Dewey the relevant phenomena are basically biological; cf. *ibid.*, p. 18: “In life that is truly life, everything overlaps and merges. . . . To grasp the sources of esthetic experience it is, therefore, necessary to have recourse to animal life below the human scale.” The work of art is treated, finally, in terms of experience; cf. *ibid.*, p. 64: “The real work of art is the building up of an integral experience out of the interaction of organic and environmental conditions and energies.” It is not to be identified, except potentially, with a physical object; cf. *ibid.*, p. 162: “It has been repeatedly intimated that there

logical, social, psychological, or historical principles of explanation.⁴ The theories which have been based on the assumption that aesthetic phenomena should be analyzed separately, whatever the complexities of the relations in which the aesthetic object or experience is involved, have sought principles in the construction and unity of the art object viewed in terms of expression (in which experience and intention are matched to form), composition (in which details are organized in form), or communication (in which emotion is evoked by form). The art object may then be isolated by a variety of devices. It may

be a difference between the art product (statue, painting, or whatever), and the *work* of art. The first is physical and potential; the latter is active and experienced." A similar endeavor animated by similar purposes may lead to the eventual separation of art from experience; thus, e.g., T. C. Pollock states as his purpose (*The Nature of Literature* [Princeton, 1942], p. xiii) "to lay a theoretical basis for the investigation of literature as a social phenomenon in terms which are consonant both with our contemporary knowledge of language and with the development of modern science"; and in pursuit of that purpose he finds it necessary to differentiate "experience" from "literature" and to define literature in terms of uses of language (*ibid.*, pp. 55–56). This is no theoretic distinction, since Dewey's inquiry would give importance to the continuity of the aesthetic with other experiences and to the problem of conferring an aesthetic quality on all modes of production (*op. cit.*, pp. 80–81), while Pollock's problem is one of differentiating the use of language from other parts of human experience and the literary from other uses of language. Or, again, the consideration of other phenomena and other problems seems sometimes to lead to the conclusion that all aesthetic considerations are in comparison abstract and false; cf. M. Lifshitz, *The Philosophy of Art of Karl Marx*, trans. R. B. Winn (New York, 1938), p. 5: "Even the eighteenth century, the classic age of aesthetics, could not remain confined to abstractions such as 'the beautiful' and 'the sublime.' In the background of purely aesthetic discussions concerning the role of genius, the value of art, the imitation of nature, practical problems of the bourgeois-democratic movement intruded themselves with increasing insistence." Theories themselves, finally, are sometimes refuted by reference not to what they state but to the conditions under which they are stated. Dewey, thus (*op. cit.*, p. 10), disavows the intention of engaging in an economic interpretation of the history of art but states his purpose "to indicate that theories which isolate art and its appreciation by placing them in a realm of their own, disconnected from other modes of experiencing, are not inherent in the subject-matter but arise because of specifiable extraneous conditions." Cf. Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York, 1920), p. 24: "It seems to me that this genetic method of approach is a more effective way of undermining this type of philosophic theorizing than any attempt at logical refutation could be." The variety of ways in which earlier or other theories have been discovered to be impertinent, inadequate, or false would supply a significant schematism for the history of thought. Modern philosophic disputes are usually tangential: positions are most frequently attacked because they are not scientific or fail to treat the facts; they are defended usually, not as scientific and factual, but as indicating work to be done, the progress of science, and the impossibility of certainty.

4. The explanation sometimes involves the reduction of art to the laws of some other science; cf. N. Bukharin, "Poetry, Poetics and the Problems of Poetry in the U.S.S.R.," *Problems of Soviet Literature*, ed. H. G. Scott (New York, n.d.), p. 195: "Poetic creation and its product—poetry—represent a definite form of social activity, and are governed in their development, regardless of the specific nature of poetic creation, by the laws of social development." The explanation sometimes involves the abandonment of older analytical techniques and the use of science in preparation for specifically aesthetic questions; cf. Y. Hirn, *The Origins of Art: A Psychological and Sociological Inquiry* (London, 1900), p. 5: "Modern aesthetic, therefore, has still its own ends, which, if not so ambitious as those of the former speculative science of beauty, are nevertheless of no small importance. These ends, however, can no longer be attained by the procedure of the old aesthetic systems. As the problems have

be isolated by making criticism itself an art, as Spingarn did when he prescribed as the only possible method of criticism the question, "What has the poet tried to express and how has he expressed it?"

All criticism tends to shift the interest from the work of art to something else. The other critics give us history, politics, biography, erudition, metaphysics. As for me, I re-dream the poet's dream, and if I seem to write lightly, it is because I have awakened, and smile to think I have mistaken a dream for reality. I at least strive to replace one work of art by another, and art can only find its *alter ego* in art.⁵

It may be isolated in relation to the artistic problem of creating art⁶ or in relation to the aesthetic experience of perceiving art.⁷ It may be isolated by the

changed with changing conditions, so too the methods must be brought into line with the general scientific development. Historical and psychological investigation must replace the dialectic treatment of the subject. Art can no longer be deduced from general philosophical and metaphysical principles; it must be studied—by the methods of inductive psychology—as a human activity. Beauty cannot be considered as a semi-transcendental reality; it must be interpreted as an object of human longing and a source of human enjoyment. In aesthetic proper, as well as in the philosophy of art, every research must start, not from theoretical assumptions, but from the psychological and sociological data of the aesthetic life." It is impossible to deal with concrete works of art or to explain artistic activity in relation to them. The tendency to engage in artistic production and artistic enjoyment for their own sake can be explained only by studying the psychology of artists and their public; and, in this study of the "art-impulse" and the "art-sense," the "art object" becomes an abstract and ideal datum. Yet such a study will be relevant to problems of aesthetics and criticism; cf. *ibid.*, p. 17: "Thus a theory of the psychological and sociological origins of art may furnish suggestions for those which have been considered as distinctive of aesthetic proper, such as the critical estimation of works of art, or the derivation of laws which govern artistic production." The explanation is sometimes distinct from the purely artistic concerns to which it is nonetheless pertinent; cf. H. Wöllflin, who finds that, of the three terms which he uses to analyze "style," one—"quality"—is artistically determined, while two—"expression" (which is the material element of style) and "mode of expression" (which is vision)—are historically determined (*Principles of Art History*, trans. M. D. Hottinger [New York, 1932], p. 11): "It is hardly necessary here to take up the cudgels for the art historian and defend his work before a dubious public. The artist quite naturally places the general canon of art in the foreground, but we must not carp at the historical observer with his interest in the variety of forms in which art appears, and it remains no mean problem to discover the conditions which, as material element—call it temperament, *zeitgeist*, or racial character—determine the style of individuals, periods, and peoples. Yet an analysis with quality and expression as its objects by no means exhausts the facts. There is a third factor—and here we arrive at the crux of this enquiry—the mode of representation as such. Every artist finds certain visual possibilities before him, to which he is bound. Not everything is possible at all times. Vision itself has its history, and the revelation of these visual strata must be regarded as the primary task of art history."

5. J. E. Spingarn, "The New Criticism," *Criticism in America: Its Function and Status* (New York, 1910), p. 14.

6. Cf. C. Bell, *Since Cézanne* (New York, 1922), p. 41: "In the pre-natal history of a work of art I seem to detect at any rate three factors—a state of peculiar and intense sensibility, the creative impulse, and the artistic problem." *Ibid.*, p. 43: "The artistic problem is the problem of making a match between an emotional experience and a form that has been conceived but not created."

7. Cf. the statement of Matisse quoted by H. Read (*Art Now* [London, 1933], pp. 72–73): "Expression for me is not to be found in the passion which blazes from a face or which is made

effort of the scientist to separate from extraneous considerations the form which determines the parts as well as the whole in a work of art.⁸

The echoes and apparent similarities which can be detected in modern discussions of art are due in part to the terms which emerge in them—"form" and "matter," "expression" and "content," or similar pairs of terms—differentiating principles of criticism bearing on organization or unity and materials organized or unified. Moreover, these principles of criticism are given content and precision by use of what seem to be comparable philosophic principles expressed in terms of "processes" and "relations," "symbols" and "effects." Yet, even within the broad modern orthodoxy in which problems are solved by operations and words, there are many warring sects who differ concerning the nature of operations and the analysis of symbols; and for each philosophic doctrine and substitute for metaphysics there is a variant interpretation of artistic form and aesthetic expression and of the material which is formed or expressed. The problem in each case is to locate the art object between artist and audience and in so doing to explain characteristics of the art object in terms suggested by that relation.

The opposition between those who examine the art object and those who examine the art object qua experience or act or symbol flows from two interpretations which can be put on those principles of criticism in view of opposed

evident by some violent gesture. It is in the whole disposition of my picture—the place occupied by the figures, the empty space around them, the proportions—everything plays its part. Composition is the art of arranging in a decorative manner the various elements which the painter uses to express his sentiments. In a picture every separate part will be visible and will take up that position, principal or secondary, which suits it best. Everything which has no utility in the picture is for that reason harmful. A work of art implies a harmony of everything together [*une harmonie d'ensemble*]: every superfluous detail will occupy, in the mind of the spectator, the place of some other detail which is essential."

8. Cf. K. Koffka, "Problems in the Psychology of Art," *Bryn Mawr Notes and Monographs*, IX (1940), 243–44: "We shall derive from this relationship a rule for the purity, or sincerity, of art. If, as we said, the artist wants to externalize a significant part of his own world with its particular ego-world relationship, then, if he is successful, the object which he creates will be such as to comply with the demanded relationship; and that means, looked at from the other side, that the way in which the Ego is drawn into the situation must be demanded by the art-object and not by any outside factors which, however they may be suggested by the art-object, are not part of it. And so we have arrived at what we call purity of art: demands on the Ego must not issue from sources that are extraneous to the art-object." Cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 246–47: "Thus what is 'extraneous' to a work of art, in the sense used in defining the purity of art, is determined by the subject and its self-limitation. We saw before that a work of art is a strongly coherent whole, a powerful *gestalt* and such self-limitation is a definite *gestalt*-property. But this determination of the term extraneous is still too narrow: a demand issuing from a part of an art object is extraneous, and, therefore, an effect produced by it artistically impure, if it is not itself demanded by the total pattern of the work. For a *gestalt* not only makes its own boundaries, but also within its boundaries rules and determines its parts in a sort of hierarchy, giving this a central position, this the rôle of a mere decorative detail, that the function of contrast, and so forth."

philosophic principles, for the structure of the object of art may be found in traits that it shares with the artist and his audience or in traits which distinguish the artist from the effects of his action and the audience from the stimulus to which it responds. The two interpretations of what seem similar or identical principles of criticism—"form" and "matter," "expression" and "content"—result from differences of analysis; they are not opposed in the sense that one is right and the other wrong (although either may be employed well or poorly by the critic), nor is the difference between them one that need be "resolved" or in which an appeal to the "facts" would embarrass either disputant. They are differences to be explained by the philosophic principles which underlie the use of the terms in criticism; and those philosophic principles, in turn, are expressed in similar terms of "process" and "symbol" interpreted either analogically in a dialectic of being and becoming⁹ or literally in a logic of cause

9. Cf. K. Burke, *The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action* (Baton Rouge, La., 1941), p. 124: "It is, then, my contention, that if we approach poetry from the standpoint of situations and strategies, we can make the most relevant observations about both the content and the form of poems. By starting from a concern with the various tactics and deployments involved in ritualistic acts of membership, purification, and opposition, we can most accurately discover 'what is going on' in poetry." *Ibid.*, pp. 89–90: "The general approach to the poem might be called 'pragmatic' in this sense: It assumes that a poem's structure is to be described most accurately by thinking always of the poem's function. It assumes that the poem is designed to 'do something' for the poet and his readers, and that we can make the most relevant observations about its design by considering the poem as the embodiment of this act. In the poet, we might say, the poetizing existed as a physiological function. The poem is its corresponding anatomic structure. And the reader, in participating in the poem, breathes into this anatomic structure a new physiological vitality that resembles, though with a difference, the act of its maker, the resemblance being in the overlap between writer's and reader's situation, the difference being in the fact that these two situations are far from identical." *Ibid.*, p. 102: "At every point, the content is functional—hence, statements about a poem's 'subject,' as we conceive it, will be also statements about the poem's 'form'" (cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 73–74). The dialectic of being and becoming is apparent in one of its most competent employments in Dewey's use of such terms as "form" and "expression" in the sense both of a process and of a product and in his treatment of "matter" in both connections. Cf. *Art as Experience*, p. 134: "Form as something that organizes material into the matter of art has been considered in the previous chapter. The definition that was given tells what form is when it is achieved, when it is there in a work of art. It does not tell how it comes to be, the conditions of its generation." *Ibid.*, p. 64: "An act of expression always employs natural material, though it may be natural in the sense of habitual as well as in that of primitive or native. It becomes a medium when it is employed in view of its place and rôle, in its relations, an[d] inclusive situation—as tones become music when ordered in a melody." *Ibid.*, p. 82: "Expression, like construction, signifies both an action and its result. The last chapter considered it as an act. We are now concerned with the product, the object that is expressive, that says something to us." Separation of these two meanings would in each instance be an error, and for this reason Dewey regrets the absence in English of a word that includes unambiguously what is signified by "artistic"—the act of production—and "aesthetic"—the act of perception and enjoyment (cf. *ibid.*, p. 46). Nor should artist and audience be separated, since "to perceive, a beholder must create his own experience" (*ibid.*, p. 54), nor matter from form, since "the truth of the matter is that what is form in one connection is matter in another and vice-versa" (*ibid.*, p. 128); and if one makes a conscious distinction of sense and thought, of matter and form, one does "not read or hear esthetically, for the esthetic value of the stanzas lies in the integration of the two" (*ibid.*, p. 132).

and effect.¹⁰ This is a philosophic opposition, and the broad disputes concerning the possibility of conceiving or analyzing individual substances, natural or artificial, and concerning the reality of causes are only slightly transformed, in the discussion of artistic form and content, into disputes concerning the possibility or error of treating the form of the work of art independently of experience or strategies, the reality of the distinction of form and matter, and, most striking of all, the nature of matter—whether it is to be sought, on the one hand, in experience, tactics, emotions, temperament, *Zeitgeist*, racial characteristics or, on the other hand, in the “parts” of the work of art—and the nature of form appropriate to such matters.

When terms are defined by the method of analogy, the principles of the discussion are found in the fundamental metaphor or metaphors.¹¹ Poetry may be conceived as vision, contriving, or imitation, experience, imagination, or emotion, symbol, action, or relation. Any one of these may be generalized or specified to determine a sense in which all men, or the best of men, or the best of some peculiarly fortunate kind of men, are poets or poems,¹² since the traits of the poet or the structure or contents of the poem are universally those of mankind or even of the Deity and the universe or since the poem or its expression or the emotion it embodies is universally intelligible or universally moving or corresponds with and reflects aspects of the universe or since its effects are homogeneous with the common experience or aspirations of mankind. When terms are defined literally, the principles of the discussion are to be found in the causes by which an object is to be isolated in its essential nature. If poetry is to be treated as poetry, it must be differentiated by its qualities as a thing or by the nature of the judgment appropriate to it or by its effects. Such distinc-

10. Cf. Koffka, *op. cit.*, pp. 209–10: “Perhaps the reader is somewhat baffled as to the kind of object-characteristics we are speaking about. They are to be such as to affect the Selves directly, to play on their emotions; but where are such characteristics to be found in psychology? Indeed there was a time when psychology did not contain any place for such characteristics, when psychological data were reduced to sensations and their attributes, the secondary and some of the primary qualities of Locke. But psychology has changed a great deal since such a statement was true. Now it derives some of its most important explanatory concepts and principles from such perceptual qualities as round, angular, symmetrical, open; fast and slow, rough and smooth, graceful and clumsy; cheerful, glowering, radiant, gloomy—a list that could be continued through many pages. Let us add a few words about it. The examples in the first group, which the reader will be willing to accept at their face-value, show us a feature characteristic of all our samples: they are features that belong to extended wholes, not to atomic parts or points.”

11. Burke (*op. cit.*, p. 26) recognizes in the synecdoche the “‘basic’ figure of speech” for “both the structure of poetry and the structure of human relations outside poetry.”

12. Cf. Coleridge, *Biographia literaria*, chap. xiv (*The Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. Shedd [New York, 1853], III, 373): “My own conclusions on the nature of poetry, in the strictest use of the word, have been in part anticipated in some of the remarks on the Fancy and Imagination in the first part of this work. What is poetry?—is so nearly the same question with, what is a poet?—that the answer to the one is involved in the solution of the other” (cf. above, n. 9).

tions are possible only in the context of a philosophy, consciously or unconsciously employed, in which sciences are distinguished from one another by principles and subject matter and in which the same object, undefined but identified in time and space, is properly treated in the variety of subject matters relevant to its characteristics—physical, psychological, moral, political, and aesthetic. By the use of the analogical method a trait or some traits suggested by the poem, by the poet, or by the audience are used to explain all three—as life is explained by synecdoche, poems by actions, and poets by qualities intended to distinguish man from the brute and assimilate him to God—and all aspects of poetry are included in one analysis. By the use of the literal method the aesthetic analysis of poetry is concentrated on characteristics properly attributed to the poem, and other problems are treated in other sciences—the ideas and emotions which the poet sought to express or those which a given audience experienced are treated in psychology, if it is a question of the thought of the poet or the reaction of the audience, or in rhetoric, if it is a question of means and medium, while the moral and political consequences of the poem, if they are considered, require analysis in terms of virtues, actions, and institutions; and the poem as conceived in terms of its various causes and effects is distinct from the poem conceived in terms of structure and form. Properly executed and understood, a complete analysis by the one method should treat all characteristics considered by the other and should even result in comparable judgments: aesthetic, moral, psychological, and practical. But even in that happy coincidence, the statements of the two analyses would clash on every point. There is doubtless but one truth in aesthetics as in other disciplines, but many statements of it are found to be adequate, more are partially satisfactory, and even more have been defended.

Such differences in the philosophic principles which determine the force and application of principles of criticism indicate a second dimension of variation, for even the discussion of the meaning of “process,” “relation,” and “symbol”—whether they are to be interpreted analogically and organistically or literally and causally—involves the recognition, if only by gestures and asides to discredited and obsolete opponents, that other principles have sometimes been used. In the literal discussion of principles it is a problem of fundamental qualities, sequence of causes, and order of discrimination. The *poem* may be fundamental in the sense that poetic effects can be identified for examination and poets can be recognized for description only if the stimulus of the one and the product of the other possess a distinguishable poetic quality. The *poet* may be fundamental in the sense that poetic composition can be treated as a poem, and its proper poetic effects can be differentiated from the accidental associations of an uninitiated audience, only by appreciating the intent of the

poet.¹³ The *effects* may be fundamental in the sense that an unexperienced poem is no aesthetic object, whatever the virtues of its form and structure, and the poem variously understood is not one but many objects.

In the analogical discussion of principles the same shifts of emphasis may be detected in the fundamental metaphor which is derived originally from poet, poem, or audience and is then applied to all three (as when experience, symbolic act, or creation characterize all three)¹⁴ or restricted to two (as when poet and poem are conceived on a different level of experience or imagination from those which characterize even the prepared reader)¹⁵ or restricted to one (as

13. This process may apparently be carried through a series of steps if one is asked to consider the writer (say, of this paper) who considers the critic who considers the artist (who might conceivably consider, as Peacock did, the intellectual ancestors of the writer who considered the critic). Cf. D. A. Stauffer, Introduction, *The Intent of the Critic* (Princeton, 1941), p. 5: "His opinion is a safe guide, therefore, only if we know Coleridge the critic as well as we know *Hamlet*, the play criticized. Such examples of the necessity of rectifying a critical pronouncement by some inquiry into the critic's character and bias and intention might be multiplied. They show the question, 'What is the intent of the critic?' may be as important to the reading public as the prior question, 'What is the intent of the artist?' is to the critic himself."

14. Cf. above, n. 9, for Burke's differentiation of poet, poem, and reader in terms of physiology and anatomy. Poetry, so conceived, is part of our natures, and all men are poets. The symbol of this may be found in men's lives and their susceptibilities to the universal poetry of nature; cf. R. W. Emerson, "The Poet" (*Works* [Boston, 1929], II, 15-17): "Every man is so far a poet as to be susceptible of these enchantments of nature; for all men have the thoughts whereof the universe is the celebration. I find that the fascination resides in the symbol. Who loves nature? Who does not? Is it only poets, and men of leisure and cultivation, who live with her? No; but also hunters, farmers, grooms and butchers, though they express their affection in their choice of life and not in their choice of words. . . . The people fancy they hate poetry, and they are all poets and mystics!" Sometimes the poetry of nature may take narrow, or even geographic, boundaries in the special sensibilities of a people; cf. W. Whitman, *Leaves of Grass*, Preface to the original edition (1855) (London, 1881), pp. 1-2, 4-5: "The Americans of all nations at any time upon the earth, have probably the fullest poetical nature. The United States themselves are essentially the greatest poem. In the history of the earth hitherto the largest and most stirring appear tame and orderly to their ampler largeness and stir. Here at last is something in the doings of man that corresponds with the broadcast doings of the day and night. . . . Their manners, speech, dress, friendships—the freshness and candour of their physiognomy—the picturesque looseness of their carriage . . . —the terrible significance of their elections—the President's taking off his hat to them, not they to him—these, too, are unrhymed poetry." Or, again, the poetic nature, although essential to mankind, may be possessed in varying degrees; cf. W. C. Bryant, *Prose Writings*, ed. Parke Godwin (New York, 1884), I, 13-14: "In conclusion, I will observe that the elements of poetry make a part of our natures, and that every individual is more or less a poet. In this 'bank-note world,' as it has been happily denominated, we sometimes meet with individuals who declare that they have no taste for poetry. But by their leave I will assert they are mistaken; they have it, although they may have never cultivated it."

15. If all men are poets, it is then imperative either to introduce a distinction of degree, completeness, or kind to distinguish the poets from other men or to distinguish the poetic from the appreciative or critical processes. Emerson, following the first of these alternatives, makes the poet representative among partial men and finds half of man in his expression; cf. *op. cit.*, II, 5: "The breadth of the problem is great, for the poet is representative. He stands among partial men for the complete man, and apprises us not of his wealth, but of the common wealth. The young man reveres men of genius, because, to speak truly, they are more himself than he is. They receive of the soul as he also receives, but they more." Lowell distinguishes two lives, one of which the poet nourishes; cf. "The Function of the Poet,"

when poets are said to aspire to express a vision which cannot be stated adequately in any poem or be experienced fully by any audience).¹⁶

Literally or analogically conceived, therefore, the philosophic principles which lie behind the discussions of the critic select for him, by defining his terms, a subject matter and principles from the vast diversity which those terms

Century, XLVII (1894), 437: "Every man is conscious that he leads two lives, the one trivial and ordinary, the other sacred and reclusive; the one which he carries to the dinner-table and to his daily work, which grows old with his body and dies with it, the other that which is made up of the few inspiring moments of his higher aspiration and attainment, and in which his youth survives for him, his dreams, his unquenchable longings for something nobler than success. It is this life which the poets nourish for him and sustain with their immortalizing nectar." Lowell emphasizes the likenesses which makes poets men intelligible to other men rather than the differences in the poet's observation which set him apart; cf. "The Life and Letters of James Gates Percival" (*Works* [Boston and New York, 1891], II, 156-57): "The theory that the poet is a being above the world and apart from it is true of him as an observer only who applies to the phenomena about him the test of a finer and more spiritual sense. That he is a creature divinely set apart from his fellow-men by a mental organization that makes them mutually unintelligible to each other is in flat contradiction with the lives of those poets universally acknowledged as greatest." The second of the two alternatives is involved in definitions of poetry which derive from the genius of the poet or the differentiation of the poem relative to creator and to critic. Coleridge thus relates his definition of poetry to genius; cf. *Shakespeare: With Introductory Matter on Poetry, the Drama, and the Stage* (*Works*, IV, 21-22): "To return, however, to the previous definition, this most general and distinctive character of a poem originates in the poetic genius itself; and though it comprises whatever can with any propriety be called a poem (unless that word be a mere lazy synonyme for a composition in metre), it yet becomes a just, and not merely discriminative, but full and adequate, definition of poetry in its highest and most peculiar sense, only so far as the distinction still results from the poetic genius, which sustains and modifies the emotions, thoughts, and vivid representations of the poem by the energy without effort of the poet's own mind,—by the spontaneous activity of his imagination and fancy, and by whatever else with these reveals itself in the balancing and reconciling of opposite or discordant qualities, sameness with difference, a sense of novelty and freshness with old or customary objects, a more than usual state of emotion with more than usual order, self-possession and judgment with enthusiasm and vehement feeling,—and which, while it blends and harmonizes the natural and the artificial, still subordinates art to nature, the manner to the matter, and our admiration of the poet to our sympathy with the images, passions, characters, and incidents of the poem. . . ." Samuel Johnson accounts for the changes of judgment and taste by distinguishing the poetry based on nature and truth from that of fanciful invention; cf. "Preface to Shakespeare," in *Johnson on Shakespeare*, ed. Raleigh (London, 1929), p. 11: "But because human judgment, though it be gradually gaining upon certainty, never becomes infallible; and approbation, though long continued, may yet be only the approbation of prejudice or fashion; it is proper to inquire, by what peculiarities of excellence *Shakespeare* has gained and kept the favour of his countrymen. Nothing can please many, and please long, but just representations of general nature. Particular manners can be known to few, and therefore few only can judge how nearly they are copied." According to Matthew Arnold, the critical power is of a lower rank than the creative; cf. "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time," *Essays in Criticism: First Series* (London, 1910), p. 4: "The critical power is of lower rank than the creative. True; but in assenting to this proposition one or two things are to be kept in mind. It is undeniable that the exercise of the creative power, that a free creative activity, is the highest function of man; it is proved to be so by man's finding in it his true happiness. But it is undeniable, also, that men may have the sense of exercising this free creative activity in other ways than in producing great works of literature or art; if it were not so, all but a very few men would be shut out from the true happiness of all men."

16. The content and aspiration of poetry are so lofty that in the fullest sense they may exceed not merely the appreciation of the audience but the powers of the poet, and therefore Emerson concludes that we have no poems, although we do have poets; cf. "Poetry and

might encompass. If the poet is the source of distinctions or analogies, the discussion may be of character, knowledge, or technique; or of imagination, taste, or genius; or of beauty, truth, or moral goodness. If the poem is fundamental, all problems may be translated into those of form and content; or of imitation and object; or of thought, imagination, and emotions; or of activity and effects. The effects finally, if they are fundamental, may be treated in terms of expression and communication; or of context and moral, social, economic, or semantic determination; or of influence and emotion.

The critic's discrimination of poet, poem, and effect, like the philosopher's preoccupation with process and relation, is only one part or possibility selected from a larger intellectual pattern which extends beyond, and is constantly intruded into, the more limited vocabularies of the conversations and disputes about art which are expressed in terms of operations and symbols. The principles of art have been sought in the nature of things and in the faculties of man as well as in the circumstances of artistic production or the effects of aesthetic contemplation. The "things" which have been considered have been various—the products of human activities or the materials from which they have been worked, the activities or the ideas and emotions from which they originated, and the poet or man himself. Philosophers who treat art in terms of things may seek poetic or dialectical principles, in the former case differentiating the artificial things which are made by man from the natural things which are the subject matter of physics, and in the latter case discovering the qualities of art in nature, which is a "poem" or a "book" or a "creation" or an "imitation." The "faculties" have been used as causes of the production of art objects or as means of their appreciation, and philosophers who seek epistemological or psychological principles in the human faculties either distinguish the visions, powers, and performances of artists from those of other men or treat scientists, moralists, politicians, and even mankind as essentially, though in varying de-

Imagination," *Letters and Social Aims* (Boston, 1883), p. 74: "Poems!—we have no poem. Whenever that angel shall be organized and appear on earth, the Iliad will be reckoned a poor ballad-grinding. I doubt never the riches of Nature, the gifts of the future, the immense wealth of the mind. O yes, poets we shall have, mythology, symbols, religion, of our own." Lowell, on the other hand, distinguishes two functions which are united in the poet—the function of the seer and that of the maker—and which facilitate the distinction between what he sees and what he expresses; cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 432–33: "And however far we go back, we shall find this also—that the poet and the priest were united originally in the same person; which means that the poet was he who was conscious of the world of spirit as well as that of sense, and was the ambassador of the gods to men. This was his highest function, and hence his name of 'seer.' . . . Gradually, however, the poet as the 'seer' became secondary to the 'maker.' His office became that of entertainer rather than teacher. But always something of the old tradition was kept alive. And if he has now come to be looked upon merely as the best expresser, the gift of seeing is implied as necessarily antecedent to that, and of seeing very deep too."

grees, poets. The "processes" have been the actions and operations, causes and effects, relations and wholes by which men have been prepared to produce objects or to be affected by them; and operational or semantic principles are sought either by distinguishing the symbols or effects of art from those of science, practical affairs, and nature or by stating all human concerns and all knowledge in terms of pragmatic and symbolic analyses. The discrimination of such principles and systems is to be found, not in differences in the gross scope of possible statement, but in what is taken as fundamental and in the precision or effectiveness with which details can be treated. A discussion which is primarily concerned with the effects of art will entail consequences which bear on the nature of works of art and on the nature or intention of the artist; and all schools of philosophers, whether they talk realistically about the work of art or idealistically about the imagination or the conditions of aesthetic judgment or pragmatically about the experience of art, will be able to state and defend metaphysical and psychological, moral, and aesthetic judgments appropriate to their principles and approaches.

The contemporary writers whose statements concerning art and criticism have been used to illustrate a pattern in modern discussions, therefore, exemplify the "philosophic temper of the present" in the sense that they talk in terms of operations and consequent relations, and the dogma is widespread among those who use this vocabulary—among philosophers as well as others who profess an interest in philosophic principles, among physicists who write on the freedom of the will and God, sociologists who write about ideologies and "stages" of knowledge, educators who reform curricula with a view to the "circumstances" of the world today or tomorrow—that there are no independent things or "substances" and that the "faculties" of the mind—and the mind itself—are fictions. Within that terminological agreement, however, all the old disputes concerning principles seem to have survived in methodological oppositions which have introduced splits between pragmatists who would choose significant questions by the criterion of operations and logicians who talk of operations but find it desirable to distinguish operations concerned with things from operations concerned with words or, further, to distinguish words which designate things from words which designate other words; and between linguists for whom things and words are sufficient to explain the phenomena of communication and proof and semanticists who require, in addition, some treatment of meanings or even emotions and motives. These differences of content in the principles signified by the same words are clarified in the broader discussion of principles signified by other words, for the ancient problems involved, though unrecognized, in the oppositions of contemporary doc-

trines, are only gradually uncovered in the progress of disputes; and verbally different statements of similar conceptions serve to set apart the different conceptions contained in statements that are verbally similar.

The subject matter of discussions of art is determined by three considerations which bear on things and which depend on principles: first, the determination of the kind of things appropriate to the discussion is stated in general philosophic principles; second, the determination of the mode of classifying such things depends on the methodological definition of principles; third, the determination of the characteristics relevant to the evaluation of such things is stated in the principles of criticism. The meaning and the subject of any critical judgment depend on all three considerations, although writers who use the same or similar terms may agree on one or more, while differing on other determinations of their meanings. Plato and Aristotle, thus, seek general philosophic principles in the nature of things, while Bacon and Kant seek them in the human understanding, and Horace and Tolstoy seek them in operations. Yet each of these pairs, although associated in the choice of philosophic principles, is divided both by the methodological determination and use of those principles and by the principles of criticism determined by them. For all the similarities of their statements, therefore, the six philosophers treat six distinct, though intricately related, subject matters in their analyses of art.

Plato and Aristotle both discuss the nature of art in terms of imitation. Plato, however, uses the distinction of poet (or maker), model (or object of imitation), and imitation (or construction) to state the principles of his physics as well as his aesthetics and so to account for all things,¹⁷ while for Aristotle those principles are the means of differentiating artificial from natural things; but, although human nature, in the poet and in his audience, is used in his analysis to account for the natural causes and origin of poetry, the principles of Aristotle's aesthetics, as derived from imitation, are the object, the means, and the manner of imitation.¹⁸ As a consequence, although Plato and Aristotle both talk about imitation and about things, they talk about different things. Plato's discussion of poetry is about men, or men and gods, those imitated in the poem, those influenced by the poem, the poets who write the poems and find themselves in competition with lawgivers, rhetoricians, and dialecticians—inferior to all who know the truth and sixth among the lovers of beauty—and

17. *Timaeus* 28C ff.; *Republic* x. 596A ff.; *Sophist* 234A–B. For a fuller discussion of the point treated in this paragraph, see above, pp. 149–68. These passages and the others from Plato, as well as those from Aristotle, Longinus, and Vico quoted in this essay, are translated by the author.

18. The arts are differentiated according to differences of their means, objects, and manners in the first three chapters of the *Poetics*; the natural causes and origin of poetry are then taken up in chapter 4. 1448^b4 ff. Once the definition of tragedy has been given, the six parts of tragedy are discriminated as means, objects, and manner of imitation (cf. *Poet.* 6. 1450^a7 ff.).

the universe which is also a living creature and an imitation; whereas Aristotle's discussion of poetry is about tragedy and epic poetry, their plots which are their end or their soul, and their parts.¹⁹

Kant and Bacon, similarly, both discuss the nature of art in terms of imagination. Kant, however, differentiates the faculties of understanding, reason, and judgment in order to treat the representations of imagination and the judgments of taste; like Aristotle, who distinguishes theoretic, practical, and poetic sciences, he differentiates theoretic and practical knowledge from aesthetic judgment; but, like Plato, whose analysis of art applies equally well to nature, he finds the principles of his analysis, not in the arts or their products, but in the judgment of beauty which applies to nature as well as to art and which has affinities with the judgment of the sublime as well as with the understanding of the purposiveness of nature.²⁰ Bacon, on the other hand, differentiates poesy from history and philosophy by relating them to the three parts of man's understanding—imagination, memory, and reason—respectively; like Aristotle, he treats poetry in particular rather than the conditions of art in general, he distinguishes it from history, and he divides it into kinds (narrative, representative, and allusive); but, like Plato, he merges aesthetic with moral judgments.²¹

19. The early treatment of music in the *Republic* is in terms of its subject matter, under which is considered the adequacy of tales to the gods, heroes, and men portrayed (*Rep.* ii. 376E—iii. 392C); its diction, under which is considered the effect of imitative speech on character (*ibid.* 392C–398B); and its manner, under which is considered the effect of modes and rhythms (*ibid.* 398C–403C). We shall be true musicians only when we recognize temperance, courage, liberality, high-mindedness, and the other virtues and their contraries in their various combinations and images (*ibid.* 402C; cf. also *ibid.* viii. 568A–B; x. 607A). Poets, rhetoricians, and lawgivers who write with knowledge of the truth are to be called "philosophers" (*Phaedrus* 278C–D; cf. also *Laws* vii. 811C–E); poets are in competition with lawgivers (*Rep.* iii. 398A–B; *Laws* vii. 817A–D; ix. 858D). For the low place of the poet in the hierarchy of lovers cf. *Phaedrus* 248C ff.; and for the universe as a creation of divine art cf. *Soph.* 265C ff. According to Aristotle, the plot is the principle and, as it were, the soul of tragedy (cf. *Poet.* 6. 1450^a38); it is the end and purpose of tragedy (*ibid.* 1450^a22); it is the first and most important thing in tragedy (*ibid.* 7. 1450^b21). The analysis treats of tragedy in terms of the unity and the parts of tragedies.

20. Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, trans. J. H. Bernard (London, 1914), Introduction, pp. 7 ff.: Part I, Div. I, Book II, "Analytic of the Sublime," § 23, "Transition from the Faculty Which Judges of the Beautiful to That Which Judges of the Sublime," pp. 101 ff.; Part II, "Critique of the Teleological Judgement," pp. 259 ff. The nature and the analysis of the Beautiful is distinct from the nature and analysis of the moral, yet the Beautiful may be a symbol of the morally Good; cf. Part I, Div. I, Book I, § 42, pp. 176–77: "Thus it would seem that the feeling for the Beautiful is not only (as actually is the case) specifically different from the Moral feeling; but that the interest which can be bound up with it is hardly compatible with moral interest, and certainly has no inner affinity therewith"; and Div. II, § 59, pp. 250–51: "Now I say the Beautiful is the symbol of the morally Good, and that it is only in this respect (a reference which is natural to every man and which every man postulates in others as a duty) that it gives pleasure with a claim for the agreement of every one else" (cf. also *ibid.*, § 52, pp. 214–15).

21. *Of the Proficiency and Advancement of Learning*, Book II (*The Works of Francis Bacon*, ed. Spedding, Ellis, and Heath, III [London, 1857], 329, 343 ff.); *De augmentis scientiarum*, Book II, chap. xiii (*Works*, IV [London, 1858], 314 ff.). Aristotle's distinction is that poetry

As a consequence, although Bacon and Kant both talk about the imagination and the human understanding, the “imagination” of Bacon is a cognitive faculty, whereas the “imagination” of Kant is a faculty of presentation. Bacon’s discussion of poetry is, therefore, about a branch of learning considered as form and matter, whereas Kant’s discussion of art is about a form of judgment which relates the presentations of imagination to the concepts of reason and understanding and which applies to natural and artistic beauty.²²

Horace and Tolstoy, finally, both discuss the nature of art in terms of operations. Tolstoy, however, defines art as a human activity which serves as a means of bringing about a community among men and of furthering their welfare.

Art is a human activity consisting in this, that one man consciously, by means of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that others are infected by these feelings and also experience them.

Art is not as the metaphysicians say, the manifestation of some mysterious Idea of beauty or God; it is not, as the esthetical physiologists say, a game in which man lets off his excess of stored-up energy; it is not the expression of man’s emotions by external signs; it is not the production of pleasing objects; and, above all, it is not pleasure; but it is a means of union among men, joining them together in the same feelings and indispensable for the life and progress towards well-being of individuals and of humanity.²³

is more philosophic and graver than history, since its statements are rather of the nature of universals, whereas those of history are singulars (*Poet.* 9. 1451^b5). Bacon draws his distinction from the matter of poetry and therefore makes the difference between poetry and history more nearly analogous to Plato’s distinction between knowledge and opinion than to Aristotle’s formal distinction between kinds of probability; and, as a consequence, he excludes, as parts of philosophy and parts of speech, all forms of poetry (satires, elegies, epigrams, odes, and the like) except the three which are treated as forms of feigned history, and he derives the moral judgment of poetry from this difference between it and history; cf. *De augmentis scientiarum*, Book II, chap. xiii, pp. 315–16: “As for Narrative Poesy,—or Heroical, if you like so to call it (understanding it of the matter, not of the verse)—the foundation of it is truly noble, and has a special relation to the dignity of human nature. For as the sensible world is inferior in dignity to the rational soul, Poesy seems to bestow upon human nature those things which history denies to it; and to satisfy the mind with the shadows of things when the substance cannot be obtained. For if the matter be attentively considered, a sound argument may be drawn from Poesy, to show that there is agreeable to the spirit of man a more ample greatness, a more perfect order, and a more beautiful variety than it can anywhere (since the Fall) find in nature. And therefore, since the acts and events which are the subjects of real history are not of sufficient grandeur to satisfy the human mind, Poesy is at hand to feign acts more heroical; since the successes and issues of actions as related in true history are far from being agreeable to the merits of virtue and vice, Poesy corrects it, exhibiting events and fortunes according to merit and the laws of providence; since true history wears the mind with satiety of ordinary events, one like another, Poetry refreshes it, by reciting things unexpected and various and full of vicissitudes. So that this Poesy conduces not only to delight but also to magnanimity and morality. Whence it may be fairly thought to partake somewhat of a divine nature; because it raises the mind and carries it aloft, accommodating the shows of things to the desires of the mind, not (like reason and history) buckling and bowing down the mind to the nature of things.” Cf. also *Of the Proficiency and Advancement of Learning*, p. 343.

22. Kant, *op. cit.*, Part I, Div. I, Book I, § 23, pp. 101 ff., and § 45, pp. 187 ff.

23. *What is Art?* trans. A. Maude, in *Tolstoy on Art* (Oxford, 1924), p. 173.

Tolstoy’s judgment of art, like Plato’s, is predominantly moral, and, like Kant, he would attribute to art an important function in uniting theoretical knowledge and practical precepts. Horace, on the other hand, is concerned with the effects of poetry, not as they might be manifested in a moral, social, and religious union of mankind, but as they might be formulated in an “art” of poetry as practical precepts to instruct poets in their function, resources, and ends,²⁴ and in view of those ends to set forth the means poets should employ if they wish to please Roman audiences and to attain lasting fame. Wisdom is the principle and fountain of good writing, in the sense that moral philosophy and the Socratic pages will furnish the poet material;²⁵ and poets aim to teach or to please or to profit and amuse at the same time, in the sense that they attract the applause of the elderly by utility, of the young by amusement, and of all if they can blend the two.²⁶ Like Aristotle, Horace treats of poetry and its kinds, of the parts and the essential unity of the poem; and his analysis of poetry, like Bacon’s, consists in treating the various kinds of subjects and the words and meters in which they can be adorned. As a consequence, although Horace and Tolstoy both consider the processes by which a poet fashions a work and the work influences an audience, the processes are entirely different in their respective treatments. For Horace they are external and causal: the poet uses any appropriate materials, old or new, in appropriate verbal form to win the approval of a select, though heterogeneous, audience. For Tolstoy the processes are internal and organic to mankind as a whole: the artist finds his material in feelings, and he makes that material intelligible to all by the form of his statement, in which the feelings are made infectious and by which mankind is united and improved.

If critics and philosophers sometimes find their subject matter in “beauty” and the “sublime,” or “taste” and the “imagination,” or “action” and “experience,” whereas other critics and philosophers treat of poetry, or even of tragedy, the epic, and the lyric, or painting, sculpture, and music, the choice is not arbitrary or without consequences, but follows the methodological devices by which they employ their principles. Aristotle, Bacon, and Horace make use of different philosophic principles, since Aristotle treats of poetry by considering the poem as an artificial object, Bacon by considering it as a branch of learning subject to imagination, and Horace by considering it as a product of the poetic processes of composition; yet they agree methodologically, since they all begin their analyses with, and seek their principles in, a specifically human product, faculty, or activity for the purpose of discovering what is peculiar, in their respective approaches, to poetry or to some kind of poetry. Plato, Kant, and Tolstoy likewise make use of different philosophic principles, since

24. *Ars poetica* 304–8.

25. *Ibid.* 309–11.

26. *Ibid.* 333–44.

Plato treats of beauty and art in terms of an eternal pattern for imitation, Kant in terms of the a priori conditions of judgment, and Tolstoy in terms of an achievable perfection in human relations; yet they agree methodologically, since they all begin their analyses with, and seek their principles in, something fundamental in the nature of things, or the human faculties, or the community of feelings, which conditions in varying degrees all things, all imaginations, or all actions. What is essential in the one approach is accidental in the other. The philosopher who begins with beauty seldom has difficulty in discriminating or treating various kinds of art or even various kinds of poetry, although, to be sure, he frequently finds nothing real in the arts to correspond to the distinctions of “genres”; and the philosopher who begins with kinds of art objects usually has something to say of beauty, if only to identify it with some aspect of structure, or perception, or pleasure. The evaluation of the facts, so defined by principles and methods appropriate to them, requires a third step—the choice of the principles of criticism. The judgment of art as art may be separated from the consideration of its effects in education, morals, politics, and all the other relations which art may have to human institutions and activities; and thus Aristotle, Kant, and Horace separate the moral from the specifically aesthetic problem, while making provision, each in his way, for the indirect relation of the two problems—Aristotle by treating the moral and social effects of art in the *Politics*, Kant by relating the beautiful and the good while separating judgment and practical reason, Horace by using the moral precepts among the material to be transformed by the poet. The same facts about the objects of art may be evaluated, on the other hand, in such fashion that there is no separation of the aesthetic from other aspects of human activities, social institutions, or natural processes, except possibly for a tendency in such organic judgments to develop a fundamentally moral, economic, sociological, or religious bias, and thus Plato, Bacon, and Tolstoy each makes use of a moral criterion appropriate to his approach to the criticism of poetry and art—Plato requiring a knowledge of the Good, Bacon requiring the imagination of acts and events more agreeable to the merits of virtue and vice, Tolstoy requiring the perfecting of mankind. Differences which seem inconsequential or insoluble—such as those involved in the long discussions concerning whether painting, music, and poetry are the same essentially but different in detail, or different essentially though similar in some respects, or concerning whether art should be considered in itself or in its contexts, or whether the good, the beautiful, and the true mutually condition one another or are mutually independent—become significant if the varying meanings which critical terms assume in the context of philosophic principles are permitted to determine the meaning of the statements and are related to the subject matter of the criticism.

The changes in the subject matter of criticism may be seen compactly in the different applications of relevant criteria which such terms as “matter” and “form,” “content” and “expression,” have had in different philosophic and critical orientations. Thus Plato, Kant, and Tolstoy treat of the conditions of art rather than of the products of art, but Plato’s critical judgments are based primarily on the nature of the object imitated, and the “matter” of art is man or more generally living creatures; Kant’s critical judgments are based primarily on the subjective form of judgment, and the object of the judgment of taste is either nature or art, which follows the rule of nature;²⁷ Tolstoy’s critical judgments are based on the feelings expressed and communicated, and not only is the “matter” of art feelings, but the sign distinguishing real art, apart from consideration of its subject matter, is the infectiousness and the quality of the feelings it transmits.²⁸ The content of “matter” and the relative importance of “form” and “matter” have shifted in the systematic context of these three kinds of criticism; and yet there is a continuity in the relevant traits of the “object” of art, for in Plato’s doctrine it is found in the virtues portrayed, in Kant’s doctrine it is found in the purposiveness of the representation, and in Tolstoy’s doctrine it is found in the moral and religious feelings transmitted. Or, to reverse the order of comparison, the social community which is to be effected by art, according to Tolstoy, is present in the recognition of the empirical interest in the beautiful by Kant²⁹ and in the strenuous measures taken against poets by Plato to safeguard the perfect community of the *Republic* and the second-best community of the *Laws* from the dangers consequent on poetry. In general, these three modes of criticism have in common an appeal to criteria exterior to the work of art by which a comparison of arts with one another results in the discrimination of true art from spurious art or better art from worse: in Plato it is the criterion of truth and the moral effects of falsity

27. On the superiority of natural to artificial beauty cf. Kant, *op. cit.*, Part I, Div. I, § 42, pp. 178 ff.; on the relation of art and nature, *ibid.*, § 43, pp. 183 ff.; on the relation of the characteristics of the object in the judgment of natural beauty and the judgment of a product of art, cf. *ibid.*, § 33, p. 158; § 46, p. 188; and § 48, p. 194. Of the subjectivity of the judgment of taste, cf. *ibid.*, § 1, pp. 45–46: “The judgement of taste is therefore not a judgement of cognition, and is consequently not logical but aesthetical, by which we understand that whose determining ground can be *no other than subjective*” (cf. also *ibid.*, § 25, p. 161). The critique of taste, however, is subjective only with respect to the representation through which an object is given to it; it may also be an act or a science of reducing to rules the reciprocal relation between the understanding and imagination (cf. *ibid.* § 34, p. 160).

28. Tolstoy, *op. cit.*, chaps. xv and xvi, pp. 274–96.

29. Kant, *op. cit.*, Part I, Div. I, § 41, p. 174: “Empirically the Beautiful interests only in *society*. If we admit the impulse to society as natural to man, and his fitness for it, and his propension towards it, *i.e. sociability*, as a requisite for man as a being destined for society, and so as a property belonging to *humanity*, we cannot escape from regarding taste as a faculty for judging everything in respect of which we can communicate our *feeling* to all other men, and so as a means of furthering that which every one’s natural inclination desires.”

which justifies the condemnation of poetry in opposition to the art of the statesman; in Kant it is the criterion of genius and the free play of imagination which places music in a place inferior to poetry;³⁰ in Tolstoy it is the criterion of religion and the infectiousness of feelings that brands modern art as spurious in contrast to true religious art. The fundamental differences between them go back to the differences to be found in philosophic principles of processes, faculties, and things. Tolstoy, emphasizing the process of communication, finds *art* supplementing theory by making science intelligible and accomplishing the ends of practice by removing the need of external political control.³¹ Kant, emphasizing the judgment, finds *criticism* the indispensable preliminary, not only to the appreciation of art and nature, but to theoretic knowledge and moral decision. Plato, emphasizing the nature of being, finds *philosophy* the necessary source of criticism and the basis of art.

Aristotle, Bacon, and Horace, on the other hand, treat of poetry rather than of beauty or nature or feeling. Yet for Aristotle the plot is the soul of the tragedy and the source of its unity, and words are the means of imitation, while for Bacon words are the form, and the content of the words is the matter which constitutes poesy a branch of learning analogous to history.³² Like

30. *Ibid.*, § 53, pp. 215–18. Contrast Aristotle *Poet.* 26. 1461^b26, in which the comparison of tragedy and epic in terms of their respective audiences is refuted and a comparison in terms of the unities achieved by their respective imitations and the pleasure appropriate to them is substituted.

31. Tolstoy, *op. cit.*, chap. x, p. 225: "The business of art lies just in this: to make that understood and felt which in form of an argument might be incomprehensible and inaccessible." *Ibid.*, chap. xx, p. 322: "True science investigates and brings to human perception such truths and such knowledge as the people of a given time and society consider most important. Art transmits these truths from the region of perception to the region of emotion." *Ibid.*, p. 331: "Art is not a pleasure, a solace, or an amusement; art is a great matter. Art is an organ of human life transmitting man's reasonable perception into feeling. In our age the common religious perception of men is the consciousness of the brotherhood of man—we know that the well-being of man lies in union with his fellow-men. True science should indicate the various methods of applying this consciousness to life. Art should transform this perception into feeling. The task of art is enormous. Through the influence of real art, aided by science, guided by religion, that peaceful cooperation of man which is now maintained by external means,—by our law-courts, police, charitable institutions, factory inspection, and so forth,—should be obtained by man's free and joyous activity. Art should cause violence to be set aside."

32. When Aristotle argues (*Poet.* 9. 1451^a36) that the work of Herodotus would still be history if written in verse, the argument proceeds on the principle that the poet is concerned with the probability and necessity essential to the plot, which is the "first and most important thing in Tragedy" (*ibid.*, 7. 1450^b21, 1451^a9 ff.; 8. 1451^a22 ff.), and on the principle that the poet is not distinguished by his use of verse as a means. When Bacon argues for the same conclusion, the argument proceeds on the principle that the difference between verse and prose is a difference in form and on the principle that the difference between history and poesy is a difference in matter. Cf. *De augmentis scientiarum*, Book II, chap. xiii, p. 315: "Now Poesy (as I have already observed) is taken in two senses; in respect of words or matter. In the first sense it is but a character of speech; for verse is only a kind of style and a certain form of elocution, and has nothing to do with the matter; for both true history may be written in verse and feigned history in prose. But in the latter sense, I have set it

Bacon, Horace analyzes poetry by treating subject matter and expression; but, unlike either Aristotle or Bacon, he recommends, as a device of imitation, the use of life and customs as an exemplar from which to draw living words; he is convinced that, if the matter is given, the words will follow, and he thinks of the problem of pleasing an audience in terms of decorum of subject and style.³³ Once again the content of "matter" and the relative importance of "form" and "matter" have shifted in the systematic context of the three kinds of criticism, and yet there is again a continuity in the relevant trait of the object of art which is for these critics the poem, the statue, or some like concrete object which requires some mark or measure of unity. In Aristotle's doctrine, unity is found in the plot, which has a beginning, middle, and end, and the relevant verbal unity depends on the unity of subject;³⁴ in Bacon's doctrine poetry is restrained with respect to words but quite unrestrained by matter;³⁵ and in Horace's doctrine unity has become a matter of decorum which depends on consistency in the relations of the parts of the poem to one another and appropriateness of the language to the matter, but it is otherwise unrestricted except in view of the reactions of audiences.³⁶ Or, again, the order of the comparison may be reversed, and the instruction, utility, and delight which are prominent in Horace's analysis may all be found in their appropriate functions in Bacon and Aristotle: in Bacon service to magnanimity, morality, and delectation are the mark of all poesy, while the clarification, or concealment, of a point of reason to make it intelligible or mysterious is the special function of one kind, parabolical poetry;³⁷ whereas in Aristotle tragedy has its appropriate

down from the first as one of the principal branches of learning, and placed it by the side of history; being indeed nothing else but an imitation of history at pleasure." Cf. *ibid.*, Book VI, chap. i. p. 443: "The Measure of words has produced a vast body of art; namely Poesy, considered with reference not to the matter of it (of which I have spoken above) but to the style and form of words: that is to say metre or verse."

33. Horace *op. cit.* 317–18; 311; 1–23; 86–118; 153–78 and *passim*.

34. *Poet.* 7 and 8, 1450^b21 ff.; for the unity of the epic cf. *ibid.* 23. 1459^a17; for unity of fiction cf. *ibid.* 20. 1457^a28.

35. *Of the Proficiency and Advancement of Learning*, Book II, p. 343: "Poesy is a part of learning in measure of words for the most part restrained, but in all other points extremely licensed, and doth truly refer to the Imagination; which, being not tied to the laws of matter, may at pleasure join that which nature hath severed, and sever that which nature hath joined, and so make unlawful matches and divorces of things: *Pictoribus atque poetis*, etc."

36. Horace *op. cit.* 23: "Denique sit quod vis, simplex dumtaxat et unum." The difference between Horace and Bacon is indicated by the fact that Bacon's quotation *Pictoribus atque poetis*—"poets and painters have always had an equal power of hazarding anything"—is, in the context of Horace's poem (*ibid.* 9–10), an injected anonymous objection which Horace grants only with restrictions on the kind of things that may properly be combined.

37. *Of the Proficiency and Advancement of Learning*, Book II, p. 343: "So as it appeareth that poesy serveth and conferreth to magnanimity, morality, and to delectation." In parabolical poetry, ideas which are objects of the intellect are represented in forms that are objects

pleasure, which is that of pity and fear, and the effectiveness of plot structure depends on an element of astonishment, but the moral effects of poetry are reserved for treatment in politics, and poets are quoted for their doctrine in the sciences.³⁸ In general, the three modes of criticism have in common a concern with characteristics that can be found in the poem: Aristotle seeks a unity in the plot which organizes the parts as material and has its appropriate effect in pleasure; Bacon is concerned with the distinctive matter of poesy, and therefore he does not raise the question of unity but does find effects in pleasure, edification, and parabolic instruction; Horace is concerned with effects, and he is therefore indifferent to matter as such but finds unity in the interrelations of parts with one another and their relations to the manner of their expression. This, again, is a fundamental difference which goes back to differences of philosophic principles, for the first is an organic unity appropriate to a thing; the second is the free organization of matter appropriate to the imagination; the third is a union of content and expression suited to achieve a specified result.

The intricate interrelations of consequences in statement and doctrine which can be traced to the interplay of philosophic principles and methods make it possible to detect similarities and differences in the various modes of criticism and to trace the transformations which a rule or generalization undergoes as it passes from one intellectual context to another. On the basis of such systematic interrelations the canons of criticism can be compared in terms of the criteria appropriate to each philosophic doctrine. Tolstoy, thus, states three criteria which bear, respectively, on the importance of the content of the work of art to its audience, on its beauty of form, and on the relation of its author to it.

The value of every poetical work depends on three qualities:

1) The content of the work: the more important the content, that is to say, the more important it is for the life of man, the greater is the work.

of the sense; cf. *ibid.*, p. 344: "And the cause was, for that it was then of necessity to express any point of reason which was more sharp or subtle than the vulgar in that manner; because men in those times wanted both variety of examples and subtilty of conceit; and as hieroglyphics were before letters, so parables were before arguments: and nevertheless now and at all times they do retain much life and vigour, because reason cannot be so sensible, nor examples so fit. But there remaineth another use of Poesy Parabolical, opposite to that which we last mentioned: for that tendeth to demonstrate and illustrate that which is taught or delivered, and this other to retire and obscure it: that is when the secrets and mysteries of religion, policy, or philosophy are involved in fables or parables."

38. The tragic pleasure is that of pity and fear (*Poet.* 14. 1453^b11); it is peculiar to tragedy (*ibid.* 13. 1453^a35; 23. 1459^a17; 26. 1462^b12); it depends on the unexpected, the marvelous, and the astounding (*ibid.* 9. 1452^a2; 14. 1454^a2; 16. 1455^a16; 24. 1460^a11; 25. 1460^b24). For the consideration of the moral effects of art cf. *Politics* vii. 17. 1336^b12 ff.; viii. 5-7. 1339^b10-1342^b34. For the use of poets for theoretic purposes cf. the quotation of Homer, Hesiod, and myths in *Metaphysics* i. 3. 983^b27; 4. 984^b23; 8. 989^a10; ii. 4. 1000^a9; iv. 5. 1009^b28; xii. 8. 1074^a38; 10. 1076^a4; and *passim*.

2) The external beauty achieved by the technical methods proper to the particular kind of art. Thus in dramatic art the technical method will be: that the characters should have a true individuality of their own, a natural and at the same time a touching plot, a correct presentation on the stage of the manifestation and development of feelings, and a sense of proportion in all that is presented.

3) Sincerity, that is to say that the author should himself vividly feel what he expresses. Without this condition there can be no work of art, as the essence of art consists in the infection of the contemplator of a work by the author's feeling. If the author has not felt what he is expressing, the recipient cannot become infected by the author's feeling, and the production cannot be classified as a work of art.³⁹

For Kant there are two problems in art which require critical criteria—the problem of the judgment of the beautiful in art and the problem of the production of beautiful objects of art. Criteria are supplied in both, not by the artificial object, but by the faculties of the mind in their mutual interrelations or as guided by nature. There is no objective principle of taste, but the product of beautiful art must resemble, and yet be distinguishable from, nature;⁴⁰ there is no rule to govern the production of art, but genius is an innate mental disposition through which nature gives the rule to art.⁴¹ Plato considers the problem of criticism in terms which reflect the influence of the same three variables—audience, work of art, and artist; but in the orientation of his analysis to truth the criterion of effectiveness is found in the object of imitation instead of the audience; the quality of the art object in the correctness of the imitation; and the virtue of the artist in the excellence of the execution of the copy.

Then must not the judicious critic of any representation—whether in painting, music, or any other art—have these three qualifications? He must know, first, what the object reproduced is, next, how correctly it has been reproduced, and third, how well a given representation has been executed in language, melody, or rhythm.⁴²

39. "Shakespeare and the Drama" (*Tolstoy on Art*, pp. 445-46). Cf. "On Art" (*ibid.*, p. 82): "Therefore, though a work of art must always include something new, yet the revelation of something new will not always be a work of art. That it should be a work of art, it is necessary: (1) That the new idea, the content of the work, should be of importance to mankind. (2) That this content should be expressed so clearly that people may understand it. (3) That what incites the author to work at his production should be an inner need and not an external inducement." *Ibid.*, p. 84: "A perfect work of art will be one in which the content is important and significant to all men, and therefore it will be *moral*. The expression will be quite clear, intelligible to all, and therefore *beautiful*; the author's relation to his work will be altogether sincere, and heartfelt, and therefore *true*."

40. Kant, *op. cit.*, Part I, Div. I, § 45, p. 187: "In a product of beautiful art we must become conscious that it is Art and not Nature; but yet the purposiveness of its form must seem to be as free from all constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a product of mere nature. . . . Nature is beautiful because it looks like Art; and Art can only be called beautiful if we are conscious of it as Art while yet it looks like Nature."

41. *Ibid.*, § 46, p. 189: "Therefore, beautiful art cannot itself devise the rule according to which it can bring about its product. But since at the same time a product can never be called Art without some precedent rule, Nature in the subject must (by the harmony of its faculties) give the rule to Art; i.e., beautiful Art is only possible as a product of Genius."

42. *Laws* ii. 669A-B.

Whereas Kant had considered questions which involved the same three variables in terms of two problems concerned with the faculties of the mind and nature, Plato's formulation of the questions leads to the reduction of them all to problems which can be solved only by reference to the nature of the object.

For Aristotle, on the other hand, critical questions bear fundamentally, not on something external to the work of art, but on the poem itself, and questions of fault no less than of excellence are determined in view of the end of poetry and the use of devices within the framework of the plot which is the end of poetry. Questions concerning the artist, the work of art, and the audience, therefore, appear in his criticism, as in Plato's, transformed so as to be related to an object; but for Aristotle, unlike Plato, the orientation is to an artificial, not an eternal or even a natural, object, and the faults, alleged by critics, based on external criteria may be justified by consideration of the work of art itself. Criticism of the poet's art takes the form of alleged impossibilities; criticism of the faithfulness of the work to fact depends on alleged improbabilities; criticism of expression or meaning depends on alleged contradictions and improprieties of language. The dialectic of criticism as developed by the philosophers who argue analogically is in terms which depend on the criteria relevant to poet-poem-audience, or making-judging, or object; but the same problems appear in the tradition of literal criticism in terms which bear on the criteria relevant to organization-content-language, or making-judging, or language. Aristotle holds that faults in respect to impossibility, improbability, and contradiction may be justified if they contribute to the end of art. Impossibilities are faults in the poet's art, but they may be justified by reference to the requirements of *art*, if they contribute to the plot by making it, or some portion of it, more astounding.⁴³ Improbabilities are errors in the representation of fact, but they may be justified by reference to the *better* or to *opinion*, for the artist should portray men better than they are or he should take account of circumstances, of what men are thought to be and of the probability of things happening against probability.⁴⁴ Inconsistencies or contradictions of language may be

43. *Poet.* 25. 1460^b22: "First, with respect to critical problems relating to the poet's art itself, if he has set forth impossibilities he has committed an error; but the error may be justified, if the poet thereby achieves the end of poetry itself—for the end has already been stated—if, that is, he thus makes this or some other part of the poem more astounding. . . . Again, is the error with respect to something essential to the art or only accidental to it? For it is less of an error not to know that the hind has no horns than to make an unrecognizable picture of one." *Ibid.* 1461^b9: "In general the 'impossible' must be justified relative to the requirements of poetry, or to the *better*, or to *opinion*. Relative to the requirements of poetry a convincing impossibility is preferable to an unconvincing possibility."

44. *Ibid.* 1060^b32: "If the objection is that the poet's narration is not true, the answer should be that perhaps it ought to be, just as Sophocles said that he made men as they ought to be, while Euripides made them as they are. . . . Again, relative to the question whether what has been said or done by someone has been well or badly said or done, we must examine not only what has been done or said, inquiring concerning it whether it is noble or base,

solved by consideration of usage, metaphor, punctuation, and the like.⁴⁵ By holding to the conception and standard of the unity of the work, the critic is able to follow Aristotle's dialectic in playing the technique of the artist against the opinions of the audience and both against the probabilities of the matter. Bacon, on the other hand, approaches poetry in terms of the matter accessible to and organized by imagination, and therefore treats of two problems of criticism in his characteristic effort to advance human learning: the estimation of existing poetry—and in this, unlike other branches of learning, he finds no deficiency—and recommendations for improvement—for which he finds no means.⁴⁶ Bacon has no criterion of organic unity, and he has little patience with questions of poetic language; his criticism, therefore, is almost entirely in terms of matter as object or product of imagination. Horace, finally, since he approaches poetry in terms of the technique of the poet, uses the terms suggested by *poeta-poesis-poema*; and, since the audience is pleased by a familiar or a consistent matter well expressed, and since words are fitted to matter, the problems of criticism consist—even those which bear on the unity of the poem and the choice of content—largely in questions for which the relevant criteria are found in terms of words.⁴⁷

In application and precept, therefore, modes of criticism thus differently oriented will select different points of excellence in the work of the artist and indicate different objectives to be urged on his attention. The same traits will

but also who did it or said it, to whom, when, by what means, and for what end—whether, for example, he does it to secure greater good, or to avoid a greater evil." *Ibid.* 1461^b12: "Such men as Zeuxis painted may be impossible but may be justified by the *better*, for the model ought to improve on the actual. The improbable must be justified by *what is commonly said*, and also by showing that at times it is not improbable, for there is a probability also of things happening contrary to probability."

45. *Ibid.* 1461^a9 and 1461^b16.

46. *Of the Proficiency and Advancement of Learning*, Book II, p. 343: "The use of this Feigned History hath been to give some shadow of satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature of things doth deny it; the world being in proportion inferior to the soul; by reason whereof there is agreeable to the spirit of man a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more absolute variety, than can be found in the nature of things." *Ibid.*, p. 346: "In this third part of learning, which is poesy, I can report no deficiency. For being as a plant that cometh to the lust of the earth, without a formal seed, it hath sprung up and spread abroad more than any other kind." Cf. *De augmentis scientiarum*, Book VI, chap. i, pp. 443–44: "But for poesy (whether we speak of stories or metre) it is (as I said before) like a luxuriant plant, that comes of the lust of the earth, without any formal seed. Wherefore it spreads everywhere and is scattered far and wide,—so that it would be vain to take thought about the defects of it. With this therefore we need not trouble ourselves."

47. Horace *op. cit.* 408–53, esp. 445–40: "A good and prudent man will censure lifeless verses, he will find fault with harsh ones; if they are inelegant he will blot them out with a black line by drawing his pen across them; he will cut out pretentious ornaments; he will force you to turn light on things not sufficiently clear; he will argue against what has been said ambiguously; he will mark what should be changed; he will become an Aristarchus"; cf. also *Epistles* ii. 2. 106–25.

be given not merely a different importance but a different meaning and locus in the statements of different critics, and they will become in one view the points of highest excellence and in another faults. Tolstoy insists on the essential importance of novelty in a work of art—it cannot be a work of art without something new in it—and he seeks the novelty in the content. Horace is indifferent to a novelty of content—he recommends a tale newly invented if it is consistent, while urging the traditional subjects even more strongly, particularly the themes drawn from Homer—but he defends with vigor the right of the poet to invent new words or to put old words to new uses.⁴⁸ For Kant novelty is translated into the originality of genius and is reflected in the freedom of imagination essential to the judgment of beauty.⁴⁹ For Bacon, who is concerned, not with the forms of judgment, but with the parts of learning, novelty is found in the lush and uncontrolled growth of poetry which makes useless and unnecessary any plans for its advancement. If the operation of novelty as a criterion is sought in Aristotle, it is found to have shifted once again, from judgment and learning to the object of art as it had shifted from the processes of composition to the faculties of the mind, and to have become the novel and marvelous element which contributes to the structure of the plot, while in Plato it is criticized as the fickle changeableness which is incompatible with the contemplation and imitation of an eternal model of beauty.⁵⁰ The choice of principles may seem a matter of initial indifference or of basic dogma, and the development of statement and determination of method may seem, in the critic who fits what he says to the instances he adduces, to depend on the facts of nature or art or experience, but the judgments of the critic may have a double effect on the facts by influencing the purposes of the artist and the taste of the audience; and therefore it is no less true that the nature and purposes of art depend on what the critic, broadly conceived, thinks his function to be than that the function of criticism is to judge the products and achievements of art.

II

Philosophic principles determine the meaning and subject matter of statements about art, and, conversely, the explication and application of statements

48. Horace *Ars poetica* 46–72.

49. Kant, *op. cit.*, Part I, Div. I, § 47, pp. 192–93: “Now since the originality of the talent constitutes an essential (though not the only) element in the character of genius, shallow heads believe that they cannot better show themselves to be full-blown geniuses than by throwing off the constraint of all rules; they believe, in effect, that one could make a braver show on the back of a wild horse than on the back of a trained animal. Genius can only furnish rich *material* for products of beautiful art; its execution and its *form* require talent cultivated in the schools, in order to make such a use of this material as will stand examination by the Judgement.”

50. *Rep.* iv. 424B–C.

determine principles, for a single statement—an identical combination of words—may express or follow from different philosophic principles as it is variously defined and applied to various subject matters. Moreover, statements which seem explicitly to express the same or comparable philosophic principles may, as a result of methodological determination in use, apply now to a broad, now to a limited, subject matter, and in so doing they may unite the objects of art with those of nature or separate them, and they may analogize the products of the different arts to each other or differentiate them. Such differences in the application of principles to subject matter—involving questions concerning whether the same principles apply to nature and art or to moral action and artistic production—reflect changes in meaning which can be set forth in terms of method as well as of subject matter, for they result from separating theoretic, practical, and poetic judgments or in turn from merging (in varying manners of identification and varying degrees of mixture) considerations of knowing, doing, and making. The same differences in the determination and use of principles may therefore be seen in the functions attributed to artist, critic, and philosopher and in their relations to each other, for when subject matters and methods are distinct, the critic is distinguished from the artist and the philosopher, but when they merge the poet is critic, the critic is poet, or both are philosophers or—in lieu of philosophy for those philosophers who hold philosophy in disrepute—historians, sociologists, psychologists, semanticists, or scientists.

To discuss the function of the critic, therefore, is to discuss the function of the poet and philosopher. Indeed, the varying conceptions of the critic are illustrated historically in a dispute, which has been continuous since it was first formulated by the Greek philosophers and rhetoricians, between artist, critic, and philosopher. In the course of that dispute, the function of the critic has sometimes been limited to tasks less constructive or imaginative than those of the artist and less theoretic or intellectual than those of the philosopher; it has sometimes been broadened to include the functions exercised by both, while each of the disputants has claimed the functions of the others and the three have been collapsed repeatedly and again separated. The function of the critic may be identical with the functions of the artist and the philosopher either because criticism is conceived to be creative or intellectual or because art and philosophy are conceived to depend fundamentally on critical judgment; and if the functions of artist, critic, and philosopher are distinguished, it is because the critic operates in accordance with some form of philosophy which will permit him to seek causes and effects in the materials and forms of the artist. The function of the critic is determined alike in the fundamental assumptions of the philosopher, the critic, and the artist. It is determined in the principles from

which the philosopher derives not only his system but the criteria by which to judge it and the rules of art by which to develop it, and even short of the development of a philosophy, the function of the critic is determined in the philosophic principles assumed in the critical judgments and criteria which artists and critics, as well as philosophers, evolve and apply. It is determined, likewise, in the conception of art which is the critic's minimum philosophy as well as the grounds of his judgments of art. It is determined, finally, in the conception of artistic purpose which is the artist's minimum critical theory and philosophy as well as the implicit formulation of his processes of production. The different conceptions of the functions of criticism, and the consequent variability of critical judgments, flow from assumptions and involve consequences which extend beyond variations in the functions of the critic to variations in art and philosophy, and the examination of criticism may fruitfully proceed through the consideration of (1) variations in the conception of art and the artist, which reflect consequences of criticism, and (2) variations in the conception of philosophy and philosophic method, which involve the grounds of judgments of value, to (3) variations in the conceptions of criticism itself and its applications.

Artists are necessarily critics in the act of artistic construction or composition. They sometimes, in addition to this active and illustrative criticism, explain what they have tried to do and relate it to the productions of other artists or the statements of other critics. Poets in particular have entered not only into that competition with other poets which is involved in the production of new poetic effects but also into competition with critics in defense of a conception of art and criticism, and with philosophers in justification of a view of life consonant with such critical values. They have frequently written as critics, expressing in their verses judgments of other poets, as Aristophanes did, or of poets and critics too, as Byron did. They have developed theories of criticism and poetics, both in verse—as did Horace, Vida, Boileau, Pope, and Browning—and in prose—as did Sidney, Dryden, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, Emerson, Bryant, and Newman. All the functions which the philosopher and the rhetorician have assigned to the poet reappear in the theories of poets: he is maker, contriver, and imitator; he is engaged in pleasing, instructing, and edifying; his poetry is a source of, as it is derived from, inspiration, enchantment, and imagination. In addition, however, the poet is assigned all the functions which any philosopher has sought to contrast to poetry in a more limited conception of the domain of art, and poets as critics have made converts of other critics and other historians and have taught them to present the poet eloquently not only as maker, but as seer, prophet, scientist, philosopher, moralist, and legislator, and to trace the history of all human knowledge and accomplishment

from poetic beginnings or to poetic fulfillments. What the poet is conceived to be—since it determines how poetry will be read, for scientific truth and moral precept, for imaginative construction and emotional stimulation, for enrichment of experience and impetus to action, for pleasure and edification—becomes in itself the statement of a history, a morality, a politics, and a philosophy.⁵¹ All sciences are dominated and perfected by poetry;⁵² man and human

51. George Puttenham, *The Arte of English Poesie*, ed. G. D. Willcock and A. Walker (Cambridge, 1936), Book I, chaps. iii and iv, pp. 6–9: “The profession and use of Poesie is most ancient from the beginning and not, as manie erroneously suppose, after, but before, any civil society among men. . . . Then forasmuch as they were the first that entended to the observation of nature and her works, and specially of the Celestiall courses, by reason of the continuall motion of the heavens, searching after the first mover, and from thence by degrees comming to know and consider of the substances separate and abstract, which we call the divine intelligences or good Angels (*Demonies*) they were the first that instituted sacrifices of placation, with invocations and worship to them, as to Gods: and invented and stablished all the rest of the observances and ceremonies of religion, and so were the first Priests and ministers of the holy misteries. . . . So also were they the first Prophetes or sears, *Videntes*. . . . So as the Poets were also from the beginning the best perswaders and their eloquence the first Rethoricke of the world. Even so it became that the high mysteries of the gods should be revealed and taught, by a maner of utterance and language of extraordinarie phrase, and brieft and compendious, and above al others sweet and civill as the Metricall is . . . so as the Poet was also the first historiographer . . . they were the first Astronomers and Philosophists and Metaphisicks.” The sum of all wisdom is frequently found in a single poet; cf. Sir Thomas Elyot, *The Governour*, ed. Henry Croft (London, 1880), I, 58–59: “I coulde reherce diuers other poetis whiche for mater and eloquence be very necessary, but I feare me to be longe from noble Homere: from whom as from a fountaine proceeded all eloquence and lernyng. For in his bokes be contained, and most perfectly expressed, nat only the documentes marciall and discipline of armes, but also incomparable wisedomes, and instructions for politike gouernaunce of people: with the worthy commendation and laude of noble princis: where with the reders shall be so all inflamed, that they most fervently shall desire and coveite, by the imitation of their vertues, to acquire semblable glorie.” According to Sidney, *The Defence of Poesie* (*The Complete Works of Sir Philip Sidney*, ed. Feuillerat [Cambridge, 1923], III, 5), poetry is the origin of all learning and the passport by which philosophers and historiographers first “entered the gates of populer judgements”; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 4–5: “This did so notably shew it selfe, that the Philosophers of Greece durst not a long time appear to the world, but under the masks of poets. So Thales, Empedocles, and Parmenides, sang their naturall Philosophie in verses. So did Pithagoras and Phocillides, their morall Councils. So did Tirtus in warre matters, and Solon in matters of pollicie, or rather they being Poets, did exercise their delightfull vaine in those points of highest knowledge, which before them laie hidden to the world.” Or, again, poetry may be made to embrace all the higher activities of man, including the other arts; cf. Shelley, *A Defence of Poetry* (*The Prose Works of P. B. Shelley*, ed. H. B. Forman [London, 1880], III, 104): “But poets, or those who imagine and express this indestructible order, are not only the authors of language and of music, of the dance, and architecture, and statuary, and painting; they are the institutors of laws and the founders of civil society, and the inventors of the arts of life, and the teachers, who draw into a certain propinquity with the beautiful and the true, that partial apprehension of the agencies of the invisible world which is called religion.” Or similar convictions may be expressed in terms of an evolution in which poets gradually fell from a high estate; cf. Lowell, *op. cit.*, pp. 432–33: “And however far we go back, we shall find this also—that the poet and the priest were united originally in the same person; which means that the poet was he who was conscious of the world of spirit as well as that of sense, and was the ambassador of the gods to men. This was his highest function, and hence his name of ‘seer.’ . . . Gradually, however, the poet as the ‘seer’ became secondary to the ‘maker.’ His office became that of

life are by nature poetical;⁵³ the universe itself is the creation, or at least the re-creation of poetic art.⁵⁴

entertainer rather than teacher. But always something of the old tradition was kept alive. And if he has now come to be looked upon merely as the best expresser, the gift of seeing is implied as necessarily antecedent to that, and of seeing very deep, too. . . . Now, under all these names—praiser, seer, soothsayer—we find the same idea lurking. The poet is he who can best see and best say what is ideal—what belongs to the world of soul and of beauty.”

52. Sidney, *op. cit.*, p. 19: “Now therein of all Sciences (I speak still of humane and according to the humane conceit) is our Poet the Monarch. For hee doth not onely shew the way, but giveth so sweete a prospect into the way, as will entice anie man to enter into it.” Wordsworth, “Preface to the *Lyrical Ballads*” (*The Prose Works of William Wordsworth*, ed. A. B. Grosart [London, 1876], II, 91): “Poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge; it is the impassioned expression which is in the countenance of all science. . . . Poetry is the first and last of all knowledge—it is as immortal as the heart of man.” These contentions concerning the nature of poetry are made in the face of opposition; cf. Peacock, “The Four Ages of Poetry” (*The Works of Thomas Love Peacock*, ed. H. F. B. Brett-Smith and C. E. Jones [London, 1934], VIII, 21): “The highest inspirations of poetry are resolvable into three ingredients: the rant of unregulated passion, the whine of exaggerated feeling, and the cant of factitious sentiment; and can therefore serve only to ripen a splendid lunatic like Alexander, a puling driveller like Werter, or a morbid dreamer like Wordsworth. It can never make a philosopher, nor a statesman, nor in any class of life a useful or rational man.” Even in this estimate of poetry the function of the poet is conceived to extend to philosophy, politics, and the practical problems of life, and Shelley’s reply to Peacock’s criticisms merely asserts what Peacock denies. Shelley includes among poets, not only the authors of language and music, but also the institutors of laws, the founders of civil society, the inventors of the arts of life, and the teachers of religion (*op. cit.*, p. 104), and he denies the distinction between poets and prose writers, philosophers and historians, holding, indeed, that all authors of revolutions in opinion are necessarily poets (*ibid.*, p. 107). “Poetry is indeed something divine. It is at once the centre and circumference of knowledge; it is that which comprehends all science, and that to which all science must be referred” (*ibid.*, p. 136). “Poets are the hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration; the mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon the present; the words which express what they understand not; the trumpets which sing to battle and feel not what they inspire; the influence which is moved not, but moves. Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world” (*ibid.*, p. 144).

53. Hazlitt, “On Poetry in General” (*The Complete Works of William Hazlitt*, ed. P. P. Howe [London, 1930], V, 2): “It is not a branch of authorship: it is ‘the stuff of which our life is made.’ The rest is ‘mere oblivion,’ a dead letter: for all that is worth remembering in life, is the poetry of it. Fear is poetry, hope is poetry, love is poetry, hatred is poetry; contempt, jealousy, remorse, admiration, wonder, pity, despair, or madness are all poetry. Poetry is that fine particle within us, that expands, rarefies, refines, raises our whole being: without it ‘man’s life is poor as beast’s.’ Man is a poetical animal; and those of us who do not study the principles of poetry, act upon them all our lives, like Molière’s *Bourgeois Gentilhomme*, who had always spoken prose without knowing it.” Or, again, the poetic nature of mankind is at the background of the poet’s direction of man and poetry’s dominance of the sciences; cf. Whitman, *op. cit.*, pp. iv, vii: “Of all nations the United States with veins full of poetical stuff most need poets and will doubtless have the greatest and use them the greatest. Their Presidents shall not be their common referee so much as their poets shall. Of all mankind the greatest poet is the equable man. Not in him but off from him things are grotesque or eccentric or fail of their sanity. Nothing out of its place is good and nothing in its place is bad. He bestows on every object or quality its fit proportions neither more nor less. He is the arbiter of the diverse and he is the key. . . . Exact science and its practical movements are no checks on the greatest poet but always his encouragement and support. . . . In the beauty of poems are the tuft and final applause of science.”

54. Augustine *De civitate Dei* xi. 21: “What else indeed is to be understood by that which is said through all things: ‘God saw that it was good,’ but the approbation of work done

To determine the function of the poet is to mark the scope of the other arts, of criticism, and of philosophy; and whatever poetry is distinguished from or opposed to, in one account, may be viewed as essentially poetical in another: music, painting, and the rest of the arts may be instances of poetry; the true critic may be poetic and creative; and Plato may be made a poet by the same processes as made Homer and Shakespeare philosophers. Poetry is expanded and contracted both with respect to the arts conceived as poetic and with respect to the practices thought proper to them. The critic and philosopher—or the poet and amateur functioning as critic and philosopher—may affect the practices and the interrelations of the arts. It is only a recent instance of an old complaint that Lessing expresses when he reproves “modern critics” for having crudely misconceived the relation of painting and poetry, sometimes compressing poetry within the narrow limits of painting, sometimes making painting fill the whole wide sphere of poetry, and for having generated by their spurious criticism a mania for pictorial description in poetry and for allegorical style in painting.⁵⁵ As criticism, operating through the activity of

according to the art which is the wisdom of God.” Shelley, *op. cit.*, p. 140: “It reproduces the common universe of which we are portions and percipients, and it purges from our inward sight the film of familiarity which obscures from us the wonder of our being. It compels us to feel that which we perceive, and to imagine that which we know. It creates anew the universe, after it has been annihilated in our minds by the recurrence of impressions blunted by reiteration. It justifies the bold and true word of Tasso: *Non merita nome di creatore, se non Iddio ed il Poeta* [None deserves the name of creator except God and the Poet].”

55. G. E. Lessing, *Laocoon*, Introd. (*Werke*, ed. J. Petersen [Leipzig, n.d.], IV, 292). The discussion of the relation of poetry and painting goes back to ancient beginnings, to Horace, Plutarch, and Pliny, and by way of them to Simonides’ conception of painting as silent poetry and poetry as speaking painting. Cf. also John Dryden, *Parallel of Poetry and Painting* (1695); Abbé du Bos, *Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture* (1719); Charles Lamotte, *An Essay upon Painting and Poetry* (1730); James Harris, “Concerning Music, Painting, and Poetry,” *Three Treatises* (1744); Joseph Spence, *Polymetis; or, an Inquiry concerning the Agreement between the Works of the Roman Poets and the Remains of the Ancient Artists, Being an Attempt To Illustrate Them Mutually from One Another* (1747); G. E. Lessing, *Laocoon* (1766); Daniel Webb, *Observations on the Correspondence between Poetry and Music* (1769). Poetry may be conceived as the essential nature or the definition of painting and music, or it may merely share with them some common characteristics or effect some common responses. Cf. S. T. Coleridge, *Shakespeare: With Introductory Matter on Poetry, the Drama, and the Stage* (*Works*, IV, 39): “In my last address I defined poetry to be the art, or whatever better term our language may afford, of representing external nature and human thoughts, both relatively to human affections, so as to cause the production of as great immediate pleasure in each part as is compatible with the largest possible sum of pleasure on the whole. Now this definition applies equally to painting and music as to poetry; and in truth the term poetry is alike applicable to all three.” Cf. also John Stuart Mill, “Thoughts on Poetry and Its Varieties,” *Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, and Historical* (New York, 1882), I, 89: “That, however, the word ‘poetry’ imports something quite peculiar in its nature; something which may exist in what is called prose as well as in verse; something which does not even require the instrument of words, but can speak through the other audible symbols called musical sounds, and even through the visible ones which are the language of sculpture, painting, and architecture,—all this, we believe, is and must be felt, though perhaps indistinctly, by all upon whom poetry in any of its shapes produces any impression beyond that of tickling

artists, affects art, those immanent critical processes in turn affect criticism and the philosophic ideas it embodies; and criticism and philosophy undergo like changes with the variations in art. The discussion of the function of the poet is a philosophic discussion, and its progress through the ages reflects the differences between those philosophers who find poetry and philosophy essentially the same and therefore seek only to determine whether poetry is perfect or deficient philosophy and whether philosophy is supreme or partial poetry and those philosophers who distinguish artistic constructions from philosophic speculations and therefore make use of art or criticism or philosophy to prevent the confusion of disciplines.

There is a rivalry between poetry and philosophy in so far as they are pertinent to the same ends and in so far as the same standards may be applied to both. The quarrel was ancient in the time of Plato,⁵⁶ and it has continued to the present because the tradition of discussion sets poetry to be judged against a standard of truth and reason, and philosophy to be criticized for its ineffectiveness and uncouthness. Plato banished the poets from the perfect state, not despite but because of the charm he acknowledges in their art, for it endangers the highest ends of man and the most vital functions of the state. The danger of poetry lies precisely in the fact that the poet, with all his art, may speak well and badly according to the standard of philosophic truth; and in the dialectic of Plato the indeterminacy for which poetry is criticized is removed only when the poet writes with knowledge, and then the poet is rightly called "philosopher." The standard applied to the poet is the same as that of the lawgiver, and therefore in the perfect state the philosopher is poet as well as ruler. Even in the second-best state delineated in the *Laws*, the principles of art are inseparable from those of morals, legislation, and philosophy; and, when a model is sought in that dialogue to indicate what is wrong and what is right in poetry, it is found in the discourse itself, which the interlocutor finds is framed exactly like a poem.⁵⁷ Moreover, the poet is under suspicion in that state as well as in the perfect republic, and writers of tragedies are viewed as rivals of lawgivers who are not philosophers as well as of those who are.

Best of strangers, we will say to them, we ourselves are poets, to the best of our ability, of the fairest and best tragedy, for our whole state is composed as an imitation of the fairest and best life, which we assert to be in reality the truest tragedy. Thus you

the ear." The three seem to overlap, without being identified essentially, according to Leigh Hunt; cf. "An Answer to the Question What Is Poetry?" (*Critical Essays of the Early Nineteenth Century*, ed. R. M. Alden [New York, 1921], p. 378): "Poetry includes whatsoever of painting can be made visible to the mind's eye, and whatsoever of music can be conveyed by sound and proportion without singing or instrumentation."

56. *Rep.* 607B.

57. *Laws* vii. 811C–D.

are poets and we likewise are poets of the same poems, opposed to you as artists and actors in the fairest drama, which true law alone, as our hope is, is suited to perfect. Do not imagine therefore that we will easily permit you to erect your stage among us in the market place and to introduce your actors, endowed with fair voices and louder than our own, and allow you to harangue women and children and all the people, saying concerning the same questions, not the same things as we do, but commonly and on most things the very opposite.⁵⁸

This is a tradition of discussion and opposition which the poets were to continue, reversing the dialectic to find poetry in Plato's works while puzzling over his antagonism to poetry, to criticize the cold insensitivity of philosophy while claiming for poetry high philosophic insight, and to seek a truth in poetry while revising according to its standard the canon of true poets. All of the terms shift their meanings in the dialectic of this discussion. Plato is sometimes a poet, although philosophy is distinct from poetry, since, as Sidney argues, "who so ever well considereth, shall finde that in the body of his worke, though the inside and strength were Philosophie, the skin as it were and beautie, depended most of Poetrie."⁵⁹ He is sometimes an instance of the highest kind of poetry,⁶⁰ and philosophy is indispensable to poetry, since "no man," as Coleridge presents the case, "was ever yet a great poet, without being at the same time a profound philosopher."⁶¹ He is sometimes essentially a poet, and Shakespeare is a philosopher, despite differences, such as Shelley emphasizes, in literary forms.⁶² He is sometimes a true poet; and, since, as Emerson formulates the nature of poetry, poets are scientists and logicians, inspirers and lawgivers, some reservations must be made concerning the poetic quality of Shakespeare.⁶³

58. *Ibid.* 817B–C.

59. Sidney, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

60. Coleridge, *Biographia literaria* (*Works*, III, 373): "The writings of Plato and Jeremy Taylor, and Burnet's *Theory of the Earth*, furnish undeniable proofs that poetry of the highest kind may exist without metre, and even without the contradistinguishing objects of a poem."

61. *Ibid.*, p. 381. The statement is applied in a discussion of Shakespeare and Milton.

62. *Op. cit.*, pp. 107–8: "Plato was essentially a poet—the truth and splendour of his imagery, and the melody of his language, are the most intense that it is possible to conceive. He rejected the harmony of the epic, dramatic, and lyrical forms, because he sought to kindle a harmony in thoughts divested of shape and action, and he forbore to invent any regular plan of rhythm which would include, under determinate forms, the varied pauses of his style. Cicero sought to imitate the cadence of his periods, but with little success. Lord Bacon was a poet. . . . Nor are those supreme poets, who have employed traditional forms of rhythm on account of the form and action of their subjects, less capable of perceiving and teaching the truth of things, than those who have omitted that form. Shakespeare, Dante, and Milton (to confine ourselves to modern writers) are philosophers of the very loftiest power."

63. Emerson, "Poetry and Imagination," *Letters and Social Aims* (Boston, 1883), p. 42: "For poetry is science, and the poet a truer logician," from whence it follows (*ibid.*, pp. 66, 68): "The poet who shall use nature as his hieroglyphic must have an adequate message to convey thereby. Therefore, when we speak of the Poet in any high sense, we are driven to such examples as Zoroaster and Plato, St. John and Menu, with their moral burdens. The Muse shall be the counterpart of Nature, and equally rich. . . . But in current literature I do not find her. Literature warps away from life, though at first it seems to bind it. In the world of

This rivalry of poetry and philosophy seems to disappear in the tradition of discussion in which poetry is contrasted literally to philosophy on all the points which served for their analogical comparison. Yet in the mixture of the traditions of literal and analogical discussion which constitutes the greater part of the history of thought, the effect of such distinctions is to supply points to serve as bases for later analogizing. The Platonic analogy of poetry and philosophy, thus, is combated in Aristotle's philosophy by distinguishing the kind of knowledge required for poetic constructions from other kinds of knowledge by its purpose; for theoretic knowledge is pursued for its own sake and for truth, practical knowledge for the sake of conduct, and poetic knowledge for the sake of making something useful or beautiful. The distinction having been made, however, the analogizing technique may be applied to it, and philosophers since the time of Aristotle have stated their basic principles by determining whether philosophy is essentially theoretic, or practical, or poetic. The conception of philosophy, therefore, is affected, no less than that of poetry, each time it is decided that philosophy is or is not poetry and that poetry is or is not philosophy: so long as the principles of philosophy are sought in the nature of things, philosophy may pretend to be fundamentally theoretic and speculative for all its practical implications and consequences;⁶⁴ when principles are sought in the nature of the human faculties or the development of human knowledge, practical knowledge tends to assume ascendancy in the hierarchy of the sciences;⁶⁵ and, finally, when principles are sought in operations and in the relations of symbols and when we seek substitutes for cer-

letters how few commanding oracles! Homer did what he could; Pindar, Aeschylus, and the Greek Gnostic poets and the tragedians. Dante was faithful when not carried away by his fierce hatreds. But in so many alcoves of English poetry I can count only nine or ten authors who are still inspirers and lawgivers to their race. . . . We are a little civil, it must be owned, to Homer and Aeschylus, to Dante and Shakespeare, and give them the benefit of the largest interpretation." Cf., also, Montesquieu, *Pensées diverses* (*Œuvres complètes de Montesquieu* [Paris, 1866], p. 626): "Les quatre grands poètes, Platon, Malebranche, Shaftesbury, Montaigne!"

64. Plato *Statesman* 259E, 285E–286A; *Rep.* vii. 518B–519D. Aristotle *Metaph.* i. 1. 981^b25–982^a3.

65. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. F. M. Müller (2d ed.; New York, 1919), Part II, "Transcendental Doctrine of Method," chap. ii, "The Canon of Pure Reason," pp. 647–48: "Pure reason, therefore, contains, not indeed in its speculative, yet in its practical, or, more accurately, its moral employment, principles of the *possibility of experience*, namely, of such actions as *might* be met with in the *history* of man according to moral precepts. For as reason commands that such actions should take place, they must be possible, and a certain kind of systematical unity also, namely, the moral, must be possible; while it was impossible to prove the systematical unity *according to the speculative principles of reason*. For reason, no doubt, possesses causality with respect to freedom in general, but not with respect to the whole of nature, and moral principles of reason may indeed produce free actions, but not laws of nature. Consequently, the principles of pure reason possess objective reality in their practical and more particularly in their moral employment" (cf. "Introduction to the Second edition," pp. 695–96).

tainty in the precisions of measurement, philosophy becomes an art again, since art takes precedence over the practical and the theoretic and man ceases to be *homo sapiens* and finds his best characterization in the functions of *homo faber*.⁶⁶

The Platonic analogy of poetry and philosophy based on their common ends is closely related to the analogy of art and nature as imitation and exemplar. Aristotle countered that analogy with the distinction of natural objects, in which the principle of motion is internal, and artificial objects, whose cause must be sought in the idea and intention of artist or artisan. Like the analogy of poetry and philosophy, the analogy of art and nature was continued either in its original terms as a likeness found in things or in terms (derived from Aristotle's literal distinctions) which connect art and nature in characteristics found in the judgments of man or in his actions. Hobbes, thus, like Plato, not only treats art as an imitation of nature but conceives nature as a kind of art:

Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by the *art* of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within; why may we not say, that all *automata* (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the *heart*, but a *spring*; and the *nerves*, but so many *strings*; and the *joints*, but so many *wheels*, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer? *Art* goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of nature, *man*. For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, OR STATE, in Latin CIVITAS, which is but an artificial man.⁶⁷

That analogy of God's creation in nature to man's creations in art lent itself easily to the terminology of Christian theology and, during the Middle Ages,

66. H. Bergson, *L'Évolution créatrice* (34th ed.; Paris, 1929), p. 151: "Si nous pouvions nous dépouiller de tout orgueil, si, pour définir notre espèce, nous nous en tenions strictement à ce que l'histoire et la préhistoire nous présentent comme la caractéristique constante de l'homme et de l'intelligence, nous ne dirions peut-être pas *Homo sapiens*, mais *Homo faber*." Cf. Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 71. Kant's emphasis on the conditions of thought and on *possible experience* leads to a philosophy in which practical rather than theoretical reason occupies the central place; Dewey's emphasis on the conditions of action and on *experience* yields a philosophy in which theory and practice are both arts; cf. *Experience and Nature* (New York, 1929), pp. 357–58: "But if modern tendencies are justified in putting art and creation first, then the implications of this position should be avowed and carried through. It would then be seen that science is an art, that art is practice, and that the only distinction worth drawing is not between practice and theory, but between those modes of practice that are not intelligent, not inherently and immediately enjoyable, and those which are full of enjoyed meanings. When this perception dawns, it will be a commonplace that art—the mode of activity that is charged with the meanings capable of immediately enjoyed possession—is the complete culmination of nature, and that 'science' is properly a handmaiden that conducts natural events to this happy issue. Thus would disappear the separations that trouble present thinking: division of everything into nature *and* experience, of experience into practice *and* theory, art *and* science, of art into useful *and* fine, menial *and* free."

67. *Leviathan* (*The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, ed. W. Molesworth [London, 1808], III, ix).

bent even the Aristotelian view of God as First Mover and First Cause to its services. When, however, a philosophic basis was sought for our judgments of things by examination of the nature of our knowledge, art was analogized to nature by means of the human faculties which bring together traits by which Aristotle had distinguished them, as judgment, for Kant, bears on the perception of purpose in nature and the perception of beauty in nature and art and so serves as link between the practical and the theoretical:

The concept formed by Judgement of a purposiveness of Nature belongs to natural concepts, but only as a regulative principle of the cognitive faculty; although the aesthetical judgement upon certain objects (of Nature or Art) which occasions it is, in respect of the feeling of pleasure or pain, a constitutive principle. The spontaneity in the play of the cognitive faculties, the harmony of which contains the ground of this pleasure, makes the above concept [of the purposiveness of nature] fit to be the mediating link between the realm of the natural concept and that of the concept of freedom in its effects; whilst at the same time it promotes the sensibility of the mind for moral feeling.⁶⁸

When, finally, a philosophic basis for our concept of nature and our judgment of values was sought in the examination of experience, purposiveness disappeared from nature as such and value from things as such, and art was analogized to nature by bringing together traits by which Aristotle had distinguished them, as all objects, for Dewey—the objects of the sciences and the objects of the arts—are tools, and art is natural, since it originates in natural tendencies in man and employs natural means to further natural ends.

In experience, human relations, institutions, and traditions are as much a part of the nature in which and by which we live as is the physical world. Nature in this meaning is not “outside.” It is in us and we are in and of it. But there are multitudes of ways of participating in it, and these ways are characteristic not only of various experiences of the same individual, but of attitudes of aspiration, need and achievement that belong to civilizations in their collective aspect. Works of art are means by which we enter, through imagination and the emotions they evoke, into other forms of relationship and participation than our own.⁶⁹

68. Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, Intro., pp. 41–42. E. A. Poe makes similar, though more simple, use of the faculties of the mind to put Aristotelian distinctions to un-Aristotelian uses; cf. “The Poetic Principle” (*Works*, ed. Stedman and Woodberry [New York, 1914], VI, 11): “Dividing the world of mind into its three most obvious distinctions, we have the Pure Intellect, Taste, and the Moral Sense. I place Taste in the middle, because it is just this position which in the mind it occupies. It holds intimate relations with either extreme, but from the Moral Sense is separated by so faint a difference that Aristotle has not hesitated to place some of its operations among the virtues themselves. Nevertheless, we find the offices of the trio marked with a sufficient distinction. Just as the Intellect concerns itself with Truth, so Taste informs us of the Beautiful, while the Moral Sense is regardful of Duty.”

69. *Art as Experience*, p. 333; cf. also p. 79: “In other words, art is not nature, but it is nature transformed by entering into new relationships where it evokes a new emotional response.” Cf. also *Experience and Nature*, pp. 136, 150–51, and esp. 358: “Thus the issue involved in experience as art in its pregnant sense and in art as processes and materials of

Nature is art because the universe, like the objects of art, is created, or because the judgment of purpose in nature, like the judgment of beauty, involves the free interplay of our faculties, or because our experience of things permits no sharp separation of our use, our knowledge, and our enjoyment of them; and each of these reasonable analogies is also reduced to literal-minded statements and criticized because it involves fictitious suppositions of eternal patterns of things, universal principles of thought, or collective aspects of epochs and civilizations.

The form in which Plato expressed his philosophy is indistinguishable from other forms of communication in his philosophy; for the subject matters of philosophy, poetry, rhetoric, and history are analogous, and the ends of the various forms of human activity are ultimately the same. It is no dramatic accident that Socrates spent part of the last hours of his life experimenting by divine direction with a poetic form; and there is no sharp line, in Plato’s employment, between dialectic, myth, and history. Aristotle could therefore commend his recording of the Socratic method as the discovery of the universal in science and philosophy, and could deprecate his separation of the universal from the particular.⁷⁰ Aristotle’s favorite means of differentiating the arts from one another is, in his sense, formal; and he therefore separated philosophy from poetry in terms, not of metrical forms, but of comparative universality, illustrating the distinction by placing poetry between philosophy and history.⁷¹ So long as the principles of philosophy are sought in the nature of things, science is of universals, since it must apply to more than the particular instance; but, when the principles of philosophy are based on a preliminary examination of the nature of thought, the virtue of science may be found either in its universality (since scientific laws must be shown to be necessary, while their objectivity may be assured by the laws of thought) or in its particularity (since scientific laws must be shown to be objective, while their universality may be assured by the uniformity of nature). Poetry may in this stage of the discussion

nature continued by direction into achieved and enjoyed meanings, sums up in itself all the issues which have been previously considered. Thought, intelligence, science is the intentional direction of natural events to meanings capable of immediate possession and enjoyment; this direction—which is operative art—is itself a natural event in which nature otherwise partial and incomplete comes fully to itself; so that objects of conscious experience when reflectively chosen, form the ‘end’ of nature.”

70. *Metaph.* xiii. 1078^b27–32.

71. *Poet.* 1. 1447^a16–20: “Even if statements concerning medicine or natural philosophy be set forth in metrical form, it is customary to call the author a poet. Yet there is nothing in common between Homer and Empedocles except the meter, and therefore it is right to call the one poet, but the other physicist rather than poet.” *Ibid.* 9. 1451^b5–7: “Wherefore poetry is more philosophic and more serious than history, for poetry is expressive more of universals, while history states singulars.”

be analogized to philosophy or to history; and the poetic quality, since it is midway between the general and the particular, may combine the two, or indeed it may be the source of the generality of philosophy or the particularity of history. Sidney borrows Aristotle's example to discover Empedocles a poet⁷² and to assign to poetry the performance of moral tasks at which philosophy and history fail.⁷³ According to Bacon, on the other hand, poetry is nothing else than an imitation of history for the giving of pleasure,⁷⁴ while Newman can quote Bacon to illustrate Aristotle's doctrine that poetry is more general than history and can follow Aristotle's judgment that Empedocles was no poet but a natural historian writing in verse in support of the doctrine that natural history and philosophy are proper materials for poetry.⁷⁵ Wordsworth, on the other hand, makes use of vague echoes of Aristotle to support the position that poetry is the most philosophical of all writing and to contrast poetry to matter of fact or science.⁷⁶ Like "philosophy," which may be taken either as identical

72. Sidney, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

73. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14: "The Philosopher therefore, and the Historian, are they which would win the goale, the one by precept, the other by example: but both, not having both, doo both halt. For the Philosopher setting downe with thornie arguments, the bare rule, is so hard of utterance, and so mistie to be conceived, that one that hath no other guide but him, shall wade in him till he be old, before he shall find sufficient cause to be honest. For his knowledge standeth so upon the abstract and generall, that happie is that man who may understand him, and more happie, that can apply what he doth understand. On the other side, the Historian wanting the precept, is so tied, not to what should be, but to what is, to the particular truth of things, and not to the general reason of things, that his example draweth no necessarie consequence, and therefore a lesse fruitfull doctrine. Now doth the peerlesse Poet performe both, for whatsoever the Philosopher saith should be done, he gives a perfect picture of it by some one, by whom he presupposeth it was done, so as he coupleth the generall notion with the particuler example."

74. *De augmentis scientiarum*, Book II, chap. xiii (*Works*, IV, 315); *Of the Proficiency and Advancement of Learning*, Book II (*Works*, III, 343). Cf. above, n. 21.

75. Newman, "Poetry, with Reference to Aristotle's 'Poetics,'" *Essays Critical and Historical* (London, 1890), I, 12: "Empedocles wrote his physics in verse, and Oppian his history of animals. Neither were poets—the one was an historian of nature, the other a sort of biographer of brutes. Yet a poet may make natural history or philosophy the material of his composition."

76. Wordsworth, *op. cit.*, p. 89: "Aristotle, I have been told, has said, that Poetry is the most philosophic of all writing: it is so: its object is truth, not individual and local, but general, and operative; not standing upon external testimony, but carried alive into the heart by passion; truth which is its own testimony, which gives competence and confidence to the tribunal to which it appeals, and receives them from the same tribunal. Poetry is the image of man and nature. The obstacles which stand in the way of the fidelity of the Biographer and Historian, and of their consequent utility, are incalculably greater than those which are to be encountered by the Poet who comprehends the dignity of his art." Cf. *ibid.*, p. 86 n.: "I here use the word 'Poetry' (though against my own judgment) as opposed to the word Prose, and synonymous with metrical composition. But much confusion has been introduced into criticism by this contradistinction of Poetry and Prose, instead of the more philosophical one of Poetry and Matter of Fact, or Science." Cf. J. R. Lowell, "Shakespeare Once More," *Literary Essays* (Boston, 1894), III, 70-71: "The aim of the artist is psychologic, not historic truth. It is comparatively easy for an author to get up any period with tolerable minuteness in externals, but readers and audiences find more difficulty in getting them down, though

with poetry or as an imperfect truth perfected by poetry, "history" takes on two senses in this Platonic opposition of a complete and partial truth. Shelley contrasts history to poetry:

A poem is the very image of life expressed in its eternal truth. There is this difference between a story and a poem, that a story is a catalogue of detached facts, which have no other connexion than time, place, circumstance, cause, and effect; the other is the creation of actions according to the unchangeable forms of human nature, as existing in the mind of the creator, which is itself the image of all other minds. The one is partial, and applies only to a definite period of time, and a certain combination of events which can never again recur; the other is universal, and contains within itself the germ of a relation to whatever motives or actions have place in the possible varieties of human nature.⁷⁷

Froude, on the other hand, finds the universality in that which is better and genuine in man and contrasts prose and verse but identifies the highest history with the highest poetry:

The prose historian may give us facts and names; he may catalogue the successions, and tell us long stories of battles, and of factions, and of political intrigues; he may draw characters for us of the sort which figure commonly in such features of human affairs, men of the unheroic, unpoetic kind—the Cleons, the Sejanuses, the Tiberiuses, a Philip the Second or a Louis Quatorze, in whom the noble element died out into selfishness and vulgarity. But great men—all MEN properly so called (whatever is genuine and natural in them)—lie beyond prose, and can only be really represented by the poet.⁷⁸

Finally, if the principles of our knowledge and the nature of things are sought in the processes of experience, history may assume dominance among sciences and things, either in the sense of accounting for the historical succession of poetry and philosophy as forms of wisdom and explanation—as Vico finds the "Aristotelian" aphorism that nothing is in understanding that was not prior in sense exemplified in the sequence after an age of poets, whose wisdom is of the sense, of an age of philosophers, whose wisdom is of the understanding⁷⁹—or in the sense that all things are histories—as Dewey finds

oblivion swallows scores of them at a gulp. The saving truth in such matters is a truth to essential and permanent characteristics.⁸⁰ Lowell, moreover, appreciated the fashion in which Wordsworth's doctrine that poetry is philosophy involved the further identification of philosophy with a kind of history, the history of the poet's mind; cf. "Wordsworth" (*Writings* [Boston, 1898], IV, 397-98): "He was theoretically determined not only to be a philosophic poet, but to be a great philosophic poet, and to this end he must produce an epic. Leaving aside the question whether the epic be obsolete or not, it may be doubted whether the history of a single man's mind is universal enough in its interest to furnish all the requirements of the epic machinery, and it may be more than doubted whether a poet's philosophy be ordinary metaphysics, divisible into chapter and section."

77. Shelley, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

78. "Homer," *Short Studies on Great Subjects*, 1st ser. (New York, 1873), p. 410; cf. also "The Science of History," *ibid.*, pp. 32-35.

79. G. B. Vico, *Principii di scienza nuova*, Book II (3d ed.; Naples, 1744), I, 129 and 376. The relation between poetry and philosophy is conceived in terms of particularity and gen-

history basic to all knowledge and histories more truly known than mathematical and physical objects.⁸⁰ Aristotle's distinction of philosophy, poetry, and history has been made the basis for assigning to poetry or history functions and characteristics which Aristotle conceived as philosophic, and, as a final irony, historians of philosophy have reproached him for mistaking poets for philosophers, misled in his humorless literal-mindedness by Plato's gentle irony.⁸¹

While poets dispute the authority of philosophers, supplementing scientific inquiries, rectifying metaphysical reflections, and expounding lofty and enigmatic visions, and philosophers in their turn borrow the devices of the poet to expound the nature, function, and place of the arts and use the arguments of the moralist or the economist to banish poets from their perfect states or to instruct them in their tasks as educators or propagandists, the critic sometimes conceives his function to be distinct from that of the artist and dialectician and

erality (cf. *ibid.*, Book I, pp. 90–91): “Axiom 53. Men first perceive without noticing; then they notice with perturbed and agitated soul; finally they reflect with a pure mind. This axiom is the principle of poetic judgments, which are formed by the perception of the passions and emotions, unlike philosophic judgments which are formed through reflection by reason. Wherefore the latter approximate more closely to truth the more they are raised to universality, and the former are more certain the more they descend to particularity.” The poetic truth may be true metaphysically when the physical truth is false (*ibid.*, p. 88). The history of mankind is analogized to the life of a man, and the infancy of the race is an age of poetry, prior to the formation of philosophy; the relation of art to nature is therefore complex—men supplement nature by the attentive study of art, but in poetry no one succeeds by art who has not the advantages of nature, and therefore, if poetry founded pagan civilization, from which in turn followed all the arts, the first poets were by nature. The people of the infant world were poets, and the arts are imitations of nature, a kind of *real poetry* (*ibid.*, p. 90). From this poetic wisdom derive on one branch a poetic logic, a poetic morality, a poetic economics, and a poetic politics, and on the other branch a poetic physics, from which proceed a poetic cosmography, astronomy, chronology, and geography (*ibid.*, p. 132).

80. *Experience and Nature*, p. 163: “And yet if all natural existences are histories, divorce between history and the logical mathematical schemes which are the appropriate objects of pure science, terminates in the conclusion that of existences there is no science, no adequate knowledge. Aside from mathematics, all knowledge is historic; chemistry, geology, physiology, as well as anthropology and those human events to which, arrogantly, we usually restrict the title of history. Only as science is seen to be fulfilled and brought to itself in intelligent management of historical processes in their continuity can man be envisaged as within nature, and not as a supernatural extrapolation. Just because nature is what it is, history is capable of being more truly known—understood, intellectually realized—than are mathematical and physical objects.”

81. J. Burnet (*Early Greek Philosophy* [3d ed.; London, 1920], p. 127) argues that Aristotle is mistaken in treating Xenophanes as the founder of the Eleatic school and that this mistake originated in his misinterpretation of Plato. “Just as he [Plato] called the Herakleiteans ‘followers of Homer and still more ancient teachers,’ so he attached the Eleatics to Xenophanes and still earlier authorities. We have seen before how these playful and ironical remarks of Plato were taken seriously by his successors, and we must not make too much of this fresh instance of Aristotle’s literalness.” Cf. *ibid.*, p. 32: “It is often forgotten that Aristotle derived much of his information from Plato, and we must specially observe that he more than once takes Plato’s humorous remarks too literally.”

sometimes enters into competition with both, assuming the role of poet among poets and dialectician among dialecticians. The functions assigned to criticism reflect all the analogies and distinctions found in the ends of poetry and philosophy, the objects of art and nature, and the forms of history, poetry, and philosophy. For criticism may be conceived as a technique applied only to works of art, if the literal distinctions are maintained; or it may be implied in any knowledge, involved in any activity, and applied to any object. The history of criticism can be traced and understood, therefore, in part by differentiating kinds of criticism applied to art, and in part by finding the manners in which criticism, conceived more broadly in a variety of ways, applies to art in particular. In the analogical tradition the effort is to avoid unreal distinctions between the emotional and the intellectual, the moral and the aesthetic, the artistic and the practical; and the development of the tradition is therefore the evolution of a single dialectic in which opposed devices for achieving critical universality jostle one another: criticism is sometimes the application of a theory in the judgment of objects and actions; it is sometimes the technique which determines both theories and arts; it is sometimes, like theory, itself an art. In the literal tradition the effort is to find a technique proper to each subject matter and therefore to separate, for the purposes of accuracy and clarity, considerations of moral, political, scientific, metaphysical, and aesthetic characteristics even in the judgment of a single object; and the development of the tradition is therefore a succession of analyses which achieve critical particularity in application to objects of art, canons of taste, or means of production and manners of social use. Echoes of the one effort emerge from the mingling of the two traditions as speculations concerning the Good, the True, and the Beautiful; and the other effort leaves its mark in discussions of the individual arts.

For Plato, “criticism” was a general term applied to all processes of judgment, those involved in the common distinctions made by the interlocutors in the dialogues as well as the technical distinctions of reason, but used particularly for the judgments pronounced in law-courts in application of the law; the judgment of art is usually treated by Plato in the context of broader political and judiciary functions. There are two intellectual arts or sciences—the science of commanding, which is the proper art of the statesman, and the art of judging, which, since it pronounces on what falls under or is disclosed by the art of commanding, is also part of the statesman’s art.⁸² Judgment is a decision between better and worse in all fields: between the unjust and the just man,⁸³

82. *Statesman* 259E–260A, 292B, 305B.

83. *Rep.* ii. 360D.

between possible kinds of lives and pleasures,⁸⁴ between pleasure and wisdom,⁸⁵ between true and false.⁸⁶ The criteria by which judgment pronounces on its subject matter to determine the comparative value of things among gods and men, and the degree of their approximation to the eternal good, are three: experience, intelligence, and discussion (*λόγος*), the latter being the “instrument” of judgment; in all three the philosopher has the advantage over other men.⁸⁷ The lawgiver, therefore, combats an erroneous doctrine—such as the separation of the pleasant from the just—by habituation, commendation, and discussion; and in the opposition of two judgments the character of the judge is reflected in the soundness of the judgment, for the judgment of the better man is more authoritative.⁸⁸ One might even concede the opinion of the majority of men that pleasure is the proper criterion of music and poetry, not the pleasure of any chance person, but of that man or those men who excel in virtue and education, for the critic should be a teacher; and when poets adapt their works to the criterion of the pleasure of their judges (so that their audiences become the teachers of the poets), they corrupt themselves as well as their audiences, whose criteria of pleasure ought to be improved by the judgments of better men rather than degraded to the common level.⁸⁹ The charm which causes pleasure, however, is usually accompanied by correctness or utility; and consequently the arts which are imitative and produce likenesses are not to be judged by pleasure or untrue opinion but by the proportion and equality they possess: to judge a poem, one must know its essence, for one must know what its intention is and what original it represents, if one is to decide whether it succeeds or fails in achieving its intention.⁹⁰ The critic of music, poetry, and the other arts is therefore the philosopher in the perfect state, or, failing that, the lawgiver and the educator.⁹¹

There are numerous ingredients of later criticism in Plato’s philosophy—the moral emphasis; the use of the criteria of experience, intelligence, and words or discussion (any one of which might assume a dominant position in derivative forms of criticism); the prominence of pleasure balanced by various forms of rightness or utility; and, finally, the background of an eternal beauty, which things imitate, which philosophers and poets seek in their manipulations of words, and which cannot itself be expressed without recourse to eternal standards of truth and goodness. The influence of Plato on later criticism is to be found for the most part in the emphasis given to one or another

84. *Ibid.* ix. 580B–C; *Philebus* 27C.85. *Philebus* 65A.86. *Theaetetus* 150B.87. *Rep.* ix. 581E–583A.88. *Laws* ii. 663A–C.89. *Ibid.* 658E–659C.90. *Ibid.* 667B–668B.91. *Ibid.* viii. 829D; xii. 948E–949A; vi. 765B.

of these critical criteria or aesthetic traits rather than in the dialectical association of them and the interplay among them which are essential to Plato’s conception of criticism. In particular, criticism is reduced to narrower limits and the dialectic of its discussion is restricted and frozen in either of two ways: by limiting its application to works of art or literature, or by assigning to criticism the role of applying theory to practice in specific subject matters. The first restriction was accomplished, probably under Stoic and Epicurean influences, in Hellenistic Greece. The word “critic” is used in counterdistinction to “grammarian” in the “Platonic” *Axiochos* (366E), which may show Epicurean influences; and Crates, the Stoic philosopher, is credited with having first distinguished “critic” and “grammarian,” the former being learned in all the erudite sciences, the latter being equipped to interpret unusual words and to treat of accents and similar properties of words; the critic thus is related to the grammarian as the architect to the craftsman.⁹² It is probable that this literal distinction of critic concerned with meanings from grammarian concerned with words reflects the influence of Aristotle’s restriction of the word “grammarian” to the treatment of words as sounds and symbols apart from significances, while the second manner of restricting “criticism” was developed from a like analogizing and fitting of the meaning of the term “criticism” to his division of the sciences. Aristotle held that every theory and every method admitted of two kinds of proficiency: scientific knowledge of the thing and a kind of broad educational acquaintance with the science, so that it is the mark of a well-educated man to be able to criticize and judge with some probability whether a thing is well or badly expounded.⁹³ In later writers Aristotle’s conception of the theoretic and practical is confused with Plato’s conception of the intellectual and practical, and every science (contrary to Aristotle’s supposition) is made to have a theory and an application between which criticism mediates. Clausewitz, thus, in his treatise *On War*, devotes a chapter to criticism so conceived:

The influence of theoretical truths upon practical life is always exerted more through criticism than through rules for practice. Criticism is the application to actual events of

92. Sextus Empiricus *Adversus grammaticos* i. 79. For the evolution of *κριτικός*, *γραμματικός*, and *φιλόλογος* cf. Gudeman’s article *κριτικός*, Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart, 1921), XI, 1912–15. In the course of the discussion “grammarian” is analogized to, or made synonymous with, “critic,” and the identification as well as the discrimination of meanings is continued even into modern discussion. This discussion of the relation of grammarian and critic is frequently associated with the second manner of fixing and restricting the meaning of “critic” by consideration of the boundaries of the sciences. Both processes are illustrated, for example, by Octavius Ferrarius (*Prolusiones et epistolae: accesserunt formulae ad petenda doctoris insignia* [Padua, 1650], p. 116): “Sed Criticos nostros sive Grammaticos duplici crimine arcessis, altero quod ineptias sectantur acerrimo, altero quod non contenti finibus suis, audent etiam vestros limites revellere, et in scientiarum campum audacter transcendere.”

93. *De partibus animalium* i. 1. 639^a1–6.

theoretical truth, and so not only brings the latter nearer to life but also accustoms the intelligence more to these truths through the constant repetition of their applications.⁹⁴

The "critical narration" which Clausewitz employs in his treatment of war consists of three parts, each of which has its special pertinence and history in the development of criticism: (1) the historical discovery and establishment of doubtful facts; (2) critical investigation proper, which consists in tracing the effect from its causes; and (3) criticism proper, which consists in testing the means employed. These two particularizations of Platonic criticism divide between them the text of the poet (which may be interpreted analogically to apply to any subject) and the truths or significances of the sciences (which may be brought analogically to apply to any text).

The Platonic criticism may, on the other hand, be used to resist such particularization, for it may be made to apply to the whole of philosophy to become a preliminary to or substitute for dialectic. Protagoras and the other Sophists are prominent in the philosophy of Plato because they are the dramatic representation of the consequences which follow from denying objective Truth and Beauty: philosophy then becomes critical; I am the judge of the existence of things that are to me and of the nonexistence of things that are not to me;⁹⁵ we all sit in judgment on the judgment of everyone else;⁹⁶ the criteria by which we judge things are internal, as, for example, the coincidence of thought and sensation;⁹⁷ and each is his own best judge concerning what is future.⁹⁸ Yet those same relativistic devices are used by philosophers to avoid relativism and skepticism, for the certainty of knowledge of things and the universality of moral standards may be based on judgment, either in the sense of making criticism of human faculties a preliminary to philosophy or of making judgment the basis of first principles in each of the branches of philosophy. "Our age," Kant said, "is, in every sense of the word, the age of criticism, and everything must submit to it."⁹⁹ Criticism becomes a necessary prelude to the task of philosophy:

It will now be seen how there can be a special science serving as a critique of pure reason. Reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of knowledge *a priori*. Pure reason therefore is that faculty which supplies the principles of knowing anything entirely *a priori*. An Organum of pure reason ought to comprehend all the principles by which pure knowledge *a priori* can be acquired and fully established. A complete application of such an Organum would give us a System of Pure Reason. But as that would be a difficult task, and as at present it is still doubtful whether and when such an expansion

94. *On War*, trans. O. J. M. Jolles (New York, 1943), Book II, chap. v, p. 92.

95. *Theaet.* 160C.

96. *Ibid.* 170D.

97. *Ibid.* 178B.

98. *Ibid.* 187E.

99. *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. xix, n. 1.

of our knowledge is here possible, we may look on a mere criticism of pure reason, its sources and limits, as a kind of preparation for a complete system of pure reason. It should be called a critique, not a doctrine, of pure reason. Its usefulness would be negative only, serving for a purging rather than for an expansion of our reason, and, what after all is a considerable gain, guarding reason against errors.¹⁰⁰

Aesthetic judgment, which bears on beauty in art or in nature, requires no inference, theoretic or practical, to external things, but depends wholly on the free interplay of imagination and understanding. Judgment may, on the other hand, be the basis of philosophy, because judgment and common sense are equally distributed among men, unlike apprehension or conception of the things we judge, and truth and falsity are qualities which belong only to judgment.¹⁰¹ Since judgment may be either intuitive or grounded on argument, the chief problems of philosophy center about the judgment of first principles, among others the first principles of taste:

I think there are axioms, even in matters of *taste*. . . . The fundamental rules of poetry and music, and painting, and dramatic action and eloquence, have been always the same, and will be so to the end of the world. . . . I do not maintain that taste, so far as it is acquired, or so far as it is merely animal, can be reduced to principles. But, as far as it is founded on judgment, it certainly may. The virtues, the graces, the muses, have a beauty that is intrinsic. It lies not in the feelings of the spectator, but in the real excellence of the object. If we do not perceive their beauty, it is owing to the defect or to the perversion of our faculties.¹⁰²

In either sense the critic discovers the fundamental rules of philosophy and art, of the perception of truth and the apprehension or construction of beauty. Lessing remarks that the first person who compared painting and poetry was a man of taste, an amateur who observed that they both produced pleasure in him, and that the second person, who investigated the inner cause of this pleasure and found that it flowed from the same source, was a philosopher; these two could not easily make a wrong use of their feeling or their reason, but the third person, the critic, who reflected on the value and distribution of these rules, might misapply them and so affect art and taste.¹⁰³

100. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

101. Cf. Thomas Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (*The Works of Thomas Reid, D.D.*, ed. Sir William Hamilton [8th ed.; Edinburgh, 1895], I, 366). Reid cites Descartes in support of his position: "Nothing is so equally distributed among men as judgment. Wherefore, it seems reasonable to believe, that the power of distinguishing what is true from what is false (which we properly call judgment or right reason) is by nature equal in all men; and therefore that the diversity of our opinions does not arise from one person being endowed with a greater power of reason than another, but only from this, that we do not lead our thought in the same track, nor attend to the same things." He quotes Cicero to the same effect: "It is wonderful when the learned and unlearned differ so much in art, how little they differ in judgment. For art being derived from Nature, is good for nothing, unless it move and delight Nature." Cf. also *ibid.*, p. 243.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 453.

103. Lessing, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

If, finally, the hope of examining the conditions of all possible experience by criticism or of arriving at common principles of taste by judgment is thought to be as illusory as the appeal to eternal ideas, then principles are sought in actual experience, and criticism, as well as philosophy itself, becomes an art. Viewed in terms of the activity of man, according to Spingarn, critical judgment and artistic creation are fundamentally the same:

The identity of genius and taste is the final achievement of modern thought on the subject of art, and it means that fundamentally, in their most significant moments, the creative and the critical instincts are one and the same. From Goethe to Carlyle, from Carlyle to Arnold, from Arnold to Symons, there has been much talk of the "creative function" of Criticism. For each of these men the phrase held a different content; for Arnold it meant merely that Criticism creates the intellectual atmosphere of the age, a social function of high importance, perhaps, yet wholly independent of aesthetic significance. But the ultimate truth toward which these men were tending was more radical than that, and plays havoc with all the old platitudes about the sterility of taste. Criticism at last can free itself of its age-long self-contempt, now that it may realize that aesthetic judgment and artistic creation are instinct with the same vital life.¹⁰⁴

Or criticism may be conceived to be properly neither impressionistic nor judicial, but to consist, as Dewey holds, in reliving the processes the artist went through to the end of deepening the appreciation of others:

For critical judgment not only grows out of the critic's experience of objective matter, and not only depends upon that for validity, but has for its office the deepening of just such experience in others. Scientific judgments not only end in increased control but for those who understand they add enlarged meanings to the things perceived and dealt with in daily contact with the world. The function of criticism is the reeducation of perception of works of art; it is an auxiliary in the process, a difficult process, of learning to see and hear. The conception that its business is to appraise, to judge in the legal and moral sense, arrests the perception of those who are influenced by the criticism that assumes this task. The moral office of criticism is performed indirectly. . . . We lay hold of the full import of a work of art only as we go through in our own vital processes the processes the artist went through in producing the work. It is the critic's privilege to share in the promotion of this active process. His condemnation is that he so often arrests it.¹⁰⁵

Or, finally, criticism may be conceived, as it was by Tolstoy, as one of the conditions which lead to the production of counterfeit art in our society, since art criticism is impossible in societies in which art is undivided and appraised by the religious conception of life common to the whole people, but it grows on the art of the upper classes, who do not acknowledge the religious perception of their time.¹⁰⁶

104. *Op. cit.*, pp. 42-43.

105. *Art as Experience*, pp. 324-25.

106. Tolstoy, *What Is Art?* pp. 241-43. The analogy of Dewey's basic principles to those of Tolstoy may be seen in his condemnation of the separation of art from the conditions of life consequent on the growth of capitalism and the *nouveaux riches* and his condemnation of

The literal separation of the arts and the sciences requires the differentiation of subject matters and methods, for the difference between the analogical and the literal is not to be found in any difference in the ease with which arts may be separated or compared by the two methods, but in the priority given to the differences or the likenesses, so that either differences are worked dialectically from basic similarities or similarities are found among things whose differences have been stated. "Criticism" and the related terms (*κρίνειν, κρίσις, κριτικός*), which for Plato are general terms, are restricted in Aristotle's usage to one of the three kinds of sciences; and some of the peculiarities of the history of criticism are to be attributed to the fact that they belong properly not to the theoretic, or the poetic, but to the practical sciences or to the practical treatment of any science which is possible since politics is an architectonic science: they do not appear in the *Poetics* (except as part of the title of a tragedy), but they are used extensively in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *Politics*, and the *Rhetoric*, and their other appearances in the works of Aristotle can be explained by the primarily practical sense given to them there. There are two sources of movement in man, appetite and mind,¹⁰⁷ imagination being a kind of thinking. The moral problem consists in a sense in submitting the appetitive part of the soul to the rational.¹⁰⁸ The problem of art, on the other hand, turns primarily on the application of knowledge to the organization of external materials, and therefore, unlike the moral virtues, the arts consist in the possession of knowledge, and their products are themselves capable of excellence or virtue.

Moreover, the case of the arts is not similar to that of the virtues, for works of art have their merit in themselves, so that it is sufficient if they are produced having a certain quality, but acts performed in accordance with the virtues are not done justly or temperately if they have a certain quality, but only if the one who performs them has a certain quality when he performs them: first, he must act knowingly; second, he must act by choice and by choice of the act for its own sake; and third, he must act from a firm and constant character. These are not numbered among the essentials for the possession of the arts, except only knowledge; but for the possession of the virtues knowledge has little or no weight, whereas the other conditions have, not a little force, but all,

the criticism which results from these conditions (*Art as Experience*, pp. 8-11). Conversely, Tolstoy pleads the importance of the proper kind of criticism, modeled on Matthew Arnold's view of the purpose of criticism to find among all that has been written that which is most important and best and to direct attention to it—unlike the actual criticism of the time, which set itself the task of praising such works as have obtained notoriety, devising foggy philosophic-aesthetic theories to justify them, or of ridiculing bad work or works of another camp more or less wittily, or of deducing the direction of the movement of our whole society from types depicted by writers and, in general, expressing economic and political opinions under the guise of discussing literary productions ("Der Büttnerbauer," in *Tolstoy on Art*, pp. 382, 386-87).

107. *De anima* iii. 10. 433^a9.

108. *Nicomachean Ethics* i. 13. 1102^b28; iii. 12. 1119^b11.

since it is the very nature of the virtues to be acquired from the repeated performance of just and temperate acts.¹⁰⁹

Art and the virtues are both related to knowledge, but in different and characteristic fashions. The arts, since they are external principles of change, are productive (that is, poetic) powers which are rational or (which is the same thing) sciences which are productive; they are themselves intellectual virtues.¹¹⁰ The virtues, since they are habits of action, involve knowledge, but they are distinct from prudence, which is the intellectual virtue concerned with action.¹¹¹ The arts share with the sciences the peculiarity that they may deal with opposite things and may have opposite effects, as medicine may produce either health or disease, while the virtue or habit which produces a certain result does not also produce the contrary.¹¹² It is possible, therefore, to speak of a virtue of art; and, indeed, wisdom, the highest of the intellectual virtues, may be detected in the virtue or excellence of art, but there is no virtue of prudence; in art, moreover, voluntary error is preferable to involuntary, but in matters of prudence and the moral virtues the reverse is true.¹¹³ An intellectual process which is not the same as opinion or any particular science is therefore involved in the virtues: intelligence (*σύνεσις*) is either the use of *opinion* in *judging* (*κρίνειν*) of what is said about matters which fall under prudence or the use of *science* in *learning* about matters proper to science, and consideration (*γνώμη*) is right judgment (*κρίσις ὀρθή*) of the equitable. Intelligence differs from prudence in that prudence determines what ought to be done or not to be done, that is, it commands, whereas the function of intelligence is limited to making judgments, that is, it is merely critical.¹¹⁴ There are, in all, four faculties which treat of ultimate and particular things: intuitive reason (*νοῦς*) perceives principles and the particulars which fall under them in the context of science; prudence (*φρόνησις*) is concerned with action in the context of the right principles; while intelligence (*σύνεσις*) and consideration (*γνώμη*) are concerned with judgment (*κρίσις*) of contingent particulars.¹¹⁵ In an important

109. *Ibid.* ii. 4. 1105^a26–1105^b5.

110. *Ibid.* vi. 4. 1140^a1–23; *Metaph.* ix. 2. 1046^a36.

111. *Nic. Eth.* ii. 6. 1106^b36 ff.; vi. 13. 1144^b1–1145^a2.

112. *Ibid.* v. 1. 1129^a13; *Metaph.* ix. 2. 1046^a36 and 5. 1048^a8; *De interpretatione* 13. 22^b36.

113. *Nic. Eth.* vi. 5. 1140^b21–25; 7. 1141^a9–12.

114. *Ibid.* vi. 10–11. 1142^b34–1143^b17; esp. 1143^a10, 14, 15, 20, 23, 30.

115. *Ibid.* 1143^a25–1143^b7. This differentiation is of the utmost importance, not only for the discrimination of the sciences from one another, but for the separation of knowledge from virtue in Aristotle's philosophy and in the literal tradition in general. The modern revolt against what passed for Aristotelianism may be stated succinctly as the reduction of these four processes or "habits" to judgment. When first principles are known by "judgment" or "common sense" or *bon sens*, and when that ability to judge the true and the false is attributed

sense, therefore, actions require *judgment*, while objects of art are *known*. Or, to state the conclusion paradoxically in the modern cognates of the terms Aristotle used: "criticism" is essential in ethics and politics, while art is understood and explained in its proper "science."

The arts and the sciences are therefore associated and distinguished from actions and practical affairs in the manner in which they are subject to knowledge and criticism. We are in general good judges or critics of those matters with which we are acquainted, of a particular subject if we are trained in that or universally if we have a general education. Therefore the scientist is a judge of any matter that falls under his science, but his judgment does not differ from his scientific knowledge; and a well-educated man is a good judge of any matter pertinent to the scope of his interest, but his judgment is the application of the arts he has learned to the argument or the construction. In questions bearing on the moral virtues or political actions, however, the application of reason is less direct, for it is not easy to determine such questions by reasoning or to state the resolution in words, since judgment depends on the particular fact and is based on perception; this is the reason why the young are educated in the arts and the sciences but are improper auditors of lectures on politics.¹¹⁶ On the other hand, judgment and criticism have a peculiar place in ethics, since the moral virtues are habits of choice, and choice involves judgments.¹¹⁷ Pleasure attends both the operation of the contemplative faculty on intelligible, and that

in general to all mankind, the distinction between theoretic and practical, between moral criticism and artistic knowledge, disappears. The line that runs back from the modern *bon sens* to the Stoic tradition, which Gilson traces, is therefore mediated by the Aristotelian *synesis* and *eusynesia*; and Gilson overemphasizes the exclusive importance of the one element when he says, "La traduction latine de *bon sens* n'est possible qu'au moyen du gallicisme *bona mens*" (René Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, ed. É. Gilson [Paris, 1925], pp. 81–83). Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In decem libros ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio*, ed. A. M. Pirotta and M. S. Gillet (Turin, 1934), Lib. VI, lect. 9, par. 1240, p. 409: "Unde dicit quod prudentia est praeceptiva, in quantum scilicet est finis ipsius determinare quid oporteat agere. Sed *synesis* est solum iudicativa. Et pro eodem accipitur *synesis* et *eusynesia*, id est, bonus sensus, sicut et iidem dicuntur *syneti* et *eusyneti*, id est *sensati* et *bene sensati*, quorum est bene iudicare." Cf., for *bonus sensus*, *Summa theologica* IIa, IIae, qu. 51, a. 4; *Commentary on the Sentences* Lib. III, dist. 33, qu. 3, a 1, qu. 2; for *synesis*, *Summa theologica* Ia, IIae, qu. 57, a.6. The instrumentalist consequences of this shift may be seen in the fact that "judgment" is by contraries, and is explicated by the analogy of the carpenter's rule, which is the test (*κρίτης*) of the straight and the crooked (cf. *De anima* i. 5. 411^a2–7).

116. *Nic. Eth.* i. 3. 1094^b27–1095^a2; ii. 9. 1109^b20–23; iv. 5. 1126^b2–4; *De part. anim.* i. 1. 639^a1–639^b14. It should be noted that the general "criticism" is of method and has no bearing on substantive truth or falsity. Cf. *Posterior Analytics* ii. 19. 99^b35; and for the psychological bases of judgment in sensation cf. *De anima* ii. 11. 424^a5–6; iii. 9. 432^a15–16, 12. 434^b3–4.

117. The good man judges well of good and noble things; cf. *Nic. Eth.* i. 9. 1109^a22–24; iii. 4. 1113^a29–31. It is difficult to judge pleasure impartially (cf. *ibid.* ii. 9. 1109^b7–9). Judgment is the result of deliberation and is antecedent to choice (cf. *ibid.* iii. 3. 1113^a2–14). Responsibility depends on the source of the power to judge (cf. *ibid.* 5. 1114^b5–8).

of the critical faculty on sensible, objects,¹¹⁸ and in practical matters judgment of fact takes precedence over the opinions of the wise.¹¹⁹ When one proceeds from the sphere of ethics to that of politics, the function of criticism or judgment increases, for the transition is by way of the virtue of justice, and legal justice is defined as the judgment of the just and the unjust.¹²⁰ Something of the Platonic distinction between ruling and judging appears in the political discussion of judgment, for those who govern must command and judge, while those who are governed must judge and distribute offices.¹²¹ The citizen is therefore defined by his participation in the deliberative and judicial processes of the state.¹²² Judgment applies not only to the decision of the law court,¹²³ and to the action of magistrates and assembly,¹²⁴ but also to the general determination of public interest and justice,¹²⁵ and is finally involved also in deliberation.¹²⁶ These considerations of the function of judgment or criticism in politics determine its central place in rhetoric, since that art exists to affect judgments.¹²⁷

To be a good judge in moral and political questions, then, one must have had experience in the sense of having performed actions by which habits have been formed, while one may be a good judge in most of the arts by means of knowledge and a kind of science of how the thing is made. The teaching of the science of politics presents peculiar problems, because it is a *science* or *art of actions*, and the application of knowledge to actions is not direct. Aristotle elucidates the difficulty by the analogy of the arts. Unlike the other sciences and arts, politics is not taught by those who practice it, for politicians seem to rely more on experience than on abstract reason, while the Sophists profess to teach it but are ignorant of the science and its subject, since they confuse it with rhetoric and imagine that constitutions can be framed by making collections of existing laws reputed to be good. The kind of teaching and learning that is possible in

118. *Ibid.* x. 4. 1174^b31–1175^a3.

119. *Ibid.* 8. 1179^a9–20.

120. *Ibid.* v. 6. 1134^a30–32; cf. also *ibid.* 9. 1136^b32 ff.

121. *Pol.* vii. 4. 1326^b12–20.

122. *Ibid.* iii. 1. 1275^a22–23; 1275^b11–21; 6. 1281^b31.

123. *Ibid.* v. 6. 1306^a36–38.

124. *Ibid.* iv. 15. 1298^a28–33, 1299^a25–28; ii. 8. 1273^b9–13.

125. *Ibid.* iii. 9. 1280^a14–16; vii. 9. 1328^b13–24.

126. *Ibid.* iii. 10. 1286^a21–35; this is particularly true in questions of equity (*ibid.* 11. 1287^b14–18).

127. *Rhetoric* ii. 1. 1377^b21–29, 1378^a20–23, 18. 1391^b8–20. The kinds of listeners determine the purposes of speeches and therefore the classification of kinds of oratory: the familiar distinction of contemplative from critical reappears among the kinds of hearers (cf. *ibid.* i. 3. 1358^b2–4). Similarly, the commonplace concerning the prudent man is stated in terms of the credit to be given to his powers of judgment (cf. *ibid.* 7. 1164^b11–14).

subjects pertinent to political judgment and criticism is illustrated by music, which differs from the other arts in the knowledge and experience required for its understanding. Even selection among constitutions involves “intelligence” and the ability to “judge” correctly; and, as in music, those experienced in this art are alone able to judge rightly the works produced in it and understand how and by what means they are perfected and what harmonizes with what, while those inexperienced in the art must be content if they do not fail to discern, as they do in painting, that the work is well or badly made. The works of the art of politics are laws, and, though collections of laws may be useful to those who are able to “contemplate” and “judge” them, those who approach them without such trained habits cannot “judge” them correctly, except by chance, and it is only possible that their “intelligence” may be improved by the study of the laws.¹²⁸ Music differs from the other arts in that it alone imitates the passions and the virtues, for the objects of other senses than hearing can be signs but not imitations of virtues.¹²⁹ The one way to become a competent judge of music, since it is directly concerned with virtues and passions, is to become a performer, notwithstanding the contrary conviction of the Lacedaemonians that one could acquire the ability to judge or criticize music by only listening.¹³⁰ The other arts, particularly painting and poetry, are imitations, too, but of agents and actions, not of virtues and passions.¹³¹ The object of art may therefore be treated in those arts as an entity in itself, an artificial object related both to the actions it represents and to the emotions it causes, but not itself a state of mind; in the strict sense, therefore, knowledge rather than criticism is pertinent to those arts, and the “poetic sciences” follow the analogy of the theoretic sciences, which are concerned with entities and actualities, more closely than they do that of the practical sciences, which are concerned with habits and institutions.

The investigation of the nature of tragedy in the *Poetics* proceeds through three stages. Aristotle first differentiates poetry from the other arts by three characteristics possessed by any imitation—its object, its means, and its manner—and uses these distinctions to account for the origin of poetry and its differentiation into kinds. The origin of poetry is traced to two natural causes: imitation is natural to man and it is also natural for man to delight in imitation.

128. *Nic. Eth.* x. 9. 1180^b28–1181^b12.

129. *Pol.* viii. 5. 1340^a12–1340^b19. Cf. Dewey’s treatment of the emotional character of hearing as distinguished from sight (*Art as Experience*, pp. 237–38); Reynolds, on the other hand, maintains that music and architecture are not imitative arts because they apply directly to the imagination (*Discourses Delivered to the Students of the Royal Academy*, ed. with Introduction and notes by Roger Fry [New York, n.d.], “The Thirteenth Discourse,” p. 365).

130. *Pol.* 1339^a42–1339^b4; 6. 1340^b20–39.

131. *Poet.* 2. 1448^a1 ff.; 6. 1449^b24–28; and esp. 1450^a15–38 and *passim*.

Both causes are discussed in terms of the process of learning, for man learns first by imitation and the pleasure he takes in art is due to the fact that he learns from it. "Learning," however, is one manifestation of "intelligence," distinct from "criticism" because it treats of particulars which fall under science rather than the particulars proper to prudence.¹³² This investigation of the origin and history of poetry, therefore, supplies the distinguishing features of tragedy and comedy—among which one significant conclusion is that the person who "knows" (not "judges" or "criticizes") about tragedies, good and bad, knows also about epics, since their parts are the same¹³³—and it lays the foundation for the treatment of tragedy as such. The isolation of tragedy is accomplished by comparing the various arts as imitations in their relations to the artist's use of means, manner, and object of imitation. Once isolated, tragedy may be considered as itself a kind of whole or object. The distinctions which had previously been made in terms of external agents and exemplars may be translated into traits discoverable in the poem, and the poem may be analyzed in terms of its unity and structure as part and whole (in which the plot, defined as the arrangement of incidents and as the imitation of action, is the principle or soul of tragedy) and in terms of the adaptation of means to ends (in which the plot is the most important part and the end of tragedy).¹³⁴ As a poetic science the results of such inquiry will serve equally for instruction of poets and amateurs, and they are stated, therefore, indifferently as what poets should do or what they have done. This second stage of analysis is knowledge or science as it is possible in and appropriate to the arts. It is supplemented, finally, by a consideration of tragedy in comparison with the closely related art of epic poetry, first, by analysis of both as parts and wholes, second, by analysis of them with respect to the means used to achieve their comparable ends and the success or failure of those means. Such comparative considerations yield "evaluation" or "censure" (*ἐπιτίμημα*), for in addition to the task which the poet faces in the construction of his play he faces "problems" which take the form of objections to "errors" (*ἀμαρτία*) he has committed. Since they are concerned with "errors," these problems are solved by inference from postulates or assumptions which the poet lays down concerning his art, such as would justify him in using as means to his end (which becomes at this third stage the proper pleasure caused by his work) devices that may be subject to some defect relative to a science or to morals but irrelevant to the considerations of his art. One of these assumptions is that the standard of rightness in poetry differs from that of politics and other arts, for two kinds of error are possible in poetry: failures

132. *Ibid.* 4. 1448^b4–19; cf. above, p. 512.

133. *Poet.* 5. 1449^b17–20.

134. *Ibid.* 6. 1450^a15–36.

of art when the poet intended to describe a thing correctly, and technical errors, proper to some other art or science, which might be justified for the purposes of the poetic art.¹³⁵ "Evaluation" or "censure" differs, therefore, from "judgment" or "criticism" as art and science differ from politics and morals: the former is the solution of a problem by demonstration that the end envisaged in the art is achieved by the means employed despite their possible deviation from other standards; the latter is the discrimination, by means of intelligence and in accordance with the command of prudence, of the contingent circumstances pertinent to actions determined by moral habits and political institutions.

The literal tradition treats of the objects of art or their production or appreciation as something apart from other objects, actions, or sciences. Three ways in which art may be isolated are suggested by Aristotle's cautious procedure and inquiry; and three kinds of treatment may be differentiated, each literal both in the sense that it is concerned only with art, or only with art of a given species or kind, and in the sense that it is sharply differentiated from other attempts to make criticism literal. It may be concerned with the work of art itself and attempt to make "scientific" generalizations or rules; it may be concerned with the work of art as illuminated by consideration of the poet's thought and attempt to make "critical," though poetic not moral, discriminations; it may be concerned with the work of art as effective of an end and attempt to make technical or artistic "evaluations." Poetic "science" differs from theoretic and practical sciences, for it is concerned neither with knowledge as such nor with action but with artificial objects and products; and if such objects are to be isolated for consideration in themselves, there must be some preliminary consideration of the conditions of their production and some supplementary consideration of the effects of their contemplation. "Criticism" is the consideration of the work of art primarily in its relation to the artist, and the problem of "making" may therefore be treated either in terms significative of thoughts and emotions (which had been reserved as the material of the practical sciences) in the discrimination and judgment of states of mind and their expression, or in terms significative of facts and knowledge (which had been used as the material of the theoretic sciences) for the resolution of problems involved in the circumstances of the poet or in the interpretation of his statements. "Evaluation" is the consideration of the work of art primarily in its relation to the audience, and the change of orientation from poet to audience involves a shift in the uses to which the basic terms are put, for the terms of thought and emotion, of imagination and fancy, are now used for the resolution of problems involved in the effectiveness of devices and the selection of con-

135. *Ibid.* 25. 1460^b6–21; cf. above, n. 113. On the implications of "censure" and its kinds cf. I. Bywater, *Aristotle on the Art of Poetry* (2d ed.; Oxford, 1909), pp. 328 ff.

ment, while the terms of knowledge and fact are used for precepts to guide the combination of thought and expression and the adaptation of both to circumstances. Criticism and evaluation or censure may then be distinguished from poetic science as variant attempts to set forth the nature and achievements of the arts literally in terms of the objects produced by artists and appreciated by audiences, and all three may be distinguished from the treatment of art in the total context of nature, thought, and experience in which knowledge, criticism, and evaluation are achieved at once and by single analogies or reductions.

The devices of "criticism," like those of "poetic science," bear on the work of art itself, but they are limited to questions similar to those initial considerations of Aristotle's *Poetics* in which the work of art is treated in relation to the artist and the conditions of its production. Criticism may, therefore, consist either in appealing to the known artist or judge or critic of works to be judged or in reconstructing the sense of those works and judging their value by learned commentary. Longinus, in the first manner, undertakes to seek a knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) and critical appreciation (*ἐπικρισις*) of the sublime, realizing that judgment (*κρισις*) in literature is the result of ripe experience and hoping to express the critical appreciation he seeks in rules and precepts.¹³⁶ The basic terms of his discussion are "nature" and "art," but the nature he is concerned with is the natural genius of the artist which is perfected or curbed by art,¹³⁷ and his rules are stated for the most part in terms of the virtues or faults of artists, which may be discerned by the artist as critic, by the expert, or by all mankind. Natural genius is fundamental, and sublimity is the true ring of the noble mind,¹³⁸ but the achievements of great authors may be used as touchstones and for emulation.

Accordingly it would be well for us, too, when we labor at anything which requires sublimity of style and loftiness of thought, to formulate in our minds how Homer would perhaps have said the same thing, how Plato or Demosthenes or, in history, Thucydides would have expressed it with sublimity. For these illustrious personages, presenting themselves to us for emulation and being as it were preeminent, will elevate our souls in some manner to the standards which our souls conceive. It will however be much more efficacious if we present this also to our mind: how Homer, if he had been present, or Demosthenes would have listened to such or such thing which I say, or how they would have been affected by it. This is truly a great contest, to submit our own statements to such a tribunal and audience, and to make believe that we are submitting the censure [*εὐθυνα*] of our writings to such great heroes as judges [*κριτῆς*] and witnesses. It would be even more stimulating to add: How will all posterity after me hear these writings of mine?¹³⁹

136. *On the Sublime* vi.

137. *Ibid.* ii. 1–3.

138. *Ibid.* ix. 1–2.

139. *Ibid.* xiv. 1–3.

Treatment of literature in terms of the "judgment" of great writers yields rules which constitute a kind of "science" as well as standards for "evaluation," for the prudential discriminations of judgment become the type of knowledge and the basis for the technical and experiential censures of evaluation. The truly sublime is so constituted in nature that it elevates our souls; moreover, any man of prudence and experience (*ἐμφρων καὶ ἐμπειρος*) will recognize it; and finally all doubt will be removed concerning both the beautiful and the sublime if all mankind agrees despite differences of circumstances in the judgment (*κρισις*).¹⁴⁰ Criticism in this first sense bears on the high moments of any branch of literature—poetry, rhetoric, history, or philosophy—and the genius is envisaged as a man of insight and feeling; criticism in the second sense bears on the meanings of all kinds of writings in a literal sense, as well as on the recondite meanings that might be found in poetry and fables, and in both the author is envisaged only in terms of the knowledge or learning to which criticism is an aid. Bacon makes use both of criticism and of "interpretation," the former applicable to all books, the latter limited to a kind of poetry and to myths.

There remain two appendices touching the tradition of knowledge, the one Critical, the other Pedantical. For all knowledge is either delivered by teachers, or attained by men's proper endeavours: and therefore as the principal part of tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly writing of books, so the relative part thereof concerneth reading of books. Whereunto appertain incidently these considerations. The first is concerning the true correction and edition of authors; wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath done great prejudice. For these critics have often presumed that that which they understand not is false set down: as the Priest that where he found it written of St. Paul, *Demissus*

140. *Ibid.* vii. 2–4. The presuppositions which underlie this transition from the judgment of the genius to that of posterity are well expressed by Ch. Labitte, *Études littéraires* (Paris, 1846), I, 181: "Pour moi, ce me semble, il n'est qu'une manière un peu précise de songer à la postérité quand on est homme de lettres, c'est de se reporter en idée aux anciens illustres, à ceux qu'on préfère, qu'on admire avec prédilection, et de se demander: 'Que diraient-ils de moi? à quel degré daigneraient-ils m'admettre? s'ils me connaissaient m'ouvriraient-ils leur cercle? me reconnaîtraient-ils comme un de leurs, comme le dernier des leurs, le plus humble?' Voilà ma vue rétrospective de postérité, et celle-là en vaut bien une autre." The same rhetorical criterion of insight and agreement may be applied to other subjects, as when the mark of philosophy is sought in the "common experience" of men as opposed to the "special experience" of the sciences. Gibbon's record of his reading of Longinus illustrates the operation of this mode of criticism. On September 14, 1762, he writes (*Gibbon's Journal to January 28th, 1763*, ed. D. M. Low [New York, 1929], p. 142): "As yet I read my author more as a man of Genius, than as a man of taste: I am pleased and astonished rather than instructed." On October 3 he writes (*ibid.*, pp. 155–56): "The 9th chapter, which treats of the first of these, (the elevation of the ideas,) is one of the finest monuments of Antiquity. Till now, I was acquainted only with two ways of criticizing a beautiful passage; The one, to shew, by an exact anatomy of it, the distinct beauties of it, and from whence they sprung; the other, an idle exclamation, or a general encomium, which leaves nothing behind it. Longinus has shewn me that there is a third. He tells me his own feelings upon reading it; and tells them with such energy, that he communicates them. I almost doubt which is most sublime, Homer's Battle of the Gods, or Longinus's apostrophe to Terentianus upon it."

est per sportam, [he was let down in a basket,] mended his book, and made it *Demissus est per portam*, [he was let out by the gate]; because *sporta* was an hard word, and out of his reading; and surely their errors, though they be not so palpable and ridiculous, are yet of the same kind. And therefore as it hath been wisely noted, the most corrected copies are commonly the least correct.

The second is concerning the exposition and explication of authors, which resteth in annotations and commentaries; wherein it is over usual to blanch the obscure places, and discourse upon the plain.

The third is concerning the times, which in many cases give great light to true interpretations.

The fourth is concerning some brief censure and judgment of the authors; that men thereby may make some election unto themselves what books to read.

The fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of studies; that men may know in what order or pursuit to read.¹⁴¹

In the more restricted region of poetry, however, the one relevant deficiency which Bacon notes is in the philosophic interpretation of ancient parables which he illustrates by developing the legends of Pan, Perseus, and Dionysus into significances applicable, respectively, in natural, political, and moral speculation.¹⁴² Criticism may be achieved, in general, by appeal to what is universal or best in men's minds, or to the reconstruction of what one man said, or to the interpretation of the allegory concealed in stories and histories; the censure that accompanies these criticisms is by standards determined by comparison with great geniuses, or with other books in the field, or with the principles of philosophers. Broadly conceived, criticism so practiced is concerned either with sublime and beautiful feelings and the means by which they are expressed

141. *Of the Proficiency and Advancement of Learning*, Book II (*Works*, III, 413–14). Cf. *De augmentis scientiarum*, Book VI, chap. iv (*Works*, IV, 493–94), where Bacon emphasizes the place of judgment in the critical processes: "There belongs thirdly to the critical part (and from this indeed it derives its name) the insertion of some brief judgment concerning the authors edited, and comparison of them with other writers on the same subjects; that students may by such censure be both advised what books to read and better prepared when they come to read them. This last office is indeed, so to speak, the critic's chair; which has certainly in our age been ennobled by some great men,—men in my judgment above the stature of critics." Machiavelli made excellent use of both fable and history (cf. *ibid.*, Book VIII [*Works*, V, 56]; *Of the Proficiency and Advancement of Learning*, Book II [*Works*, III, 345, 453]), yet the Stoic use of the allegorical interpretation of poets seemed to Bacon vain: "Nevertheless in many the like encounters, I do rather think that the fable was first, and the exposition devised, than that the moral was first, and thereupon the fable framed. For I find it was an ancient vanity in Chrysippus, that troubled himself with great contention to fasten the assertions of the Stoics upon the fictions of the poets. But yet that all the fables and fictions of the poets were but pleasure and not figure, I interpose no opinion. Surely of those poets which are now extant, even Homer himself, (notwithstanding he was made a kind of Scripture by the later schools of the Grecians,) yet I should without any difficulty pronounce that his fables had no such inwardness in his own meaning; but what they might have upon a more original tradition, is not easy to affirm; for he was not the inventor of many of them" (*ibid.*, III, 345).

142. *Ibid.*, pp. 318–35; cf. *On Principles and Origins According to the Fables of Cupid and Coelum* (*Works*, V, 461–500).

or with the learned and critical interpretation of statements and the meanings they express.

The consideration of the work of art itself may be in terms of its effects rather than in terms of its organization or its author, and then the processes of "evaluation" will take precedence over those of "criticism" or "science." If appeal is made directly to audiences, rather than to posterity or any other universal audience which will approve only of the greatest artists, audiences are diversified and numerous; and if meanings are sought directly in words, rather than in the comparison of works on the same subject, the effects to be achieved by words are relatively few. The basic terms of evaluation are words and things, style and content, and the subject of censure may be either the suitability of the manner of statement to achieve effects on various audiences, or faults and improprieties from bad combinations of diction, composition, and subject in various styles. As the concern with the character of the poet and with his treatment of subject matter suggested analogies to the first part of Aristotle's analysis, so the concern with effects on an audience and with the relative effectiveness of various poetic genres may be viewed as a translation of the topics treated in the third part of Aristotle's analysis to a place of central importance. Horace's constant worry over the tastes of actual audiences yields emphases opposite to those which Longinus derives from his audience of heroes: popular judgment is fickle;¹⁴³ the public is sometimes right, sometimes wrong, but its particular error is to esteem the ancient poets and to censure other works, not because they are coarse or inelegant in style, but because they are modern;¹⁴⁴ the absence of a discerning critic of unmusical verses has an unfortunate effect on Roman poetry;¹⁴⁵ the recommendation to the poet, therefore, is to choose subjects suited to his own powers, and if Horace imitated Archilochus it was in spirit and meter, not in words or in subjects, so that even the imitation was a novel departure by which he was the first of the Romans to use those numbers:¹⁴⁶ the preferred critic is the good and prudent man who censures lifeless lines.¹⁴⁷ Similarly, Horace's treatment of kinds of poetry yields the familiar

143. *Epistles* i. 19. 37; cf. also i. 1. 71–76, where he speaks of the public as a many-headed monster imposing its "judgments"; and *Satires* i. 10. 72–77, where he advises the poet not to try to please the crowd but to be content with a few readers. The differentiation of audiences and their preferences or faculties is never far removed from the moral considerations from which this form of criticism takes its origin; cf. Reynolds, *op. cit.*, p. 354: "Such men will always prefer imitation to that excellence which is addressed to another faculty that they do not possess; but these are not persons to whom a painter is to look, any more than a judge of morals and manners ought to refer controverted points upon those subjects to the opinions of people taken from the banks of the Ohio, or from New Holland."

144. *Ep.* ii. 1. 63–92.

145. *Ars poetica* 263–64; the term used is *iudex*; cf. *Sat.* i. 10. 38, where Horace thinks of his poems as competing before Tarpa as judge: *certantia iudice Tarpa*.

146. *Sat.* 38–40; *Ep.* i. 19. 21–34.

147. Cf. above, n. 47.

genres rather than the parts of learning which emerge from Bacon's treatment. The effect of literature on audiences, however, may also be sought in the differentiation of styles, for in the rhetorical tradition in which Aristotle undertook to classify kinds of rhetoric in terms of audiences Theophrastus studied the "virtues," not of authors or of audiences, but of styles, and Cicero, Quintilian, Dionysius, and Demetrius classified first three, then four, styles in terms of their respective qualities and faults. Unlike Bacon, who treated words as the form, the content of statements being the matter, Cicero thought of words and speech as the material from which verse and the styles of prose are formed, and the styles are fitted to our thought.¹⁴⁸ Demetrius' classification of the elevated, the elegant, the plain, and the forcible styles depends at once on organizing parts into wholes and at the same time on fitting words and compositions appropriately to thoughts, so that his analysis of style differs from Horace's as the respective ends which they both derive from audiences differ, while in the place of the kinds of poetic composition, as classified by Horace or by Bacon, Demetrius arrives at kinds of style because the parts and wholes defined by thought in his analysis are verbal: members, phrases, periods. Finally, unlike Longinus' analysis, which is fixed on the expressions of the loftiest genius, Demetrius' inquiry is concerned with ways of fitting words to a variety of thoughts and with the faults corresponding to each of the possible styles. Evaluation may be achieved, in general, by comparing the effects of what is written on actual or chosen audiences or by measuring it against the canons for statements of the "kind" to which it belongs; the judges are either men conceived by various standards to be good and prudent or men judged to be expert in rhetoric or some other appropriate science of expression. Broadly conceived, evaluation so practiced is concerned either with qualities of genres of literature and art or with the virtues of style and expression.

III

The words used in criticism are relative to their subject matter, but the subject matter changes with changes of philosophic principle. The vocabulary of criticism is therefore applied now to all things—natural or artificial—and again only to artificial things or even to the things made in one art; and so restricted it applies now to entities, now to states of mind, and again to activities or expressions. Moreover, the consequent ambiguity in critical terms is not readily removed by stating critical or philosophic principles—whether for purposes of elucidating relative meanings or laying down the law of the true meaning—since the critic sometimes employs philosophic principles for the interpretation of art, sometimes uses criticism to dictate the principles of both philosophy and

148. *De oratore* iii. 45. 177.

art, and sometimes operates as artist, justifying at most his suspicion of philosophic or critical principles; or, again, if he thinks of his function as in some sense scientific, he conceives his knowledge on the model sometimes of the theoretic sciences, sometimes of the moral or practical sciences, sometimes of the aesthetic or poetic sciences. Changes of subject matter and changes of principles or manner of use of principles are rarely indicated by the introduction of new terms, and, even when they are, coined words or words borrowed from other disciplines merely illustrate anew the fashion in which the meanings of words shift within a discipline or by passage from one discipline to another. The history of critical discussions could be written in terms of a small number of words, which with their cognates and synonyms have moved back and forth from obscurity to prominence in the aesthetic vocabulary, or from neighboring vocabularies to criticism, or from one significance to another in different modes of criticism. Yet such relativity does not mean that standards are impossible or insignificant in criticism. It means rather that significances must be sought in the sense and application which statements of critical doctrines have in their context and relative to their purpose. It means, secondly, that the evaluation of critical statements should consist in a determination of their adequacy to the end for which they were formulated and of the relevance of that end to the explication of art and objects of art. The differentiation of meanings according to the variety of systems and purposes is itself neither criticism nor philosophy but a device preliminary to both and a substitute for the easy acceptance or refutation of statements according to preferred meanings which the reader justifies because (whether or not they leave the writer who is being interpreted much sense or consistency) they are determined by the *real* nature of art, or the *actual* limits of criticism, or the *true* precepts of philosophy.

The shifts of meaning do not, of course, occur as gross phenomena discernible in an idle glance, describable by simple tags, or remediable by semantic precepts and prohibitions. A purely "analogical" or a wholly "literal" set of terms is as mythical as "climates of opinion" or "dialectics of history" or any of the sets of terms that have been used to give meaning to such devices of explanation and discrimination—like realism, nominalism, conceptualism, or dogmatism, skepticism, criticism, or idealism, materialism, naturalism, and so through the dreary list of tags by which significant explanations are reduced to props for one more explanation that will in turn be honored and dismissed with a technical name. In the mixed tradition of discussion, however, the two usages are distinguishable by two movements in the meanings of terms: the analogical, by a dialectical doubling in which a word takes on two differentiated meanings, one good and one bad, or by a dialectical reduction in which a word retains only the minimal and slightest of its dialectical meanings; the literal, by a shift of the

terms from subject matter to subject matter with accompanying changes of meaning.

These two kinds of change are rendered possible, and in turn are obscured, by the fact—on which the peculiarities of refutation and inference depend—that any statement or theory of criticism may be read and interpreted by any method of criticism and according to the principles of any philosophy. In the long history of variant uses to which Aristotle's *Poetics* has been put, for example, it would not be difficult to illustrate the fashion in which statements have been interpreted and reinterpreted to assume almost any philosophic form and significance, and have in turn been criticized for failing to take into account some implication of every significance that has been attached to them. Thus, the term "imitation" undergoes a typical series of literal shifts of meaning from Aristotle's application of it to the work of art as an imitation of nature, to the Hellenistic and Renaissance application of it to the artist imitating artists,¹⁴⁹ to the modern application of it to the amateur imitating the work of art or the artist.¹⁵⁰ Yet none of these need be literal, since man's imitation of man may be taken as essentially the same as his imitation of objects or as the objects' imitation of models which are of a higher degree of reality than man or human arts: the term "imitation" undergoes a typical series of analogical doublings and reductions, which may in turn be given literal definitions, from Plato's use of it to

149. Cf. above, pp. 168–69. The doctrine that the arts, or at least some of them, are essentially imitative of external things is, of course, not limited to antiquity but has had advocates in all the later ages, including the modern; cf. T. B. Macaulay, "Moore's Life of Lord Byron" (*Miscellaneous Works of Lord Macaulay*, ed. Lady Trevelyan [New York, n.d.] I, 476): "Poetry is, as was said more than two thousand years ago, imitation. It is an art analogous in many respects to the art of painting, sculpture, and acting. . . . Thus the objects of the imitation of poetry are the whole external and the whole internal universe, the face of nature, the vicissitudes of fortune, man as he is in himself, man as he appears in society, all things which really exist, all things of which we can form an image in our minds by combining together parts of things which really exist. The domain of this imperial art is commensurate with the imaginative faculty." Cf. also I. Babbitt, *The New Laokoon* (New York, 1910), chap. i, "The Theory of Imitation," pp. 3–19.

150. Cf. Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 325: "We lay hold of the full import of a work of art only as we go through in our own vital processes the processes the artist went through in producing the work." In the doctrine of *Einfühlung* or empathy the relation is between spectator and object, but it is contemplative rather than practical, and it is individualized to each spectator; cf. V. Lee, *The Beautiful: An Introduction to Psychological Aesthetics* (Cambridge, 1913), chap. ii, "Contemplative Satisfaction," and pp. 74–75: "I am speaking once more of that phenomenon called *Inner Mimicry* which certain observers, themselves highly subject to it, have indeed considered as Empathy's explanation, rather than its result. In the light of all I have said about the latter, it becomes intelligible that when empathic imagination (itself varying from individual to individual) happens to be united to a high degree of (also individually very varying) muscular responsiveness, there may be set up reactions, actual or incipient, e.g. alterations of bodily attitude or muscular tension which (unless indeed they withdraw attention from the contemplated object to our own body) will necessarily add to the sum of activity emphatically attributed to the contemplated object."

apply to nature, science, and art (in which the imitation of art is condemned unless it is with knowledge of the true), to the application of it to art in two senses, one good and one bad,¹⁵¹ to the use of it in a sense in which it is opposed to genius and the antithesis of art.¹⁵²

151. Coleridge, *Biographia literaria*, chap. xviii (*Works*, III, 421): "This and the preceding arguments may be strengthened by the reflection, that the composition of a poem is among the imitative arts; and that imitation, as opposed to copying, consists either in the interfusion of the same throughout the radically different, or of the different throughout a base radically the same." Both terms may be given literal definitions, as in Bryant, *Lectures on Poetry*, Lecture IV, "On Originality and Imitation" (*Prose Writings*, I, 35): "I propose in this lecture to say a few words on the true use and value of imitation in poetry. I mean not what is technically called the imitation of nature, but the studying and copying of models of poetic composition. There is hardly any praise of which writers in the present age, particularly writers in verse, are more ambitious than that of originality. This ambition is a laudable one, for a captivating originality is everything in art. Whether it consists in presenting familiar things in a new and striking yet natural light, or in revealing secrets of emotion and thought which have lain undetected from the birth of literature, it is one of the most abundant and sure sources of poetic delight." Or, again, the two senses of imitation—good and bad—and the two kinds of imitation—of nature and of artists—may be combined dialectically in such fashion that each meaning is set off by the others, as in Reynolds, *Discourses*, where the initial distinction between genius or natural ability and the study of authentic models leads to insistence on the importance of teaching young students to draw correctly what they see ("The First Discourse," pp. 7–13) and is then developed into a distinction between mere copying or exact imitation and selective imitation of the masters ("The Second Discourse," pp. 24–30), and, finally, mere imitation of masters and of nature is contrasted to the contribution of imagination, poetical enthusiasm, the grandeur of ideas and an ideal beauty, superior to what is to be found in individual nature but discernible by diligent study of the works of our great predecessors and the works of nature; cf. "The Third Discourse," pp. 49–53: "The first endeavours of a young Painter, as I have remarked in a former discourse, must be employed in the attainment of mechanical dexterity, and confined to the mere imitation of the object before him. Those who have advanced beyond the rudiments, may, perhaps, find advantage in reflecting on the advice which I have likewise given them, when I recommended the diligent study of the works of our great predecessors; but I at the same time endeavour to guard them against an implicit submission to the authority of any one master, however excellent; or by a strict imitation of his manner, precluding themselves from the abundance and variety of Nature. I will now add, that Nature herself is not to be too closely copied. There are excellences in the art of Painting beyond what is commonly called the imitation of Nature; and these excellences I wish to point out. The Students who, having passed through the initiatory exercises, are more advanced in the Art, and who, sure of their hand, have leisure to exert their understanding, must now be told, that a mere copier of Nature can never produce anything great; can never raise and enlarge the conceptions, or warm the heart of the spectator. . . . Could we teach taste or genius by rules, they would be no longer taste and genius. But though there neither are, nor can be, any precise invariable rules for the exercise or the acquisition of these great qualities, yet we may truly say, that they always operate in proportion to our attention in observing the works of Nature, to our skill in selecting, and to our care in digesting, methodising, and comparing our observations. There are many beauties in our Art that seem, at first, to lie without the reach of precept, and yet may easily be reduced to practical principles." Invention is the power of representing a mental picture on canvas, and the great end of the art, in turn, is to strike the imagination ("The Fourth Discourse," pp. 73, 74). But painting is intrinsically imitative, and therefore imitation "in its largest sense" must be contrasted to imitation in the sense of following other masters; even genius is the child of imitation, and we learn to invent by being conversant with the inventions of others, while even nature, which is the source of all excellences in art, may be known through the selections made by great minds of what is excellent in nature ("The Sixth Dis-

While the word "imitation" undergoes these changes, related terms go through like or proportional alterations. When art is an imitation of nature, and tragedy an imitation of action, the analysis may be, as Aristotle's was, in terms of parts of tragedies of which the plot, itself a combination (*σύστασις*) or a composition (*σύνθεσις*), is the most important. Plot is important in an analysis of objects of art because it is a combination of things or incidents (*σύστασις πραγμάτων*),¹⁵³ and it may be viewed for analytic purposes as synthesis or composition (*σύνθεσις*) of things, while only diction is analyzed as a composition of words.¹⁵⁴ Moreover, since beauty requires size as well as order and arrangement, the beautiful object of art is comparable as a structure (*σύστημα*) to beautiful organisms or animals.¹⁵⁵ Again, literature may be viewed, as it was by Longinus, in terms of the constituents (*σύστασις*) which yield sublimity; and of the five constituents chosen, two are natural, being

course," pp. 142–43, 145, 148, 152). If a more liberal style of imitation is distinguished from mere servile imitation of one master (*ibid.*, pp. 156–68), imitation is the one means by which an artist may perfect his art; cf. *ibid.*, p. 171: "Thus I have ventured to give my opinion of what appears to me the true and only method by which an artist makes himself master of his profession; which I hold ought to be one continued course of imitation, that is not to cease but with his life." The fact that art is an imitation of nature does not mean, however, that he who imitates her with the greatest fidelity is the best artist, for nature is not constituted of particularities ("The Seventh Discourse," pp. 193–94). The Platonic sources of this dialectic are apparent in the dependence of art as imitation on an eternal beauty; cf. "The Tenth Discourse," p. 270: "Imitation is the means, and not the end of art; it is employed by the sculptor as the language by which his ideas are presented to the mind of the spectator. Poetry and elocution of every sort make use of signs, but those signs are arbitrary and conventional. The sculptor employs the representation of the thing itself; but still as a means to a higher end—as a gradual ascent always advancing towards faultless form and perfect beauty." Therefore the art of seeing nature or, in other words, the art of using models is the point to which all art studies are directed ("The Twelfth Discourse," p. 344). Yet, consistently with this doctrine, Reynolds could object to the treatment of painting as only an imitative art, attributing the theory to Plato, and could differentiate the respects in which painting imitates nature from the respects in which it, and all the other arts, depart from nature for the purpose of inspiring the imagination ("The Thirteenth Discourse," pp. 353–66).

152. Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, Part I, Div. I, §§ 46–47, pp. 188–90: "Genius is the innate mental disposition (*ingenium*) through which Nature gives the rule to Art. . . . Every one is agreed that genius is entirely opposed to the *spirit of imitation*." Yet, even for Kant, imitation has its purposes and uses in separating genius from teaching, and to make that distinction Kant repeats Aristotle's separation of judgment and knowledge, but assigns judgment, not to moral questions, as Aristotle did, but to the determination of the beautiful; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 191–92: "If now it is a natural gift which must prescribe its rule to art (as beautiful art), of what kind is this rule? It cannot be reduced to a formula and serve as a precept, for then the judgment upon the beautiful would be determinable according to concepts; but the rule must be abstracted from the fact, *i.e.* from the product, on which others may try their own talent by using it as a model, not to be copied but to be imitated."

153. *Poet.* 6. 1450^a15, 32, 1450^b22; 14. 1453^b2, 1454^a14; 15. 1454^a34.

154. *Ibid.* 6. 1450^a5; cf. also 1449^b35; 12. 1452^b31, 1453^a3, 19, 23. A riddle is a *σύνθεσις τῶν ὀνομάτων* (22. 1458^a28).

155. *Ibid.* 7. 1450^b36–1451^a6. For the similar conditions of beauty in nature cf. *De part. anim.* i. 5. 645^a17–26 and 645^b14–20, and *Metaph.* xiii. 3. 1078^a31 ff.

concerned with thought and emotion, while three are the contribution of art, being concerned with words, and of these verbal constituents the last, composition (*σύνθεσις*), when it achieves dignity and elevation, embraces all the rest.¹⁵⁶ Composition becomes the mere arrangement of words,¹⁵⁷ and it may be analogized, when the concern is with grandeur, to the structure (*σύστημα*) of the animal organism.¹⁵⁸ Finally, the problems of literature may be conceived, as Demetrius conceived them, entirely in terms of composition (*σύνθεσις*), which becomes a verbal organization to be contrasted to the intellectual meaning and combination (*δύναμις καὶ σύστασις*) imposed by argumentation.¹⁵⁹ In addition to moving literally in this fashion from subject to subject, the concept of "composition" undergoes the dialectical doubling in which verbal composition is contrasted to a higher or freer or more natural composition of feelings or ideas, as well as a dialectical reduction in which it becomes an improper term for aesthetic discussion. According to Goethe, it is a "thoroughly contemptible word."

How can one say, Mozart has *composed* [*componirt*] Don Juan! Composition! As if it were a piece of cake or biscuit, which had been stirred together out of eggs, flour, and sugar! It is a spiritual creation, in which the details, as well as the whole, are pervaded by *one* spirit, and by the breath of *one* life; so that the producer did not make experiments, and patch together, and follow his own caprice, but was altogether in the power of the daemonic spirit of his genius, and acted according to his orders.¹⁶⁰

The terms for imitation were applied to things before imitation became psychological or verbal, and the terms for composition have persisted in their verbal associations and connotations after they have ceased to be applied to thoughts in their relations to one another and to words and to things in their artificial combinations and organic structures. Between these two sets of terms, controlling them and controlled by them, an even larger set of psychological terms undergoes similar alterations.

Thought (*διάνοια*) may be conceived, as it was by Aristotle, as one of the proper parts of tragedy distinct from character and plot, but relative to the object of imitation, while diction is treated as the means of imitation.¹⁶¹ Or

156. *On the Sublime* viii. 1.

157. *Ibid.* xxxix.

158. *Ibid.* xl.; cf. also xi.

159. *On Style* i. 30–31. For "synthesis" or composition in Demetrius, cf. *ibid.* 4, 8, 9, 11; ii. 38, 40, 43, 45, 48, 49, 58, 68, 74, 92, 117, 121; iii. 179, 180, 186, 189; iv. 204, 221, 237, 239; v. 241, 246, 248, 299, 301, 303.

160. *Conversations with Eckermann and Soret*, trans. J. Oxenford (London, 1913), Sunday, June 20, 1831, p. 556.

161. *Poet.* 6. 1450^a7–15, 1450^b4–8.

thought and emotions may be contrasted as nature to words and expression as art, both thought and words being sources of the sublime, as Longinus held, since the ring of the sublime is due to thought (*διάνοια*) no less than to melody,¹⁶² and the thought (*νόησις*) and diction of a statement may be mutually explanatory, beautiful words being the very light of thought.¹⁶³ Or thought (*διάνοια*) may be set forth in words, which, according to Demetrius, express in periods either whole thoughts or parts of whole thoughts.¹⁶⁴ In the analogical tradition thought may appear, not among the parts but among the criteria of art, as when Plato requires that the poet compose with knowledge of the truth, thereby satisfying both moral and theoretic criticism, since virtue is knowledge;¹⁶⁵ or thought may function neither as part nor criterion, practical or theoretic, and the region of art may be found in the interplay of understanding and imagination, as when Kant distinguishes judgment from both pure and practical reason;¹⁶⁶ or thought may be invoked in its practical guise, controlling or guiding the passions and emotions, as when modern critics, like Newman, Tolstoy, or D. H. Lawrence, argue that art is essentially moral.¹⁶⁷ When psychological functions are distinguished in aesthetic theory, reason is recon-

162. *On the Sublime* xxxix. 4.

163. *Ibid.* xxx. 1.

164. *On Style* i. 2–3; cf. 30–31; ii. 38, 115; iii. 187; iv. 236, 239. It is worthy of note that in actual discussion thought seems to be equated to subject matter (*πράγμα*); cf. *ibid.* ii. 75–76, where poetry and painting are compared; iii. 132–36, 156–62; iv. 190; iv. 239; v. 240, 302, 304.

165. Cf. Sidney, who borrows from the Aristotelian terminology to argue that poetry is the architectonic science (*op. cit.*, pp. 11–12).

166. In Kant's division of philosophy into theoretical and practical, the phenomena of art fall in neither since the feeling of pleasure and pain is intermediate between the faculty of knowledge and the faculty of desire (*Critique of Judgement*, § i, pp. 7–8; § iii, pp. 14–17). Croce, dividing philosophy into theoretic and practical in terms of activities rather than faculties, finds art one of the two divisions of the *theoretic* and aesthetics a science of expression and general linguistics (*Estetica come scienza dell'espressione e linguistica generale* [6th ed.; Bari, 1928], chap. viii, pp. 68–69). Maritain, distinguishing in terms of virtues, finds art one of the two domains of the *practical* order (*Art et scolastique* [Paris, 1927], chap. iii, p. 8).

167. Newman, *op. cit.*, p. 21: "We do not hesitate to say, that poetry is ultimately founded on correct moral perception; that where there is no sound principle in exercise there will be no poetry; and that on the whole (originality being granted) in proportion to the standard of a writer's moral character will his compositions vary in poetical excellence." Tolstoy, *What Is Art?* p. 307: "So that were the question put: Would it be preferable for our Christian world to be deprived of *all* that is now esteemed to be art, and together with the false to lose *all* that is good in it? I think that every reasonable and moral man would again decide the question as Plato decided it for his *Republic*, and as all the early Church-Christian and Mohammedan teachers of mankind decided it, that is, would say, Rather let there be no art at all than continue the depraving art, or simulation of art, which now exists." D. H. Lawrence, *Studies in Classic American Literature* (New York, 1923), p. 254: "The essential function of art is moral. Not aesthetic, not decorative, not pastime and recreation. But moral. The essential function of art is moral."

ciled with or opposed to the passions¹⁶⁸ and imagination.¹⁶⁹ In the relations of reason, imagination, and the passions, again, the literal tradition sets up distinctions which are in turn the subject of fruitful comparison by use of the analogical method. In the literal tradition pleasure may be selected among the passions as the distinctive mark of beauty¹⁷⁰ or the end of poetry;¹⁷¹ or a particular pleasure of pity and fear may be the mark of tragedy.¹⁷² Or, in turn, the passions may be broadened analogically to embrace poetry, which may be defined as the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings,¹⁷³ or the expression of any feelings¹⁷⁴ or of certain moral feelings;¹⁷⁵ or art may be

168. Hazlitt, *op. cit.*, p. 3: "Plato banished the poets from his Commonwealth, lest their descriptions of the natural man should spoil his mathematical man, who was to be without passions and affections, who was neither to laugh nor weep, to feel sorrow nor anger, to be cast down nor elated by any thing. This was a chimera, however, which never existed but in the brain of the inventor; and Homer's poetical world has outlived Plato's philosophical Republic." Cf. Plato *Rep.* x. 605A–607A.

169. Addison, *Spectator*, No. 421: "The Pleasures of the Imagination are not wholly confined to such particular Authors as are conversant in material Objects, but are often to be met with among the Polite Masters of Morality, Criticism, and other Speculations abstracted from Matter, who, tho' they do not directly treat of the visible Parts of Nature, often draw from them their Similitudes, Metaphors, and Allegories. By these Allusions a Truth in the Understanding is as it were reflected by the Imagination; we are able to see something like Colour and Shape in a Notion, and to discover a Scheme of Thoughts traced out upon Matter. And here the Mind receives a great deal of Satisfaction, and has two of its Faculties gratified at the same time, while the Fancy is busie in copying after the Understanding, and transcribing Ideas out of the Intellectual World into the Material." Cf. also Hobbes, *op. cit.*, 1. 8 (*Works*, III, 58): "In a good poem, whether it be *epic*, or *dramatic*; as also in *sonnets*, *epigrams*, and other pieces, both judgment and fancy are required: but the fancy must be more eminent; but ought not to displease by indiscretion." In Hobbes's table of the sciences, poetry figures as one of the sciences which treat of consequences from the qualities of men in special, since its subject is consequences from speech manifested in magnifying, villifying, etc. (*ibid.*, p. 73).

170. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1896), Book II, Part I, sec. 8, p. 299: "Pleasure and pain, therefore, are not only necessary attendants of beauty and deformity, but constitute their very essence."

171. Dryden, "Defence of an *Essay of Dramatic Poesy*" (*Essays of John Dryden*, ed. W. P. Ker [Oxford, 1926], I, 113): "I am satisfied if it [verse] cause delight; for delight is the chief, if not the only, end of poesy: instruction can be admitted but in the second place, for poesy only instructs as it delights."

172. *Poet.* 14. 1453^b8–14.

173. Wordsworth, *op. cit.*, pp. 82, 96.

174. Hazlitt, *op. cit.*, p. 2: "Fear is poetry, hope is poetry, love is poetry, hatred is poetry; contempt, jealousy, remorse, admiration, wonder, pity, despair, or madness, are all poetry." Or the circle may be rounded, and the passions may return to truth, beauty, and power by way of imagination and fancy; cf. Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. 377: "Poetry, strictly and artistically so called,—that is to say, considered not merely as poetic feeling, which is more or less shared by all the world, but as the operation of that feeling, such as we see it in the poet's book,—is the utterance of a passion for truth, beauty, and power, embodying and illustrating its conceptions by imagination and fancy, and modulating its language on the principle of variety in uniformity. Its means are whatever the universe contains; and its ends, pleasure and exultation."

175. Newman, *op. cit.*, p. 23: "According to the above theory, Revealed Religion should be especially poetical—and it is so in fact. . . . It may be added, that the virtues peculiarly Christian are especially poetical—meekness, gentleness, compassion, contentment, modesty,

concerned with emotions only if they are joined to materials,¹⁷⁶ or with pleasure only if joined to utility,¹⁷⁷ or, finally, the beautiful may be separated wholly from interest or pleasure.¹⁷⁸ Imagination, in turn, apart from its relation to or distinction from understanding and the passions may require causal differentiation into genius as a source and taste as a standard of beauty, or dialectical doubling into imagination and fancy.

Such shifts in the meanings of individual terms, of course, select different subject matters for the proper domain of criticism and are selected by principles which determine the interrelations and compendancy of terms. But, in addition to their factual consequences and philosophic implications, terms and their meanings may be examined in their interplay in each of the modes of criticism in which they approximate systematic use in individual writers and particular traditions, and in the influence of modes of criticism on one another in the evolution and development of terms and meanings. If terms like "imitation," "imagination," and "communication" change their meanings as they move from context to context, it should be possible not only to trace the pattern of individual changes in such terms but also to sketch the analytic schemes which determine the various meanings and the stages of change.

The intermixture of analogical and literal elements in the discussion of art suggests a classification according to six modes as a means of ordering the many forms of aesthetic analysis that have been practiced and that still continue to contest the interpretation, criticism, and evaluation of art. The six modes are differentiated by the variables and constants that are appropriate to their sets of terms and by the means which are used to delimit or define them.

"Dialectical" criticism may be viewed as a single mode among these six, comprising a vast, sometimes amorphous, series of forms, which merge or move from one emphasis to another to take up in altering but appropriate terms the continuing opposition of dialectical criticism to each of the five remaining forms of "literal" criticism. It is a single mode, despite its diversity, since the full universality of subject matter and scope which it achieved in the

not to mention the devotional virtues; whereas the ruder and more ordinary feelings are the instruments of rhetoric more justly than of poetry—anger, indignation, emulation, martial spirit, and love of independence."

176. Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 69: "Yes, emotion must operate. But it works to effect continuity of movement, singleness of effect amid variety. It is selective of material and directive of its order and arrangement. But it is not *what* is expressed."

177. Plato *Rep.* x. 607D.

178. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, Part I, Div. I, § 4, pp. 50–51: "In order to find anything good, I must always know what sort of thing the object ought to be, *i.e.* I must have a concept of it. But there is no need of this, to find a thing beautiful. . . . The satisfaction in the beautiful must depend on the reflection upon an object, leading to any conception (however indefinite); and it is thus distinguished from the pleasant which rests entirely upon sensation."

hands of Plato is possible in any of the forms which it has assumed since his time. Since it is a dialectical mode, however, that achievement must await, in each form, a great dialectician or poet, while in the hands of lesser critics the mode deteriorates to timid and common-sense apologies for what seems extravagant or sophistical in the moral judgment of art or to literal repetitions of those judgments in limited—and sometimes trivial, sometimes oppressive—applications. In any of its forms, the terms of dialectical criticism reflect the two moments or aspects of the method: the differentiation of terms in application to subjects and their reduction in the solution of problems. In the form which Plato employed, it is a dialectic of things; and his analysis of art and making in terms of imitation, therefore, requires the differentiation of object of imitation (which itself has a quality or value), the imitation (whose value depends on its correctness and the value of its object), and the execution of the imitation (which adds considerations of skill and medium to the previous two criteria). The reduction of these differentiations is achieved by Plato's distinction between being and becoming, knowledge and opinion, for the criterion of excellence is in each case—within art itself as in science, action, and being—found in the eternal pattern of ideas. When the dialectic shifts in the use of other writers to a dialectic of knowledge, it retains its scope in the dimension left free for the judgment of beauty or the practice of art within a rigid and literal distinction between theoretic and practical. This may be accomplished in either of two ways, depending on whether knowledge is conceived in terms of the human faculties or in terms of the branches of learning. Kant, in the first manner, differentiated the objects and laws of nature from those of freedom—thereby separating natural philosophy from moral philosophy, the metaphysics of nature from the metaphysics of ethics—and in the region between the theoretical and practical uses of reason he found the place of judgment and imagination in the free interplay of the human faculties, unlimited in the sense that they embrace art and nature, beauty, sublimity, and purpose. As a consequence, there is a doubling of both subject matters and problems, for the beautiful is distinguished from the sublime (which is certainly included in the concept of beauty developed in the *Symposium*), and the problems of appreciation are separated from those of production in the distinction of taste from genius (whereas the problems of the poet, the interpreter, and the amateur are inextricably involved in one another as treated in the *Ion*). Art is no longer imitation in this reduction to judgment; but the rules of the arts have become basic and unchanging, and the operation of taste might be made to yield the rules governing the individual objects proper to each of the arts, while the operation of genius might adumbrate the guiding rules of nature. Comte, in the second manner, divides all human activities into theoretic and practical, the latter

being the application of the former by means of intermediary arts.¹⁷⁹ The result is again the doubling of subject matter and problems, for abstract laws are distinguished from concrete actions, and the objective method which leads to that distinction must be supplemented by a subjective method by which the supremacy of morals and sociology is established.¹⁸⁰ The logic of poetry is to be found midway between the logic of thought and the logic of feeling.¹⁸¹ When the judgment of beauty is assigned to the free activity of imagination and taste, located midway between the pure and the practical reason, there is some danger that the rules regulating the beautiful in art will receive only such vague formulation as is customary in the delineation of taste or the designation of genius; when the operation of art is assigned to a logic of imagination, operating midway between a logic of thought and a logic of feelings, there is some danger that it will appear primarily in the guise, not of fine art, but of incidents pertinent to morals and sociology or explicable in psychology. The dialectic may undergo a third shift, however, to a dialectic of processes and relations, in which Plato's three basic differentiations appear in the altered form they assume in the realm of becoming: communication or expression takes the place of imitation (with sincerity in the artist taking the place of correctness in the

179. *Cours de philosophie positive*, ed. E. Littré (3d ed.; Paris, 1869), I, 50: "Tous les travaux humains sont, ou de spéculation, ou d'action. Ainsi, la division la plus générale de nos connaissances réelles consiste à les distinguer en théoriques et pratiques." *Ibid.*, p. 55: "On concevra d'autant mieux la difficulté de construire ces doctrines intermédiaires que je viens d'indiquer, si l'on considère que chaque art dépend non-seulement d'une certaine science correspondante, mais à la fois de plusieurs, tellement que les arts les plus importants empruntent des secours directs à presque toutes les diverses sciences principales. C'est ainsi que la véritable théorie de l'agriculture, pour me borner au cas le plus essentiel, exige une intime combinaison de connaissances physiologiques, chimiques, physiques et même astronomiques et mathématiques: il en est de même des beaux-arts. On aperçoit aisément, d'après cette considération, pourquoi ces théories n'ont pu encore être formées, puisqu'elles supposent le développement préalable de toutes les différentes sciences fondamentales. Il en résulte également un nouveau motif de ne pas comprendre un tel ordre d'idées dans un cours de philosophie positive, puisque, loin de pouvoir contribuer à la formation systématique de cette philosophie, les théories générales propres aux différents arts principaux doivent, au contraire, comme nous le voyons, être vraisemblablement plus tard une des conséquences les plus utiles de sa construction."

180. *Système de politique positive* (Paris, 1851), I, 433–35 and 447–49; IV, 171–84, esp. 171: "Les lois abstraites constituent donc le domaine commun de la science et de l'art, qui les destinent respectivement à discipliner notre intelligence et régler notre activité."

181. *Ibid.*, I, 451–52; "Quelle que doive être l'aptitude naturelle du nouveau régime envers la logique rationnelle, principalement destinée aux philosophes, il est donc encore plus indispensable pour construire et développer la logique morale, essentiellement propre aux femmes et aux prolétaires. Entre ces deux voies extrêmes, la logique des vrais poètes, qui procède surtout par images, vient placer un lien général qui complète la constitution, à la fois spontanée et systématique, de la méthode humaine. Jusqu'ici l'image ne fut guère employée que pour perfectionner la manifestation, soit du sentiment, soit de la pensée. Désormais elle secondera surtout leur élaboration respective, d'après leur réaction mutuelle, dont elle constitue l'agent naturel. Tantôt l'image, rappelée sous le signe, fortifiera la pensée par le réveil du sentiment; tantôt, au contraire, l'effusion suscitera l'image pour éclaircir la notion."

imitation as a criterion), the emotions subsume the relevant problems of execution (for emotion is selective of material or of the ordering of material), and content is determined, not by the nature of the objects imitated, but by the interests of audiences or the interest of artists (for it is justified by its importance to the one or its pertinence to the intention of the other) or its appropriateness to the medium of expression.¹⁸² Three problems emerge, where Plato treats the one problem of imitation and Kant the two problems of the production and the appreciation of beauty, for the reduction now operates on the artist (who is conditioned by experience or by his times and circumstances), and the art object (which cannot be considered in isolation), and the audience (which should reproduce in itself the operations of the artist and the structure of the art object) either by means of such inclusive and universal concepts as "experience" or the "brotherhood of man," which reconcile oppositions, or by means of the universalism of symbols which communicate emotions by expressing them and relate objects by signifying them. The resolution remains that appropriate to a dialectic of process and becoming; and, although some philosophers who take their subject matter from events and relations have, like Whitehead, returned to a Platonic dialectic of eternal objects, no modern semanticist has yet recognized his heritage by enunciating the logos-doctrine that haunts his study.

The terminologies of the five literal modes of criticism bear a double relation to the terminologies of the various forms of the dialectical mode: the terms employed in any form of the dialectical mode are usually also subjected to a literal treatment, intended to define them in the respects to which they were vague and to relate them to clearly distinguished matters, and those literal distinctions are usually analogized, at the next stage of discussion, in a dialectical treatment designed either to broaden them in more sensitive application or more reasonable definition or to show that they correspond to nothing real or essential in art. Since these attempts at literal definition are concerned to establish sharp boundaries, there results from them, not a single variegated mode of criticism, but a series of literal modes more or less sharply and successfully separated from one another and from the dialectical mode.

The mode of criticism which balances Plato's form of dialectical criticism, Aristotle's "scientific" criticism, may therefore be taken as the second mode, instituted in terms closely related to those of Plato's dialectic. In spite of the similarity of terms, however, the "scientific" method of the *Poetics* is distinct from the dialectical criticism of Plato; and much as dialectic, which is the method of science and philosophy for Plato, became a second-best

182. For Tolstoy's use of these distinctions cf. above, pp. 480 and 486; for Dewey's use cf. *Art as Experience*, pp. 69, 18, and *passim*.

method, based on opinions rather than on knowledge of things, for Aristotle, so, too, the treatment of imitation—in terms of object of imitation, the imitation itself, and its execution, which was easily translated in the dialectical tradition to audience, art object, and artist—formed the structure of Aristotle's rhetoric rather than of his poetics. He made use of a scientific method, rather than dialectic or rhetoric, to place his analysis of tragedy, considered as an object, in the context of his philosophic inquiries, for the first five chapters of the *Poetics* treat of phases of the operation of the artist in terms of object, means, and manner of imitation prior to analyzing tragedy in terms of construction and parts, while the last four chapters compare tragedy to a related art form and formulate replies to censures which ignore the ends governing the construction of tragedy. The scientific analysis which is framed between these preliminary and supplementary treatments of tragedy in terms of its efficient causes and its end brings the formulation of the circumstances and purposes of tragedy to bear on the analysis of tragedy as a whole consisting of six parts—plot, character, and thought arising from the object, diction and melody arising from the means, and spectacle from the manner of imitation—by finding a prime importance in plot and by treating plot at once as a combination of incidents, or, more literally, of things, and as the organizing principle of the tragedy. A criterion of unity and structure is thereby rendered available, and on it the possibility of a poetic science depends, for otherwise the analysis of an object of art must reduce the diversity of concepts that might be included under Aristotle's six terms to two broad analytic elements—form and matter—and must go for its criteria directly to the intention of the artist, or the reaction of the audience, or the technical achievement of the structure.

Such a criterion of unity disappears when the terminology of criticism is taken, not from things (the tragedy as an artificial thing and the incidents or "things" that compose its action) but from thoughts and aspirations, conceived either as universal, shared by all mankind but given particular expression by the poet, or as peculiar to the poet, and in need of explanation by his life and circumstances to make them intelligible to other men. Following the former principle, Poe could argue plausibly that "the phrase, 'a long poem,' is simply a flat contradiction in terms," for the poetic principle is the human aspiration for supernal beauty and the elevating excitement it occasions cannot be of long duration;¹⁸³ following the latter principle, T.S. Eliot could be moved to maintain that it is impossible to understand Shakespeare from any one of his plays, since the relation between the plays taken in order must be studied for years before any slight interpretation may be ventured,¹⁸⁴ and that Shakespeare indeed sup-

183. Poe, *op. cit.*, pp. 3 ff.

184. Eliot, "Dante," *Selected Essays, 1917-1932* (New York, 1932), p. 207.

plies in this personal and individual way a unity, not merely to his work, but to his times.¹⁸⁵ The two modes of criticism which employ these two principles approximate the equivalent forms of "dialectical" criticism more closely than other modes of literal criticism do, for the mind assumes a synoptic universality embracing things known and actions contemplated whether they are included analogically within its nature or separated literally from its proper activity.

The third mode of criticism, "poetic" criticism, proceeds from the poet, or more broadly the author, conceived as universal in the sense of being possessed of lofty thoughts and inspired by vehement emotions intelligible or moving to all mankind, to the particular language of the author's expression. The "objects of imitation" have been translated into the ideas and feelings which are the matter or content of the author's statement, and his "composition" is examined in a part-whole analysis into "periods" and "figures." This mode of criticism is properly called "poetic" both in the sense that it proceeds from the conceptions and expressions of great authors and uses them as touchstones for other statements, and in the sense that the critic's own expression must arouse reactions like those caused by the poet if the criticism is to be effective as a guide. It differs (as practiced, for example, by Longinus) from the equivalent form of dialectical criticism (as developed, for example, by Kant) in that it is concerned not with the conditions of the judgment of beauty and sublimity in general, but exclusively with their sources in literature.

The fourth mode of criticism, "scholarly" criticism, reverses this procedure and attempts to reconstruct the peculiar character and significance of an author from the corpus and development of his work. It was in this mode that the *ars critica* developed to such massive importance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,¹⁸⁶ laying the foundations of the higher biblical criticism, furnishing the example of classical, and later modern, philology, and in the process revolutionizing historical method. It is based on the truth, converse to the basic truth of "poetic" criticism that poets are universal—and quite as obvious as it—that poets are particular, that their words, their references, and their intentions must be understood, if their statements and inventions are to be appreciated; that their various works have relations to one another and to the works of other authors, as well as individual marks of unity and particular high points of

185. Eliot, "Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca," *ibid.*, p. 119: "It has been said that Shakespeare lacks unity; it might, I think, be said equally well that it is Shakespeare chiefly that is the unity, that unifies so far as they could be unified all the tendencies of a time that certainly lacked unity."

186. For an excellent review of "critical" literature as it bears on theological and historical problems in the seventeenth century see S. von Dunin Borkowski, *Spinoza, IV: Aus den Tagen Spinozas* (Münster i.W., 1936), 136-308 and 523-50.

excitement; that even when most original they seldom originate, but what is novel in their accomplishment may be understood by knowing what they, in turn, experienced and esteemed; and that the patterns of their lives and works are more easily perceived when the elements of which their works are composed are known independently. It differs (as practiced, say, by F. A. Wolf or Dover Wilson) from the equivalent form of dialectical criticism (as practiced, say, by Fechner) in that it is concerned, not with the formulation of scientific aesthetic principles, derived from the natural or biological sciences, to be applied in criticism to specific objects, natural or artificial, but with the use of the devices of the historical sciences to explain the significances of objects of art. The principles of scholarly criticism are the same as those of poetic criticism—expression and thought or emotion; form and content—but, whereas the poetic critic goes to other great authors to test the universal achievement of a given expression, the scholarly critic goes to other sources of information and other statements to elucidate the particular meaning of a given statement. Whereas the poetic critic proceeds from the elevation of soul caused by a statement to the examination of the manner of expression, the scholarly critic proceeds from the recovery of the author's meaning to the discovery of its effectiveness and value. As one consequence of this difference the poetic critic is concerned only with small bits which constitute the high achievement of the author, whereas the scholarly critic tends to treat the whole body and context of his work. The poetic critic will proceed from the consideration of principles like the “good sense,” “fancy,” and “imagination” analyzed by Coleridge to abstract by practical criticism the marks characteristic of original poetic genius.

In the application of these principles to purposes of practical criticism, as employed in the appraisal of works more or less imperfect, I have endeavored to discover what the qualities in a poem are, which may be deemed promises and specific symptoms of poetic power, as distinguished from general talent determined to poetic composition by accidental motives, by an act of the will, rather than by the inspiration of a genial and productive nature.¹⁸⁷

The scholarly critic will examine all the data bearing on the establishment of the text and its interpretation before venturing an evaluation of the quality of any part of it or the sense or imagination of its author.

Such considerations of genius and the author's circumstances disappear, in turn, when the terminology of criticism is taken, not from thoughts and feel-

187. *Biographia literaria*, chap. xv (*Works*, III, 375). The characteristics of genius are found in language and thought: (1) in the sweetness of the versification and its adaptation to the subject, (2) in the choice of subjects remote from the private interests and circumstances of the writer, (3) in images modified by a predominant passion or by associated thoughts or images awakened by that passion, (4) in depth and energy of thought. It is in virtue of the last characteristic that Coleridge argues that “no man was ever yet a great poet, without being at the same time a profound philosopher” (p. 381).

ings, whether in their universality or particularity, but from consideration of the effects of their expression. Such a causal analysis may be conducted either by studying the relation of the work to the audience to determine the *effects* that are produced or ought to be produced, or by studying the relation of the content to the style to determine the *means* that are effective or ought to be effective.

The fifth mode of criticism, “technical” criticism, which is developed in “arts” of poetry, constructs its precepts about what pleases or instructs audiences in terms relevant to thought and expression in a manner similar to poetic criticism. Yet the terminology which these two modes largely share is put to different applications and assumes different significances. The concern of poetic criticism is with the sublime and elevated moments achieved by literature; the concern of technical criticism, as practiced by Horace, Vida, or Boileau, is with any device which achieves a pleasant or a profitable effect. Therefore, the criterion for thought and expression is not the loftiness of thought, of expression, or of both together, but the decorum which relates them to each other and to the audience; its application is not limited to isolated moments, since it may apply significantly to the structure and unity of a work; and its incidence falls less upon content than upon devices and style.

The sixth mode of criticism, “formal” criticism, reverses the procedure of technical criticism, beginning with the work and the effort to express rather than with the audience and the effect of the expression. Its terminology, like that of technical criticism, bears a close relation to the terms used in poetic criticism, but the analysis is not limited to elevated thought but runs through a variety of contents and yields, not a single analysis, but a classification of styles (as in the case of Demetrius) or of uses of language (as in the case of I. A. Richards and some of his various rival semanticists). The concern of formal criticism is with the analysis of compositions or communications into their constitutive parts to evaluate the effectiveness or appropriateness of devices to purposes: figures of speech relative to subject matters and effects in the older analysis, strategies and devices of evocation relative to objectives and attitudes in the newer; it proceeds by a part-whole analysis from words or phrases to the composition as a whole; and the controlling consideration is the characteristic or thought which determines the devices suited to it. Consequently, the consideration of audiences and circumstances in technical criticism yields canons and censures for composition, whereas the consideration of the devices of language in formal criticism, since it takes language (according to the phrase of Demetrius) as a lump of wax from which anything may be molded, yields differentiations in effects to be achieved.

The principles employed by these various modes of criticism and the subject matters to which they are relevant are in the case of most of them so distinct

from those of the others that statements constructed of the same words often turn out on examination of their meanings to be unrelated when apparently contradictory or equivalent when apparently opposed. It is important to recognize these variations of meanings, however, not because terms are necessarily inexact and criteria vague in criticism, but rather because the varieties of meanings are determined by the purposes and methods of the modes. Even the most impressionistic and subjective critic writes with the conviction that the expression at least of a personal or skeptical opinion is intelligible and to that minimum extent effective as communication; and in varying manners and degrees the critic works on the assumption that the appreciation, judgment, and evaluation of art follow laws which may be stated in terms of the matter or the form of objects of art, or the imagination, feelings, or reason of man, or his experience, his conditions actual or projected, or his manner of expression. It is therefore true (if the statement be interpreted in the dialectical mode of criticism) that the philosopher, the critic, the artist, and the amateur express the same thing, when each is sensitive and successful, the philosopher by choosing, through his principles, pertinent and analyzable characteristics, the critic by treating such characteristics in the objects he judges, the artist by embodying them in his appropriate medium, and the amateur by reacting to them in his experience of the object of art. What the critic directs attention to is the result of the labor of the artist and an ingredient in the experience of the intelligent amateur, even though neither would have made the explicit statement of the critic, and it should find a place and explanation in the system even of philosophies antagonistic to the critical presuppositions on which it depends. There are three dimensions of variability in the discussion of art. The artist at work with the natural materials which constitute his media and with the ideas and emotions which he seeks to express has a latitude of choice in the construction of his work and the effecting of his purposes, for the media may be used in a variety of ways and the responses may be secured by new and old devices: among the influences which might bear on the solution of his problem are the devices of other artists, the statements of critics, and the assumptions of philosophers. The critic contemplating the finished work of art finds in it as great a latitude for his interpretations as the artist found in the artistic materials for his manipulations: the example of other artists, the refutation or application of what other critics or scientists have said, and the substantiation of a philosophy may be among the influences which determine his choice. A changed conception of the imagination, or the rise of the proletariat, or the unbelief of the upper classes may lead to the institution of new critical systems and applications even in a single mode of criticism; and yet the three modern forms of dialectical criticism which have resulted from such changes apply to em-

pirical data which overlap little or not at all: the Humanist critics to cultural, the Marxist to economic, and the Tolstoyan to moral and religious data. The philosopher, finally, takes the phenomena of art, the judgments of criticism, and the formulations of other philosophies among his subject matters, resolving their oppositions and contradictions within the scope of his own principles, and his resolutions become in turn one of the matters which the next philosopher may be concerned to explain. Even though principles do not achieve finality and universal adherence in philosophy, they do serve to state the purposes of the artist and the criteria of the critic. The shifts of artistic styles, critical evaluations, and philosophic principles illustrate the importance of standards and principles, and the alternations of advocacy of a set of principles and attack upon them do not constitute evidence for those who think to avoid the discussion of principles as stultifying in art, futile in criticism, and fantastic in philosophy. For even the technical questions of art and criticism—questions of materials and production, taste and judgment, intention and interests—have philosophic bases which serve to clarify the solutions to those problems and their relations to other proposed solutions.

The purposes and relative effectiveness of the various forms of dialectical criticism may be stated and judged in the terms used in the development of those forms of criticism, for the dialectical process employed in the discussion of art also determines the transition from one form of the dialectic to another and the issues which emerge in the oppositions of forms. The terms of that continued dialectic—largely the same and different primarily by the addition of technical terms to attach new significances to the continuing terms—are determined in their use and the differentiation of their significances by the things to which they are applied in the reductive scheme of each form of the dialectic. When the reduction is to things, as in the criticism of Plato, the characteristics of art are found in objects: the object of imitation, the object of art itself, and its objective characteristics or style. When the reduction is to faculties of the mind or to thoughts, as in Kant's analytic and dialectic, the characteristics of art are found in the taste by which it is judged and the genius by which it is produced: the objects of art and their relations to nature may be envisaged from rules derived from taste and genius. When the reduction is to processes and events, as it is in Tolstoy's or Dewey's operational inquiries, the characteristics of art are found in the act of expression: the emotions of the artist, the sophistication of the audience's reaction, and even the object of art may be differentiated as moments in the "union of moral community" or the identity of process and product. There is no reason why the complete dialectical development should not be possible in any of these reductive schemes. The peculiar virtue of dialectical criticism, however, is not

in the isolation of art from other phenomena or of the aesthetic aspects in art as peculiar phenomena, but rather in the return of both to a broader context in which each object is considered in terms of the good, the true, and the beautiful, or as subject to the operation of pure reason, practical reason, or judgment, or as incident to the living processes of experience.

There are, however, three dangers which the analysis of art encounters in the dialectical mode of criticism which arise from the successive domination of one of the dialectical triad: the good, the beautiful, and the true. The moral implications of Plato's criticism have attracted more attention in the later discussions of art than the role which beauty plays in his conception of the nature of things or in the motivations of human actions; and, although under his influence art takes on a metaphysical significance in the philosophy of Plotinus, the meanings of Platonism have been exploited chiefly by moral critics from the Christian Church Fathers to Tolstoy. Kant, on the other hand, supplied analytical and dialectical devices to isolate beauty and the sublime from the subject matters of science and morality, but he did not himself state the rules which determine the objects of art as fully as he explored those involved in the activities of the pure and practical reason; and his heritage has been exploited less by critics who treat the phenomena of art than by idealists who, like Schelling, make aesthetics the center of philosophy and who do not consider art as a particular phenomenon but, on the contrary, construe the universe itself in the form of art and philosophy as the science of the universe in the potency of art. Dewey, in turn, has found in concepts like "inquiry," "instruments," and "experience," the dialectical device by which to reduce and confute all the distinctions made by idealists and by other philosophers: beauty and utility, art and science, practice and theory, morals and science, mechanical arts and fine arts, experience and nature, inquiry and knowledge—these and all like separations introduce distinctions which are unreal and problems which are false according to the principles of his philosophy; but the therapeutic effect of Dewey's dialectic depends rather on the abundance of mistaken distinctions which he can reduce to experience, thereby giving the concept a kind of refutative richness, than on specific or positive characteristics isolated in art or on methods evolved for the elucidation of art. As in the analyses of Plato and Augustine, the treatment of art recommended by Dewey is in the context of a synoptic analysis, and the direction of his thought is most nearly analogous to the hope repeatedly expressed by writers on aesthetics that at last, if their respective suggestions are followed, the inquiry will become scientific and the object of art or the appreciation of art will become an instance of physiological, psychological, sociological, ethnological, economic, or psychopathic phenomena, to be

explained, used, and, when the circumstances warrant and the techniques are adequate, even cured as such.

The five modes of literal criticism, on the other hand, treat art as art, in some sense, by techniques and according to criteria distinct from those of other disciplines and sciences. The sharpness of this difference, however, does not preclude the possibility that dialectical criticism, sensitively and intelligently employed, may lead to the same conclusions in application to a particular set of problems as those justified by the use of a mode of literal criticism, for the intermingled universal principles of dialectic may, of course, be brought to bear on particular instances, and the specific principles of a literally aesthetic analysis may be supplemented by the application to the same object or event of principles proper to politics, ethics, psychology, or physics. The hope of universality in philosophy, indeed, depends on the possibility of such equivalences among the results of intellectual labor painstakingly and accurately carried forward in different perspectives, and the dangers of error indicated by disagreements arise from the misapplications, the miscarriages, and the mistaken interpretations of any given method rather than from the oppositions of methods. The dangers in the dialectical method are to be found in the loss of balance consequent on a dogmatic freezing of the dialectic in defense of an unexamined faith, for as a result the consideration of art or of any other subject may be submerged in other concerns or become itself the ruling principle of other considerations. The dangers in literal criticism arise from pedantic concentration on a trait proper to a form of literal criticism and the treatment of it subtly and in detail in isolation from the causes from which it originated, the effects which it might explain, and the phenomena with which it is related. The five modes of literal criticism which have been enumerated are related to one another in their common concern with the object or phenomenon of art as such. They differ from one another in the qualities selected as essential to art and the methods proper to the analysis of art. They may therefore be in opposition to one another; they may supplement one another; and any one of them may be the subject of such exclusive devotion—as program of research or manifesto of art—as to make it the peculiar interest of a school rather than a technique for inquiry or elucidation. Any one of them, finally, may suggest the terminology and the distinctions for a recrudescence of dialectical criticism devoted to the attempt either to give generality and therefore vitality to the distinctions used in a restricted fashion in literal criticism or to reduce and therefore rectify its separations.

The respective purposes and subject matters of the five modes of literal criticism may be isolated by consideration of the use they make of the causal

analysis—the causes which contribute to the construction of the work and the effects which may be traced back to the work—and of the analysis of form and content or whole and part. In “scientific” criticism, as practiced by Aristotle, the causes and effects—the peculiarities of poets, their media, and their subjects, the proper pleasures of art forms, their peculiar structures, and probable criticisms—are translated into terms which may be identified in the work of art itself, and therefore the probability and necessity by which incidents are knit together in the unity of the plot may be distinguished from the natural probability which is imitated in the manner appropriate to the medium; character and thought in tragedy may be subordinated to the needs and end of plot; and diction may be treated as the matter whose potentialities are exploited in the construction of forms. In “poetic” criticism, as practiced by Longinus, natural causes are not translated into artistic causes, but nature and art alike contribute to the production of the sublime, for the causal analysis is analogical, the prime element in all natural production, and therefore in literary effectiveness is the exemplar, and the function of scientific method is to control the effects of natural genius, not to explain the product of art.¹⁸⁸ The sublime, therefore, is contrasted as an overwhelming excellence and distinction of language to the arrangement and economy of things,¹⁸⁹ and the ideas and content become the “matter” organized in the organic whole of the composition of a great genius.¹⁹⁰ Thought, metamorphosed from the function it has for Aristotle as expressive of character and subservient to plot, has become the thought of the author and matter for his composition, and the effect of the sublime is not dependent primarily on the form and arrangements of facts or things. In “technical” criticism, as practiced by Horace, the diversification of effects considered is derived from the character of audiences, and therefore his analysis, like that of Longinus, depends on the nature of the poet and proceeds by considering content and expression, but the exemplar is found in the life and custom to be portrayed rather than in the performance of genius, and words no longer achieve effects independent of the persuasiveness of matter but follow the matter that is given. Horace’s analysis, like that of Aristotle, embraces larger units than the analysis of Longinus and supplies even a criterion of unity; but, where Aristotle thought the complex plot preferable, Horace’s methods incline him to simplicity. All three modes of criticism treat of causes to account for literary forms: the scientific mode treats the formal cause of objects of art by

188. *On the Sublime* ii. 1–3.

189. *Ibid.* i. 3–4. Where the plot had been a combination of “things” for Aristotle, the composition becomes for Longinus the means of adumbrating slowly the arrangement and economy of things (*τάξις και οικονομία τῶν πραγμάτων*). Cf. the treatment of arrangements of thought and words in the consideration of the figure Inversion (*ibid.* xxii. 1–2).

190. *Ibid.* x. 1; xiii. 4.

analyzing their structure; the poetic mode finds form in that union of thought and expression which is consequent on the causality of the poet; the technical mode finds form in the verbal structure which secures effects in audiences. The virtues of the scientific mode are to be found in the analytic technique it supplies; the virtues of the poetic mode are in its manuductive guidance for judgment among monuments of art; the virtues of the technical mode are in the devices for censure and evaluation which may be derived from technical or strategic rules of the artist’s craft.

The perversions of the three modes are likewise characteristic: the scientific mode may be reduced to a routine and dialectical application of “classical” rules for the unity of action, time, and place, the genealogical nobility of characters, and the rigid elevation of thought; the poetic mode may be translated from a method of judgment to a random dialectical biography of the adventures of a soul and the dialectical justification by selective example of any preference; the technical mode may degenerate from the canonic reaction of a selected audience as a standard—the Roman audience of Horace, the prince’s court during the Renaissance, the urban population of Reynolds, the plain men of Tolstoy, the proletariat of the Marxists, or even a vaguely envisaged posterity which will rectify the errors of contemporary evaluation—to a dialectical relativity in which standards may be treated either in a history of the themes, forms, and media that were successively esteemed or in a canon of methods to achieve any results thought to be effective on the audiences of the moment.

The excesses or perversions of these three literal modes are avoided or rectified by other devices of literal criticism and by other subject matters to which those devices are applied. The “scientific” analysis usually occurs in the context of other methods appropriate to other aspects of art phenomena, and therefore the consideration of the form, structure, and material of works of art may be balanced by the consideration, in other sciences, of its psychological origins, social effects, and historical developments, which return the art object to its context in nature and society. “Scholarly” criticism, in like fashion, returns the genius and his expression from a universal and sublime isolation to the conditions of his life, times, and interests, which determined the idiom and manner of his expression as well as the temporal and local peculiarities of his objects. “Formal” criticism marshals the verbal or other technical devices by which a medium may be made to achieve any of the effects of which it is capable and from which the artist may choose, or the amateur recognize, devices and means. All three modes of criticism treat of content and form to account for the peculiarities of literary and artistic objects: in literature the scientific mode treats words as matter and other scientific methods are designed to seek the other manners in which the forms—the actions and incidents, the necessities

and probabilities—appropriately expressed in literature may exist; the scholarly mode seeks in the circumstances of the artist the matter to which he gave form; the formal mode analyzes the verbal forms in which the vast variety of matters may be presented effectively. The virtues of the scientific mode are in the distinctions it makes possible between natural and artistic forms by means of their respective matters, and in the analysis that is therefore possible of particular artistic forms; the virtues of the scholarly mode are in the concrete significance it may give to the forms of an artist by considering the matters assembled in his experience and life and in the poetic appreciation and critical understanding that are thereby rendered possible of particular works; the virtues of the formal mode are in the differentiation of means of presenting the varieties of matter appropriate to communication, and in the practical evaluation and comparison of particular devices that is therefore possible. The scientific mode is perverted when artistic form or cause is confused dialectically with natural thing or cause, and art is treated as the exclusive or peculiar subject of some other science than the poetic; the scholarly mode is perverted when the investigation of the circumstances of the artist is pushed into details irrelevant to the traits of the art objects he produced, and still further perverted when those irrelevant traits are dialectically converted into the only explanation of his art; the formal mode is perverted when the machinery and terminology of distinction are carried to such refinements in the dialectical ordering and discrimination of tropes and figures that differences of effects and of matter are obscured or lost.

Needless to say, a given critic may successively employ more than one of these modes of criticism and may even combine two or more of them, crudely or effectively, in a single theory or application of criticism. Purity in adherence to a single mode is not necessarily a virtue in criticism since the differentiation of modes is in terms of the purposes envisaged in the criticism, and the identification of the mode employed by a critic is only a step toward the evaluation of his achievement in so far as such identification may indicate the appropriate criterion and thereby contribute to both the understanding and the judgment of his statements.

The pertinence of an examination of philosophic and critical principles in relation to art and criticism may, therefore, be illustrated by applying the distinctions treated in this essay to the essay itself. It is an essay in the dialectical mode of criticism, using as its reductive device concepts derived from semantics. It does not, however, use those semantic concepts in the form of dialectic in which the controlling principles are processes or symbols (as I. A. Richards, for example, reduces all meanings to symbolic or emotive uses of language) but rather takes advantage of the possibility of achieving full dialectical scope

in any form of the dialectical mode of criticism to return to a dialectic of things on the model of Plato's usage. The manner of adherence to that mode may be seen in the subjects of the three parts into which the essay is divided: they are concerned in turn with the objects of criticism, criticism itself, and the terms of criticism, which are an adaptation of what Plato said about the criticism of art to the criticism of criticism, whereas the semantic mode of dialectic would translate these three (as was pointed out above when the three forms of dialectical criticism were considered) into some such considerations as the intention of the critic, the form of his criticism, and its pertinence to or effects on the audience. The effect envisaged in the three-fold division of subjects employed in the essay is to prevent the reduction of the treatment of criticism to some partially literal dialectic frozen to some one conception of the nature of art, or of the domain of criticism, or of the principles of philosophy. The essay is not, however, concerned directly with the criticism of art but with the criticism of criticism. It might be made the propaedeutic to an essay in the criticism of art which would then, under the guidance of the criteria and subject matters distinguished in the six modes of criticism, pursue one mode in an appropriate manner and to a relevant conclusion with some grounds for the expectation that its meaning and purpose might be more clearly perceived. But, although it adumbrates no solution of the problems of art or beauty, it may pretend to adequacy in treating what has been said about art and beauty, for being a dialectic of what medieval philosophers used to call second, as distinct from first, intentions, it accounts for the literal modes, as well as for the dialectical mode in which it is couched, without distortion or prejudice, since in the positive operation of the dialectic the virtues of each mode may be isolated and the refutative elenchus may disclose indifferently the failures and perversions of each mode.